



Liberalization and public policy-making in Tanzania: a cross-sector experience

Edwin Babeiya

Department of Political Science and Public administration, Dar es Salaam University College of Education, University of Dar es Salaam, P.O Box 2329, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received: 30 October 2011;

Received in revised form:

15 November 2011;

Accepted: 26 November 2011;

Keywords

Public policy,
Donors,
Policy makers,
Power.

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses public policy making in Tanzania. Using documentary analysis, it attempts to find out whether the problems that were observed by Goran Hyden in 1984 have so far been solved by policy makers. A point of reference is made to the fact that Hyden's observation was made during the time in which Tanzania was under state controlled economy. With the country's adoption of liberalization policies which Ndumbaro (1994) describes as the era of power shift in policy making from the state to donors, it is imperative to see whether this has affected policy making in the country. The paper concludes that although donors' influence in policy making has continued to increase, there is no significant improvement in addressing policy-making problems that were noted by Hyden. Most of the policies continue to be made without adequate information, in which also the past does not seem to be of great use in shaping new policies. As a result, policy makers continue to be driven by a desire to do everything at the same time, which in turn increases the burden to policy implementers.

© 2011 Elixir All rights reserved.

Introduction

When Tanzania got her independence in 1961 from the British colonial rule it faced a lot of socio-economic, political and administrative challenges. It was therefore upon the new government to make sure that these problems were effectively dealt with. The government thus embarked on formulating various policies and programmes to overcome these challenges. Eventually, strong socio-economic, political and administrative decisions were made. For instance, the new government introduced various policies such as africanization, nationalization, villagization and agricultural and rural development-related policies just to mention some¹. Following the formulation of these policies, the next intricate phase was that of implementing them.

Implementing these policies resulted into both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, with Ujamaa villages it was easy for the government to provide social services such as water and health services to the people as it brought together scattered households. Also the number of villages had grown from 180 in 1968 to 5556 by the end of 1973 with a population of 2, 028,164 (Komba, 1995). Notwithstanding some positive outcomes accrued from the implementation of these policies, a lot of problems also emerged. For instance, during the implementation of villagization policy there were forceful evictions of people, some of whom were already well established in the areas they were told to vacate. In a number of cases, probably affecting 800,000 people, regional commissioners anxious to prove their diligence and coming under pressure from the government used forceful methods to compel those reluctant to move to do so (Legum, 1995). As a result, the entire villagization programme was widely criticised especially for its forceful measures (Legum, 1995). The

opposition against villagization was thus witnessed especially in areas where the peasants had begun to grow rich from a lucrative cash crop and that were practising large-scale productive systems (Irene & Brown, 1995).

A general conclusion that could be drawn from the implementation of ujamaa policies is that the expected achievements were to a great extent not realized. This was mainly due to the weaknesses that affected public policy processes as it will be highlighted in the conceptual and analytical framework of this paper. It was from this failure that the country was forced to embark on structural adjustment programmes in 1980s to save the country from the horrible and deteriorating socio-economic situation.

However, since 1980s there has been a shift of policy making powers from the state to external agencies and, as a result, policy processes are said to be controlled and dictated by donors ((Ndumbaro, 1994). Following this shift of power, Ndumbaro (1994) maintains that although donors give Tanzania a chance to develop, they always let it happen within their set framework. The idea of power shift in policy making is also echoed by Mmuya and Hyden (2008) who argue that donors have increasingly been influencing and watching the way the government is operating (Mmuya & Hyden, 2008). One of the indicators of power shift in policy making is the technicization of public policy making which has in turn given donor agencies especially the IMF and the World Bank complete control over policy processes in Tanzania. The effect of increased influence of donors in policy making is that donors' initiated policies are widely accepted by domestic policy makers who tend to embrace development partners' suggestions and recommendations without a critical analysis of the specificity of the social-economic and political environment (Ndumbaro 1994). While the power of the state in policy making is said to be decreasing, it is however yet to be determined whether this shift of policy making powers has also affected the way public

¹ All these initiatives were implemented under absolute state control, within a socialist framework

policies are made. This paper thus seeks to examine policy making in Tanzania in a liberalized era.

Conceptual and analytical framework

Public policy making is an exercise that is complicated and that differs from one setting to another. It is however generally acceptable that the developed and developing worlds have different policy making stories emanating from socio-economic and political contexts shaping these countries. Public policy scholars such as Dror (1989) and Hyden (1984) argue that public policy making in the developing world differs much with that of their developed counterparts. For instance, Dror (1989) outlines various features that distinguish public policy processes in modern states and developing states (*the hypothetical avant-garde developing state*). As regards the former he outlines its features some of which include; that in western democratic countries policies are usually realistic in that they are economically and politically feasible. Also related to the above feature is that in democratic countries, the private individuals have more opportunity to shape public policy since as voters they can critically influence the careers of politicians. On the other hand, he identifies various features characterizing policy processes in the developing world namely; that the search for alternative in developing countries is somewhat more intense than in modern countries because there are no policy precedents. A related feature is that the cultural ecology within which the public policymaking system operates and which conditions its basic characteristics, is not conducive for rationality. It is also argued that in developing countries there are no units in charge of periodically and systematically evaluating and redesigning the policy making structure, though, developing countries tend rather strongly to undertake extensive formal reorganizations, based on a superficial feedback and unsustainable recommendations by foreign experts, or often changes in the political power elite.

Dror (1979) further contends that most developing countries have special planning units that have relatively better rational components than the other policymaking units but that even if they do, their policymaking quality is still often poor, partly because the dominant ideologies do not permit feasible intermediate-range high rational planning and partly because the needed inputs are scarce. In the developing countries, knowledge and information are said to be a scarce resource due to lack of professionally qualified manpower and because the knowledge, both factual data about the respective countries and scientific theories that could help accelerate development, often does not exist.

Dror's formulation clearly indicates that policy processes in developing countries face formidable challenges that can in the end threaten the achievement of policy goals. Although some sceptics can still challenge Dror's overgeneralization of public policy processes in the developing countries, it is clear that this formulation provides a useful framework for analysing public policy processes in developing countries. In explaining public policy making in the developing countries, using Tanzania as a case study, Goran Hyden (1984) labelled the country's policy making as "*we must run while others walk*". More specifically, he identified four policy making features in the country namely; the strong urge to do everything and do it at once. This was manifested in the way various programmes and policies were presented as frontal attacks and as "matters of life and death" in which a clear example of this desire was the ujamaa program and villagization policy that aimed at raising agricultural

production. Hyden also observed that policy makers often decided on matters without first having obtained full and detailed knowledge of the possible consequences of their decisions. They were said to run and take consequences as they unfolded. Consequently, there was no full understanding of what could or could not be achieved with the existing resources.

The third feature characterising public policy making was the unwillingness of policy makers to use the past as a source of guidance for the future. He shows that policy makers had a tendency of moving to the unknown while being influenced by the assumption that the right policies are not necessarily those chosen from the realm of what is considered feasible in economic terms

Lastly, Hyden observed that public bureaucrats were compelled to work in a context where public expectation constantly exceeded what could actually be obtained by the incumbent officers. These officials were therefore made to work under much pressure to meet the demands of the public and the politicians. It is quite a long time since Hyden (1984) made this observation and as already pointed out this paper aims at establishing whether or not there have been any improvements in public policy processes in Tanzania. This paper uses Hyden's four identified features of policy making in Tanzania as the analytical framework. These include; using the past as a source of guidance, a desire to do everything at once and at the same time, employees' capacity versus public expectations and the role of information in public policy making.

Using the past as a source of guidance

Recalling the lessons learnt from previous policies is a very essential and more useful insight for future policy making. This is basically because the previous experience helps to set policy precedents that can help to improve subsequent policies. For instance, if the adoption and implementation of a certain policy failed to meet the expected results, possible bottlenecks that led to poor results can be identified so that they do not recur. On the other hand, past positive policy achievements can be a good starting point through which other policies can be built. As it is not always the case that policies meet maximum targets, previous policy achievements act as a source of morale and confidence to policy makers.

The experience of policy making in Tanzania shows that since independence most of the policies that are made have been failing to achieve the desired outcomes. Real examples of this weakness can be drawn from almost all sectors. For instance, in discussing the problems within the agricultural sector in Tanzania, Jim Crees (2000) argues that agricultural policies in the 1970s and 1980s focused on production rather than producers and that despite giving some incentives to producers, farmers were suppressed through the monopolization of markets and pouring of the national budget into parastatal ventures that were sheltered from commercial discipline. One of the reasons behind this policy-making failure is the tendency of policy makers to ignore the importance of using the past experience as a guide towards making new policies. This observation is affirmed by the evidence from the agricultural sector. Since independence, the sector continues to cripple, despite the fact that it is the backbone of the country's economy. While the first phase government seriously attempted to improve agriculture through the adoption of various policies and slogans such as *kilimo cha kufa na kupona*, literary meaning agriculture as a matter of life and death and *siasa ni kilimo*, meaning politics is agriculture, a green revolution was not achieved. Various factors

accounted for this weakness. The first factor was that most of the policies made were influenced by an assumption that the government under the single party rule always makes right and perfect decisions. As a result, other factors such as stakeholders' participation were not seriously considered. Participation at this stage only meant that individuals were to support party's-backed policies without any power to question their rationality. For instance, the adoption of Ujamaa policy which was officially declared in the 1967 Arusha Declaration aiming at confronting three public enemies namely; ignorance, diseases and poverty raised public optimism that the new independent government was heading to the right direction. However its flaw was that the country adopted a centralist approach without peoples' participation with an assumption that it was only the politicians who were foresighted (Shoki & Kasongi, 2003). Consequently many policies were introduced to the majority Tanzanians under a situation where the public was unaware or incompetent enough to effectively have a great role in policy processes. It is thus a reality that these initiatives failed and made the government unable to meet its set targets.

The implementation of agricultural policies in Tanzania was also affected by the lack of an elaborate and comprehensive outreach programme to educate the peasants about proper and up to date agricultural methods. As a result, the peasants continued with traditional agricultural methods which were to a great extent less productive as working tools such as tractors continued to be inadequate. This was despite some government efforts to revolutionize the sector. One of the notable attempts by the first phase government to bring about green revolution was the construction of two factories for manufacturing agricultural equipments namely Ubungo Farm Implements (UFI) and Zana Za Kilimo (ZZK) Mbeya. For instance ZZK produced 1764 ploughs in 1983 while UFI produced about 5000 ploughs in 1975 and about 76,000 in 1984 (Sosovele, 2000:162). However, these initiatives were inadequate as most of the peasants continued to rely on a hand hoe meaning that the agricultural activities they were engaged in were mainly subsistent. Furthermore, poor marketing of agricultural products continued to be one of the setbacks to the sector meaning that the farmers could not get their expected returns from selling their hard laboured agricultural commodities. Worse still, the bodies that were to play a crucial role in marketing agricultural products were to a great extent ineffective. For instance, most of cooperative unions were blamed of malfeasance such as corruption and embezzlement of the unions' funds as they did not care about the welfare of the peasants. As the government noticed corrupt practices in cooperatives, it tried to clear up this mess by dissolving the East Lake federation and a number of existing unions, dismissing many committee men on the cooperatives and placing government personnel in managerial positions (Irene & Brown, 1995).

From a comparative perspective, very little or nothing significant has changed so far as since the country adopted liberalization policies the same problem still exists. The past experience does not seem to be of great use to public policy makers in the agricultural sector. This observation is supported by the reality that policy making still suffers from the problem of repeating similar mistakes that hampered the implementation of previous policies.

It is obvious that most of the problems such as centralized decision making, poor market for agricultural produces and the use of outdated tools are ubiquitous in the agricultural sector.

The sector is almost as it was in the previous for it is unable to get the majority of Tanzanians especially in rural areas out of abject poverty. In that regard, those who solely rely on agriculture for their livelihood are poorer than those outside this sector (Lazaro & Mdoe, 2003). Many people in rural Tanzania still lack basic and modern agricultural skills that they could have used to transform their lives. As a result, the introduction of new policies and strategies do not really seem likely to revolutionize agriculture. For instance, the Tanzanian government is currently treating the newly introduced and overemphasized strategy "Kilimo Kwanza", which literally means agriculture first, as a panacea to the problems that have been facing agricultural sector. Notwithstanding any good intention that Kilimo Kwanza has, this new strategy seems to be a strange phenomenon to most Tanzanians. One of the related realities about this strategy is that some of the people have been associating the slogan with the country's new Prime Minister, Mizengo Pinda and not the fourth phase government as a whole². A source of confusion to many is that the slogan gained popularity especially among the ruling elites when this prime minister came to office as before that the government was reiterating about bringing agricultural revolution but with no a clear working plan in place.

Apart from the above contradiction, it is still unclear whether there are systematic and well prepared coordination mechanisms of this new government initiative. As the 2008 Mmuya and Hyden's study findings indicate, the view of the general Tanzanian public is that most of public policies are implemented in arrogant fashion by alienating citizens and that in most cases the government listens only to donors while ignoring the role of internal stakeholders. It is obvious that the preparations for implementing the strategy are poor and there is no any indications suggesting the possibility of a difference in terms of focus and design that can provide a prospect for positive outcomes. In explaining the current weaknesses of the agricultural sector in Tanzania, the Tanzania's 2010 human rights report points out that poor performance of the Kilimo Kwanza scheme is a result of inadequate investment in irrigation and rural infrastructure, agricultural technology, equipment and basic inputs, inadequate extension services, lack of appropriate financing mechanisms for agriculture and the absence of a reliable market (LHRC 2010:209). It can obviously be noted that this strategy was introduced prior to making sure that key and essential aspects are clearly exhausted. Some of these aspects include; the failure to inform the public during the initial preparations of the strategy and instead people are urged to participate in implementing the strategy. The 2010 Tanzania Human Rights Report aptly states that small scale producers were not consulted during the preparation of the Kilimo Kwanza Scheme (LHRC 2010:208).

Basing on previous experience, it is the fact that most of the peasants are demoralized as they cannot comfortably rely on agriculture to sustain their living. Agricultural sector has been ignored by the previous governments and therefore any revival strategy of the sector has to clearly instil to the public a sense of confidence and prospects. For decades now, agricultural sector

² Mizengo Pinda was appointed as the prime minister of the United Republic of Tanzania in 2008 after the resignation of the first prime minister in the fourth phase government Mr. Edward Lowassa who was implicated by the parliamentary select committee in the Richmond saga over power generation.

reforms have been a song sang with no any signs of positive improvement. As a result, the rate of rural-urban migration has continued to increase as peasants are abandoning their unproductive agricultural activities to look for greener pastures in urban areas (Mwananchi December 17th, 2009). One of the effects of this migration is an increasing rate of urbanization which has resulted in the growth of urban areas such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya. Tanzania's population policy shows that the proportion of population living in urban areas increased from 5 percent in 1967 to 13 in 1978 and from 21st percent in 1988 to 27 percent in 2002.

Apart from lack of peasants' education, a more compelling challenge is the marketing of agricultural products that will be produced as a result of implementation of Kilimo Kwanza strategy. For many years now, peasants continue to suffer from lower prices for their agricultural produces and the absence of adequate processing industries to process their agricultural commodities. As a result, most of these products are cheaply sold in their raw forms while other agricultural produces continue to rotten in farms due to lack of modern storage mechanisms. It is therefore hard to convince peasants that once they will produce in abundance they will not suffer from similar problems that have been facing them for decades. Although there has been an initiative to increase the number of local markets, the problem of poor prices for agricultural produces remains unresolved. Furthermore, there are still no strategies in place to ensure that peasants are fairly paid and consequently agricultural products are reportedly smuggled to neighbouring countries as peasants look for good better prices. This is despite the fact that apart from Kilimo Kwanza there are other sister agricultural programmes that are yet to improve the agricultural sector and hence emancipate many Tanzanians from abject poverty. One of these programs is the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP). ASDP was launched in 2006 to provide a sector wide investment vehicle to deliver the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and to contribute to the targets of reducing rural poverty from 27% to 14% by 2010, and raising agricultural growth to 10% per year by 2010 (URT,2011). Some of the achievements that are said to be a result of ASDP include the increase of production and exports. For instance, rice production rose from 600,000 to 900,000 tons from 2005 – 2009. Also maize production increased from 2.6 to 3 million tonnes over the same period, while exports rose from \$ 0.6 to 0.8 billion (URT 2011). Despite these eye-catching government figures, the reality on ground continues to suggest that agriculture is still very backward.

A desire to do everything at once and at the same time

Policy making is about choices. Those who make policies will always have a lot of issues to attend to and it is therefore upon them to prioritize. Examining policy making in Tanzania, Goran Hyden observed that the exercise was haunted by the "over ambitiousness" of the government in policy making. Policy makers wanted to accomplish everything at the same time eventually ending up with poor results. It was however argued that the prevailing circumstance by that time forced the government to adopt such model of decision making as the country was facing numerous challenges all calling for immediate government attention. It is now almost 50 years since the country got her political independence and therefore one expects to see improvements in prioritizing and identifying issues to be addressed by public policies. This is however still not the case in Tanzania as the same problem continues to affect

public policy making in the country. There have been various policies made by the government which show that the government still suffers from the problem of over-ambitiousness in policy-making as reflected in the country's investment policies. For instance the implementation of the privatization policy from 1990s was carried out under urgency such that thorough research, preparations and due diligence to support the subsequent privatization decisions were not done.

As Masebu (2005) indicates, by June 2004 more than 300 public corporations were already privatized. It is obvious however that while the privatization exercise was executed in such a high speed, the bodies such as Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) that were responsible for monitoring the exercise were not well prepared. The areas that suggest lack of preparation include the valuation of the privatized assets and devising a mechanism to ensure that privatized entities could better their performance. One of the indicators of poor valuation capacity was the privatization of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) at a giveaway price. Instead of selling the National Bank of Commerce 1997 Limited at 21 billion Tanzania shillings as it was agreed earlier, it was only sold at 15 billion Tanzanian shillings only (AFRODAD, 2007:14). Given the assets that NBC possessed such a network of buildings nationwide it was indeed unfair to be sold at that price.

On the other hand, lack of appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the privatized firms improved their performance is also supported by numerous cases. These include the privatization of Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Authority (DAWASA), Air Tanzania, Tanzania Railways Corporation and various manufacturing industries. In spite of privatizing DAWASA to City Water Services, water supply in Dar es Salaam continued to deteriorate to the extent that the government had to terminate the contract in 2005. The government blamed the new investor of investing below the agreed amount. Similarly, the privatization of Air Tanzania to South African airways did not prove any positive outcomes as the corporation's performance severely dwindled, the problem that is yet to be resolved. A related case was the management contract of TANESCO to Netgroup Solutions from South Africa. Contrary to what the public had expected from the new management, electricity services remained poor and the government decided not to renew the contract.

A similar concern over government's lack of patience in policy making is also raised over the mining sector. While the government seems very determined to attract more foreign investors particularly in the mining sector, there does not seem to be adequate preparations to make sure that mineral extraction benefits the country. This is basically because it is the investors who continue to get a lion's share of the mineral proceeds. For instance, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) revealed that more than 90 percent of Tanzanian minerals are exported out of the country illegally (Chachage 2003). According to Chachage, making a reference to the information received from TIC, Germany recorded imports of minerals from Tanzania worth 300\$ million in 2000 while the official records indicated that Tanzania exported minerals worth 10\$ million. With regard to tanzanite, it was revealed that while the U.S.A market imported tanzanite worth 328\$ million, the records of the ministry of minerals and energy showed that Tanzania exported such minerals worth only \$31 million (Chachage, 2003).

The imbalance in mineral gains between the government and foreign investors is also reiterated by Lissu and Curtis (2008). These scholars show that government revenues from gold mining are very low as compared to what the mining corporations get from the export of minerals. Using the data from the ministry of energy and minerals Lissu and Mark (2008) show that while the value of Gold exports was US\$ 2.6bn, total government revenues including all taxes and royalties was only 78 US\$m. Unequal gains in mineral exports is also shown by the UNCTAD (as cited by Lissu & Curtis, 2008) data which indicates that the government earned only 86.9 US\$ out of 890 US\$m that was obtained from gold exports from 1997 to 2002 (Lissu & Mark 2008). Their concern is that while the government earned very little from mineral exports the value of mineral exports (gold) continue to increase over the years. Using the data from the ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing of 2007, Lissu & Curtis (2008) show that the value of gold export in 2002 was 230 US\$m, 2003 was 401US\$m, 2004 was 498US\$m, 2005 was 577US\$m and in 2006 that value increased to 852US\$m. On the other hand, the data from the ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment of 2007(as cited by Lissu & Mark, 2008) indicates that the value of gold exports in 2002 was 341US\$m, in 2003 was 503US\$m, in 2004 was 629US\$m, in 2005 was 655US\$m and in 2006 that value increased to 773US\$m (Lissu & Curtis 2008).

The above figures coincide with the data issued by the Bank of Tanzania which show the increase of mineral exports. As table 1 indicates, the exports of gold, diamond and other minerals since 2009 have been increasing. For instance, while in the January-March quarter of 2009 the amount of money earned from the export of gold was 191 US\$m, that amount increased drastically in the same quarters in 2010 and 2011 to 329.9US\$m and 493.6 US\$m respectively. Such increase is also reflected in the April-June quarter for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. There have been also some improvements in other minerals as the table below shows. Nonetheless, this improvement is yet to cascade down to supplement the country's economic development endeavours. This is largely a result of a rush to attract foreign investors without sequencing the exercise of inviting the investors.

Although attracting foreign investors into the mining sector is vital for the country's economic growth, the manner in which this exercise is carried out has been very questionable particularly due to the fact that the government seems to get very little from the mining sector.

It was on this basis that the CCM's fourth phase government vowed to review all contentious mining contracts once elected to office. Since the fourth government came to office, two developments concerning the mining sector have been witnessed. The first action was the president's formation of the Bomani Commission in 2008 to make a review of the mining sector. One of the recommendations of this commission was that Tanzania should increase mining royalties and grant fewer tax exemptions. It is worth noting that for many years mining companies were exempted from many payments such as a 30 percent corporate tax and custom duties, duty-free equipment imports and fuel-levy relief. The second step taken by the government is the introduction of the new mining Act of 2010. As regards the proposed new mining law, voices of discontent from civil societies have persistently been heard, all criticising the proposed amendments. Mining and environmental activists have been arguing that the proposed law still favours

large mining firms and that no significant changes have been made to ensure that Tanzanians benefit from the country's mineral wealth.³ Mining activists also insist that the proposed law still gives more powers to mining companies and therefore making the country continue to get a pittance from its mineral wealth.

In explaining the weaknesses of the new 2010 mining Act, the LHRC (2010) identifies four areas of weakness. The first one is that the new law provides for insufficient royalty. The report shows that section 87(1) of that Act increased the rate of royalty paid on the gross value of minerals produced under a mining license at the rate of: (a) Uranium 5%, (b) Gemstones and diamonds 5%, (c) Metallic minerals 4%, (d) Gem 1% and other minerals 3%. The report however insists that the mining sector is still contributing a little to national economic development as compared with what foreign investors are getting from the same sector. The second weakness of the new mining Act is said to be the failure to learn from best practices. Its point of departure is that while other minerals-endowed countries such as Botswana earn a lot from minerals, the story is different in Tanzania. Mining sector accounts for over 70% of Botswana's foreign earnings and 34.2 of its GDP. This is in sharp contrast with Tanzania in which its mining industry accounts for only about 3% of the country's GDP (LHRC 2010:224). The third weakness of the Act is lack of comprehensive provisions on pertinent issues such as corporate social responsibility, human rights and the rights of small miners.

On the other hand, the views from the government in support of the proposed amendments have been that with the new law a lot of positive effects will be attained. Some of these include; the royalty for gold will be raised from three to four percent royalties from other metallic minerals such as copper and silver will be four percent while the rate of uranium gemstones and diamond will be five percent. Notwithstanding the anticipated changes in the mining sector with this law, foreign mining companies continue to get a lion's share of the profit accrued from Tanzanian minerals.

There are various views on what accounts for the desire to do everything at once and at the same time. The first view is that the problem of excessive desire in policy making is exacerbated by unbearable pressure from the donor agencies. It is argued that donor agencies have been forcing the recipient countries to embark on certain projects prior to making thorough cost-benefit analysis. Donors' continued emphasis on liberalization of the economy has always been putting the developing world, Tanzania inclusive, under a big pressure hence making them to struggle to meet donors' deadlines irrespective of possible negative consequences. As AFRODAD study indicates, much of the initial impetus for privatization in Africa came from creditor institutions such as IMF and World Bank as part of their push for structural adjustment. As a result of this pressure, African countries were required to adopt various policies some of which were problematic. An example of these policies includes policies of privatization of public parastatals, land commercialization and policies requiring the privatization of agricultural enterprises. For instance, in Tanzania the decision to privatize DAWASA was to fulfil one of the preconditions given if the country was to receive Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) relief (AFRODAD 2007).

³ The Citizen, 19th, April, 2010

A related factor concerning the government's tendency to do everything at once and at the same time is the failure of the government to invest in human resources. There has been a growing concern that those involved in preparing and signing the contracts with foreign investors lack adequate knowledge and thus are to be trained more about the handling of investment contracts. The problem of incompetency means that politicians are in some occasions wrongly advised by less knowledgeable bureaucrats hence immersing the country into the vortex of poor contracts that are in favour of the investors. The third argument is linked with corruption in which it is said that poor management of the mining sector is a result of dubious deals between unfaithful senior politicians and bureaucrats in one hand and foreign investors on the other. This argument refutes the bureaucratic incompetency argument by insisting that poor mining contracts are largely a result on selfish motives among the ruling elites.

Employees' capacity versus public expectations

Policy implementation is the responsibility of public bureaucrats as they are required to adhere to the directives from the politicians. There are various views that explain the relationship between public bureaucrats and the politicians in policy processes. Woodrow Wilson suggested a dichotomy between politics and administration in which politicians are supposed to make policies and public administrators to implement those policies (Henry 2006). Another view is overhead democracy in which politicians are regarded as principals whereas the bureaucrats are the agents, who in this regard are to be monitored by the politicians (Bendor 1990). In explaining the problems characterizing public policy making in Tanzania, Goran Hyden (1986) noticed that there was a clear gap between what was expected from the bureaucrats and what they could actually deliver. A lot of promises were made by the politicians to the public and these promises made the public to develop too much expectation from public bureaucrats. This pressure was exerted on public bureaucrats in a situation where the prevailing circumstance could not allow these officials to meet public demands. There are various considerations that are to be taken into account if one wants these bureaucrats to perform better. Some of these include having the required policy knowledge, availability of resources, motivation and operational autonomy just to mention some. Most of these items were to a great extent inadequate by that time.

Surprisingly, up to this moment public bureaucrats are the victims of unbearable pressure from the politicians. Once the policies are made, the prevailing government philosophy appears to be that public bureaucrats should meet public expectations irrespective of whatever obstacles that might be in place. As a result, coordinating, planning and strategizing public policies and programmes are absent at central government level largely because power is not exercised in a legal-rational fashion but more in terms of controlling subordinates (Mmuya & Hyden, 2007). The political leadership in the country has been in most cases failing to give due attention to public bureaucrats especially in facilitating them to effectively implement the policies made. For instance, in an attempt to alleviate poverty, various programs and strategies have been introduced by the government. Some of these include The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA), Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), Vision 2025 etc. It is however obvious that most of public bureaucrats especially at lower levels are not familiar with the policies they are supposed to

implement. This is the same case with political leaders at local levels who are also not well trained to lead the anti-poverty campaigns. Given the fact that poverty is more internalized in rural areas, any poverty reduction strategies have to take into account the role of street-level bureaucrats like village executive officers and ward executive officers and political leaders such as hamlet and village chairpersons, ward councillors and other leaders who are more close to the people. On the contrary, there is no clear programme to provide these leaders with more knowledge and information about the policies they are required to implement. The prevailing style of communication is top down in which local leaders and administrators are required to obey and implement the orders as they flow from above.

The same problem is currently affecting the country's education sector. Since early 2000 the country embarked on primary and secondary education reforms under Primary Education Development Programme (PEDEP) and Secondary School Education Development Programme (SEDEP). For instance, in the efforts to improve secondary school education, the government embarked on a massive plan to increase the number of secondary schools and students enrolment as well. The endeavour to increase the number of secondary schools has resulted into the construction of a secondary school in almost every ward. The expansion of secondary schools has, according to government reports resulted in significant positive achievements. For instance, the government's education sector performance report for the year 2010 identifies enrolment expansion as one of such achievements. The report shows that secondary schools enrolment (form 1 to form 4) increased from 1, 401, 559 in 2009 to 1, 566, 685 which is an increase of 165, 126 pupils, an equivalent of 11.8% increase. On the other hand, the enrolment of high school students also increased from 64, 843 in 2009 to 72, 014 which marks an increase of 11%. The report also shows that the total enrolment of pupils from form 1 to form 6 increased from, 1466, 402 in 2009 to 1, 638,699 in 2010. Other related achievements mentioned include the increase of registered secondary schools (public and private) from 4,102 in 2009 to 4266 in 2010. The construction of a secondary school in every ward has brought an intensive debate in the country over their rationale. Those who criticize this massive construction of secondary schools have had an opinion that there was no feasibility study conducted prior to commencing secondary schools expansion project. The basis of this argument is drawn from the fact that most of these schools are in horrible situation as they suffer from a number of problems.

Some of these problems include inadequate teaching facilities and other infrastructure. Almost all public secondary schools face serious shortage of laboratories, libraries and teaching aids, the factors that are severely compromising learning achievements (The Daily News, August 14, 2009). The problem here is that there is no elaborate plan to have these schools well supported with these facilities and it is in most cases the local government authorities that are made to carry this burden. Furthermore, the infrastructures such as classrooms especially in rural areas are of poor quality and inadequate. Also residential houses for teachers remain a nightmare as teachers are left with no assurance as to when they will secure decent housing. A related problem is the continuing imbalance in teachers-students ratios. For instance, in explaining this ratio Hakielimu (2009:iii-iv) shows that by 2009 the teacher-pupil ration in primary schools was at 1:54 and that with the increase

of schools and enrolment by 135% and 180% respectively between 2005 and 2009 almost doubled the secondary school teacher-pupil ratio from 1:22 to 1:43. This ratio is one of the factors that are attributed to poor performance of students in secondary schools. As table 2 indicates, the general performance of students in the Certificate for Secondary Education Examinations (CSEE) for 2010 was very poor. Table 2 below shows that 174,193 students which is 49.60 of all candidates failed whereas 136,633 candidates got division four, a grade that is usually close to failure. Only 40,388 candidates passed with division one, two and three. What is more shocking is that only 1.53% and 2.83% of all candidates passed with division one and two respectively.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, one of the greatest challenges facing the government is that of ensuring that there are adequate teachers in both primary and secondary schools. It is the fact that most of these schools have serious shortage of teachers. In explaining the inadequacy of school facilities, the LHRC (2010:134) cites a case in Dar es Salaam in which Saranga Primary school at Kimara Temboni in Kinondoni municipality had 10 classrooms and 17 teachers who catered for 1,080 pupils. The report further shows that some classrooms had more than 200 pupils which is above the government limit of 45. Furthermore, in discussing the shortage of teachers, the report shows that Mtwara region has about 802 secondary school teachers out of the required 2829 for the entire region, which is a shortage of 71.4%. There have also been reported cases whereby some ward secondary schools have one teacher who is however required to make sure that all courses/subjects regardless of one's specialization are taught. Some analysts are therefore questioning the vision of the government. Pessimist views rests on the ground that the focus of the government is mainly on the quantity of students and not the quality education that they are supposed to get. It is argued that there is no deliberate intention to have these schools reach successful levels due to the fact that political considerations are the ones driving the management of the education sector. It is argued that the reform of the sector seems politically strategic and expedient as politicians are using figures such as the number of secondary schools built and enrolment statistics as an indication of government's better performance. This argument sounds real as some political officials (from the ruling party) have started pointing out these figures as a success story of the incumbent government. This was for instance pointed out by president Kikwete in his televised interview with Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) in 2009. As table 3 below shows, enrolment figures in primary schools, secondary schools, colleges, vocational training and universities have increased steadily since 2001.

The problems in the management of the education sector are also reflected in the handling of teachers. It is worth noting that the decision to ensure that each ward has a secondary school means that more schools are built in rural areas. However, the experience in Tanzania has always been that most of public employees such as teachers do not prefer to work in rural areas mainly because of horrible living and working conditions. In this regard, one might have expected to see the government introducing a motivational scheme in order to attract more teachers to work in rural areas. Surprisingly, there is no such kind of a scheme in Tanzania and therefore it is upon the teachers to make a choice between going to work in rural areas or declining the employment offer.

For instance, explaining the weaknesses of PEDP, Benson argues;

"The recruitment and motivation of teachers is an area where PEDP has not been successful at all. When I met with teachers at each of these schools, my first question to them was "What gives you joy in this work?" I almost always was met with silence, until I asked about the hardships involved in teaching. Most would then open up to describe salaries that they could not live on, but that they had to as the demands of teaching prevented them from earning any extra income. Most felt that they could not enjoy this work because their basic needs were not being met. I later asked if PEDP was better for students or teachers. In all schools, the teachers felt that PEDP had been helpful for students but done nothing, or close to nothing, for teachers. The program has been seen as one that would help teachers but up till now few teachers felt that PEDP had done anything for them" (Benson 2005:5)

The role of information in public policy making

Policy information is the heart of policy making processes. For a given problem to be effectively dealt with, there ought to be a more careful exercise of collecting the information that are useful and that clearly explain the problem to be addressed. A working proposition is therefore that the success or failure of public policies largely depends on the nature and quality of information that were used in making public policies. In explaining policy making processes in Tanzania, Hyden argued that one of the problems that were affecting policy making in the county was the failure of policy makers to make policies after collecting adequate information. Policy makers were therefore criticised for rushing to make policies prior to exhausting all the necessary information. For instance, a scholarly research that evaluated the villagization approach using the "operation mode" showed that things were done in such great haste that the programme lacked the benefits of thorough, comprehensive and participatory planning (Komba, 1995). In the anxiety or over enthusiasm to get quick results, some implementers failed to plan carefully (Komba, 1995). In that regard, most of the policies made were ill-informed and could not properly define the problems they meant to deal with.

It is now more than twenty years since Hyden noticed this problem but so far nothing significant has changed. Most of the policies formed are still made using inadequate information. They are made under urgency prior to gathering the information for policy making particularly on aspects such as the workability, the viability and the general returns to be expected from the policies. It is nowadays common that most of the inefficiencies are diagnosed after policies have already been implemented. In 2008 Mmuya and Hyden conducted a study in order to gain an insight on how much politicians consult others and listen to economic and other types of advice before making decisions. The findings were that 39.5% of the respondents were of the opinion that only some politicians heed technical advice before making decisions. It was also noted that one out of five respondents believed that politicians ignore all technical advice, foreign or local and that 13.2% felt that politicians could accept technical advice but ignore economics. Also on the aspect of policy implementation, one third of all respondents believed that policies are implemented by government officials in an arbitrary manner following their own biases (Mmuya & Hyden, 2008)

Most of the examples that we pointed out earlier in this paper such as Kilimo Kwanza strategy and the attraction of foreign investment have shown that policy makers have a

tendency of rushing to making policies prior to making thorough investigation about the strengths and weaknesses of the policies to be made. There are various factors that can explain the problem of relying on poor information to make public policies. One of those factors is the internalization of the culture of haphazard policy making. When Hyden (1984) conducted this study and came out with the observation that policies were made without relying on adequate information, he provided an excuse that such style was adopted due to the compelling circumstance of that time. Problems were many and they needed immediate solutions thus calling for immediate policies. As the time has continued to pass by, it has now become a tradition that policies can still be made even if the information available are not sufficient. Policy makers look relaxed, though with a lot of defensive arguments, as they have been used to this policy making style for more than four decades now. It is thus commonplace that any suggestions for change or improvement are in most cases treated as a threat to the status quo and are thus ignored by policy makers.

It can also be argued that the tendency of policy makers to ignore the role of information is a result of lack of a clear division of responsibilities between policy makers and implementers. It is difficult to establish the demarcation of responsibilities and roles between the politicians and public bureaucrats in Tanzania mainly because the former look as political administrators. Public bureaucrats in Tanzania are not very autonomous and free to exercise their expertise in policy processes as they are always subjected to frequent interference from the politicians. Public bureaucrats are always obliged to do what is politically viable and not what is scientifically feasible. A working proposition is therefore that who knows whether adequate information in policy making is very essential or not is a politician, not the other way round.

In addition to the reasons pointed out above, there has been poor utilization of research findings stored in research institutions such as universities. Despite the fact that there is limited research budget in the country, those researches that are conducted and that could have guided policy makers to make informed decisions are in most cases ignored. As a result most of research information remain unused while the country continues to suffer from poor policies that are short of adequate information.

Moreover, lack of strong civil society in Tanzania for quite a long period made policy makers complacent as there were no strong associations or policy think-tanks to challenge the policies. Although since the reintroduction of liberal politics many associations have been formed, most of them are yet to be strong enough capable of effectively influencing and watching policy making processes. Policy makers are thus not used to pressures from civil society organisations and as a result in cases where some associations stand up firmly to challenge policy making they face stiff resistance from policy makers. A clear example was a confrontation between Hakielimu and the government over its excessive critics against the government's management of the education sector in which the association received ban threats.

Concluding remarks

In the introduction of this paper we indicated that donors influence in policy making in the country has continued to increase especially following the country's adoption of donor-driven policies such as privatization and investment policies. It is however surprising that all the problems that were diagnosed

by Hyden (1984) during the time of state-controlled economy are still prevalent during the current donors-driven era. Various observations can be generated from this dilemma. One such observation is that the influence of donors in policy making is attached to specific entrenched interests which in turn make them to limit their influence to certain levels. As it is the case in almost all countries in the developing world, donors continue to influence agenda setting and policy formulation in Tanzania, but this has not helped to ensure that the policies made take into consideration all important pre-requisites that could facilitate the attainment of predetermined goals. For instance, while it was the donors who forced Tanzania to privatize public parastatals, they did little in assisting the country to effectively implement the privatization policy. It is on the basis of this reality that Tanzania continues to nurse the wounds of poor privatization decisions. Privatization experience in Tanzania suggests that the role of donors in the course of the country's pursuit of economic liberalization policies was mainly "*what to do*" with little or no concern about "*how to effectively do it*".

Apart from the failure of the donors to help Tanzania effectively implement privatization policies, they have also been less interested with what takes place in most of domestic issues. Such lack of interest raises various contradictions. One of these contradictions is whether or not there is a correlation between the increase of the powers of donors in policy making and the drive for the efficiency of the policies made. This concern emanates from two aspects. The first is that most of the policies whose formulation was a result of pressures from donors are surrounded with a lot of controversies which in turn lower their relevance to the country's development efforts. For instance, as pointed out earlier, the pursuit of privatization policy in the country has largely brought little positive changes to the performance of privatized firms as most of them have been performing poorer. With an exception of few privatized companies such as Tanzania Breweries Limited and Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited, the performance of most of the privatized firms is not satisfactory. Some of the failed privatization cases include Air Tanzania Corporation Limited, Tanzania Railways Corporation and DAWASA, just to mention some.

The second aspect that doubts the powers of donors is that apart from stipulating broader policy issues, donors in most cases seem unable to control local politicians, especially in ensuring that they implement the policies as expected. It can be noted that while the donors continue to confine their involvement to macro policy issues, they have failed to put in place a mechanism that can regulate the behaviour of policy makers within the country.

One of the mechanisms that could have been used is the introduction of a citizens' empowerment strategy so as to enable them actively participate in the policy processes. However, this does not seem to be in the interests of donors, as popular participation is sometimes treated as a bottleneck to the implementation of some policies such as mining policies. With the absence of popular power in policy making, local politicians are left unchecked hence enjoying more powers in the policy processes. As a result of the absence of checks and balance in the policy processes, policy-making in Tanzania continues to suffer from the same problems such as making policies without adequate information and the failure of policy makers to use the past as a source of guidance for future decision making.

It is thus worth noting that although the donors control policy processes in Tanzania, it is an illusion to take for granted that local politicians are mere conduits of donors' directives as they still retain discretionally powers to determine and influence policy outcomes.

References

- African Forum and network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) (2007). Tanzania's Experience with Privatization Policies. A Case Study. AFRODAD, Harare
- Bank of Tanzania (BOT) (2009). Economic Bulletin for the Quarter ending March, 2009, Vol XLI, No.1
 (2009). Economic Bulletin for the quarter ending June, 2009, Vol XLI, No.2
 (2010). Economic Bulletin for the Quarter ending March 2010, Vol XLII, No.1
 (2010). Economic Bulletin for the Quarter ending June 2010, Vol XLII, No.2
 (2011). Economic Bulletin for the Quarter ending March 2011, Vol XLIII, No.1
 (2011). Economic Bulletin for the Quarter ending June 2011, Vol XLIII, No.2
- Bendor, J (1990). Formal Models of Bureaucracy. In Lynn & Wildavsky Public administration: The state of the discipline. Chatham House Publishers, Inc. New Jersey.
- Benson, J (2005). "A Complete Education?" Observations about the State of Primary Education in Tanzania in 2005. Hakielimu
- Chachage, C.S.L (2003). Liberalized mining policy in Tanzania and its implications. REDET
- Cree, J (2000) Changing Agricultural Policy in Tanzania. In Starkey P and Simalenga T (eds), 2000. *Animal power for weed control*. A resource book of the Animal Traction Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (ATNESA).
- Dror, Y (1989). Public Policymaking Reexamined. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA).
- Hakielimu (2009). Annual report. Hakielimu
- Henry, N (2006). Public Administration and Public Affairs 9th Edition. Prentice-Hall of India
- Hyden, G (1984). Administration and Public Policy. In Joel D.Barkan (ed) Politics and public policy in Kenya and Tanzania, revised edition. Praeger Publishers, New York U.S.A
- Irene & Brown (1995). Approach to Rural Mass Poverty. . In Mmari & Legum (1995) Mwalimu: he Influence of Nyerere. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers
- Kasongi, D & Shoki, P (2003). Mbali na Malumbano: Kwanini Tanzania Bado ni Masikini miaka 40 Baada ya Uhuru. In Othman, S et.al (eds). Kwanini Tanzania bado Maskini 40 Baada ya Uhuru?. Tuki, University of Dar es Salaam
- Komba, D (1995). Contribution to Rural Development: Ujamaa& Villagisation. In Mmari & Legum (1995) Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers
- Lazaro, E & Mdoe, N.S.Y (2003). Sekta Ya Kilimo- Uti wa Mgongo au Vunja Mgongo. In Othman, S et.al (eds). Kwanini Tanzania bado Maskini 40 Baada ya Uhuru?. Tuki, University of Dar es Salaam.
- Legum, C (1995). The goal of an egalitarian Society. . In Mmari & Legum (1995) Mwalimu: he Influence of Nyerere. Mkuki na Nyota Publishers
- Lissu, T & Curtis, M (2008). A Golden Opportunity?: How Tanzania is failing Benefit from Gold Mining. Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), National Council of Muslims in Tanzania (BAKWATA) and Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC).
- Masebu (2005). The Third Phase Government and Privatization in Tanzania. A paper presented at the 13th State of Politics Conference, 19th -20th, July 2005
- Mmuya& Hyden (2008). Power and Policy slippage in Tanzania-Discussing National Ownership of Development-Sida Studies No.21. Sida
- Ndumbaro L.J (1994). The relative shift of power centre in Tanzania's public policy making in 1980s. M.A dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam
- Sosovere, H (2000). Constraints to the adoption of animal-powered weeding technology in Tanzania. In Starkey P and Simalenga T (eds), 2000. *Animal power for weed control*. A resource book of the Animal Traction Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (ATNESA).
- United Republic of Tanzania (2006). National Population Policy.
 (2011). Evaluation of the Performance and Achievements of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), final draft
 ----- (2010). Education Sector performance Report 2009/2010
- Online sources:
<http://www.moe.go.tz/pdf/TAKWIMU%20TANGU%20UHURU%20%20HADI%20T,%20%20%202011.pdf> , accessed 13th, September, 2011
http://www.hakielimu.org/index.php?searchword=2010+results&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemid=1&option=com_search&lang=en, accessed 25th, August,2011

Table 1: Mineral exports in Tanzania

2009		2010		2011	
Jan- March Quarter		Jan-March Quarter		Jan-March Quarter	
Type of minerals	Amount of US\$m	Type of Mineral	Amount of USD	Type of Minerals	Amount of USD
Gold	191.1	Gold	329.9	Gold	493.6
Diamond	0.6	Diamond	0.0	Diamond	4.0
Other Minerals	2.9	Other Minerals	45.4	Other Minerals	8.7
April- June Quarter		April-June Quarter		April-June Quarter	
Gold	224.1	Gold	347.8	Gold	478.3
Diamond	8.5	Diamond	3.5	Diamond	4.7
Other Minerals	4.3	Other Minerals	10.7	Other Minerals	13

Source: Compiled by the author from Bank of Tanzania's Quarterly economic bulletins

Table 2: Students' performance (by division) in 2010 ACSE results

Division	Boys		Girls		Total	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
I	3874	2.04	1489	0.72	5363	1.53
II	7003	3.68	2939	1.83	9942	2.83
III	16928	8.90	8155	5.06	25083	7.14
I-III	27805	14.62	12583	7.81	40388	11.50
IV	79220	41.66	57413	35.65	136633	38.90
0	83150	43.72	91043	56.53	174193	49.60

Source: Hakielimu website

Table 3: Tanzania's Enrolment Figures

Schools	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
Primary	486470	902619	3530622	3507384	4845185	8363386
Secondary	11832	43352	67682	166812	289699	1789547
Teachers Training College	1723	4475	13138	15684	15561	37698
University	14	2200	3650	4269		104130
Vocational Training Colleges		652	1360	1814		102217

Source: Ministry of Education and vocational training website