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Strategy and the Underdog

Laure Paquette
Lakehead University

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ABSTRACT

This article presents the strategic thinking of the underdog, and to show how it is possible to teach or train people in all walks of life. The first part discusses the characteristics of underdog strategic thinking by comparing them to strong-side strategic thinking. The examples are deliberately drawn from a range of applications, to emphasize that the underdog will never think of only one category of means. The second part proposes some simple exercises to start training people in underdog thinking, first by identifying those who do so naturally, and then in using a simple device, the core idea, to give their own strong-side thinking the beneficial characteristics of the other kind of strategy.

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Introduction

The weak think differently from the strong, and it is hard for all members of society to start including those differences in their thinking, let alone political scientists. At the time of Aristotle, the great philosopher deliberately excluded from future political discourse the *mêtis*, the way of thinking of “women and the vanquished”.¹ Although this way of thinking did not disappear, discussions of it did, and we find ourselves by and large without the conceptual framework to incorporate it easily. This is especially true since the Aristotelian revival after the Renaissance.² However, research into the concept of strategy has already allowed for the incorporation of characteristics of this *mêtis*, and the training below provides a simple heuristic device, the core idea, to help anyone incorporate it into their own thinking. The core idea forces the use of more than the rational powers characteristic of Aristotelian thought dominant, as we have seen, in most western cultures. It allows the participant to call upon experience, judgment, intuition and the tacit dimension of knowledge. It is a purely pedagogical or heuristic device, discussed in more detail below, but it points up to one of the main differences between the strategy of the strong and the strategy of the weak: the added dimension of thinking, almost as if the strong were thinking in two dimensions and the weak are thinking in three. There is also a quick and simple test to determine whether individual members of the armed forces practice it *mêtis*, which is discussed below.

Whether you find yourself in an underdog position or there is an underdog that can affect the outcome, it is important to understand how an underdog thinks strategically. Not all underdogs do. But the underdog thinks differently from the strong, and it is important to understand that, whatever the outcome. Underdogs are always thinking about what the

strongman is about to do – life and limb depend on it. You should do the same.

The goal of this paper is to present the strategic thinking of the underdog, and to show how it is possible to teach or train people in all walks of life. The first part discusses the characteristics of underdog strategic thinking by comparing them to strong-side strategic thinking. The examples are deliberately drawn from a range of applications, to emphasize that the underdog will never think of only one category of means. The second part proposes some simple exercises to start training people in underdog thinking, first by identifying those who do so naturally, and then in using a simple device, the core idea, to give their own strong-side thinking the beneficial characteristics of the other kind of strategy. I recommend to the reader to start with the part that is of most interest to him.

The strategic thinking here is of the learning, intelligent underdog, not the crazy one, not the inept one, not the stupid or ineffectual one. One should never underestimate any opponent, of course. But underdogs who survive are underdogs who tend to be either lucky or gifted. If they are lucky, then all of you have to do is keep fighting him and his luck will run out. But as the Chinese say, luck is an opportunity for which one is prepared. The underdog is likely someone who can learn from experience and is quick on his feet. The crazy underdog is, of course, much less predictable, but also much more likely to be wasteful. Only in exceptional combinations of circumstances will he be successful, although that will occur from time to time. Part I: The Underdog's Strategic Thinking

The main differences between strong-side strategic thinking and the underdog's strategic thinking are: the underdog uses a different definition of strategy; the underdog is holistic; the underdog is adaptive at every tactics; the underdog plays a waiting game; the underdog is creative; the underdog sees the big picture much more easily; the underdog uses strategic intervention; the underdog is always trying to figure out what his opponent is thinking; the underdog is constantly forecasting for all events and all other actors; the underdog is constantly coming up with tactics for all the preceding eventualities; the

¹ Marcel Detienne, *Les ruses de l'intelligence* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), 124.

² Although daring, attempting such a correction is not without recent precedent. Philippe Nemo, *What Is the West?* (New York: Duquesne University Press, 2007).

Tele:

E-mail addresses: lpaquett@lakeheadu.ca

underdog assumes that any direct confrontation will lead to his own defeat; the underdog will break even his own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal; and the underdog's passions or passionate feelings are engaged.

Difference #1: the underdog uses a different definition of strategy. The underdog may not have an explicit concept of strategy written down somewhere. But he behaves as if he conceives strategy as an imaginative idea which orchestrates and/or inspires sets of actions (tactics) in response to a given situation. Among the many definitions of strategy as used by the strong, strategy is a plan to use the instruments of national power to achieve a goal; or the art and science of using instruments of national power to achieve military goals. What is different here is that strategy need not be confrontation; it can be used to take advantage of an opportunity; that strategy is more than simply rational or based on rational decision-making; and that the instruments of power are not necessarily national in scope. For example, some of the Palestinian insurgents are using improvised means to build explosive devices: these are not means controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Some of the Palestinian extremists are not rational in their behavior; indeed some of the problems of the Palestinian movements have been the lack of control of some of its partisans, some of whose passionate commitments are outside the traditional bounds of rational decision-making.

Difference #2: the underdog is holistic. That is a consequence of difference #11, that he cannot win a head-on confrontation. Since the underdog is weaker than the opponents in one or more ways, then he is forced to seek out weaknesses in his enemy and strengths on his own side in other dimensions. In all likelihood the underdog is going to do this repeatedly, and this will lead him to consider a wide range of possible tactics, not just one dimension of any particular problem, challenge or opportunity.

Difference #3: the underdog is adaptive at every tactic. This characteristic arises from the constant experience of being at a disadvantage, sometimes critically at a disadvantage. This means that the underdog, in order to survive, must learn with every move of his adversary or competitor. With strategy being an idea, the underdog is free to change actions constantly, without having to go through the process of changing his whole strategy. It also helps that his strategy is metaphorical, and can therefore easily change in terms of actions chosen.

Difference #4: the underdog plays a waiting game. This characteristic is at its most pronounced among the Chinese and other cultures who have a non-linear, non-atomized concept of time, but it is true of much underdog strategy. Since the underdog is certain that direct confrontation will end in defeat, the underdog has no choice but to wait for opportunities for him to act that do not bring him in direct confrontation with his adversaries or competitors. He must also wait to find out what other characteristics his adversaries may have, beyond the dimension where they are at their strongest. This also takes time and observation.

Difference #5: the underdog is creative. This characteristic arises from the constant experience of being at a disadvantage, sometimes critically at a disadvantage. His means are limited, and usually dramatically more limited than the means available to his adversary. Since he cannot meet him head on without being defeated, the underdog, in order to survive, must find new and different ways to counter every move of his adversary or competitor. With strategy being an idea, the underdog is free to change actions constantly, without having to go through the process of changing his whole strategy. It also helps that his strategy is metaphorical, and can therefore easily change in

terms of actions chosen. Finally, the underdog will not hesitate to violate the rules of the game, if necessary, all of which can help with creativity.

Difference #6: the underdog sees the big picture much more easily. The underdog is used to living and acting in a hostile and unpredictable environment. If he has survived as long as he has, it is because he has developed the habit of constantly scanning his environment for possible threats and for possible opportunities. He also has to make a connection between events in the environment and possible actions on his part. This habit of moving from the broader environment to the specifics of his own situation means that he has the capacity to see strategy as a set of nesting bowls or Russian dolls, one fitting in with the other. For example, let's say a highly creative professor is seeking tenure in a university and a scholarly system that does not deal well with innovation, as is the case with peer-review. That professor is very likely to watch closely what sort of standards are being applied by the tenure committee, but also to look at the incoming university president, a shift in the editorial boards of major journals, the terms of reference of a granting agency, in a way that a more conventional professor would not. The same is true of an underdog in a military or economic situation.

Difference #7: the underdog uses strategic intervention. By strategic intervention, I mean a tactic specifically designed in very difficult circumstances, to turn the situation around, or in close keeping with the strategy adopted. What this means is that the underdog sees the impact of every action, every tactics, on the whole picture, and takes all the potential consequences into account when he designs his tactics or actions. There is training available in strategic intervention.

Difference #8: the underdog is always trying to figure out what his opponent is thinking. His life and limb depend on it, and the more important or powerful or stronger the opponent, the more the underdog will think about it. It is a little like being a mouse in bed with an elephant: every twitch and quiver is worth examining to see if the elephant isn't about to turn over, and crush the mouse.

Difference #9: the underdog is constantly forecasting for all events and all other actors, and invests in the development of even unlikely scenarios. This is called variously *gedankenexperimenten*, as used by Einstein, thought experiments, behavioral rehearsal, and no doubt other terms. In any event, no underdog who survives to challenge a great power like the United States can do so without constantly scanning the environment for events that can be threats or opportunities. With each of these events, the underdog forecasts all the possible consequences and all of his own and others' possible responses, in a cascading matrix of options and scenarios. This must occur for each event and action throughout the underdog's strategy and political/military life, or he is in danger for his life or limb. This is also what leads him to be adaptive and flexible. He invests in even unlikely scenarios because the outcome of any of them is usually his own extinction.

Difference #10: the underdog is constantly coming up with tactics for all the preceding eventualities. For the underdog, strategy is an idea about action. He has identified the idea he is going to work with, and he is constantly identifying actions and courses of actions that go with this strategy and are suited to the events discussed under difference #9.

Difference #11: the underdog assumes that any direct confrontation will lead to his own defeat. This is absolutely the case of any enemy of the United States, which is the unquestioned predominant military power in the world today.

There are possible enemies that could inflict serious damage and casualties to the United States military, such as the People’s Republic of China, but it is extremely unlikely that even China would go into a war with the US thinking itself superior. This is different of course, from what an underdog might say or do publicly – that is in the realm of posturing.

Difference #12: the underdog will break even his own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal. It is not so much that the underdog has no rules of behavior, but that his rules are so different that they may seem like they do not exist. I am reminded of the story of one of the first students from the people’s Republic of China to study abroad, in the 1990’s. The People’s Republic of China had become a puritanical society where modesty was essential. However, this student found that the US society was very permissive, by his standards. He was expelled from a university for having changed his clothes in front of a window on the ground floor, where he was seen by other students. His protests were to no avail, but culturally it is easy to understand: to him, the rules in the US were so much more permissive that it seemed to him that there were no rules at all. In which he was, of course, wrong. It was that he could not perceive those implicit rules of behavior because they were so different and so much broader than his own. The same is true of the underdog. He understands the rules of behavior that apply to the adversary or the enemy – but he does not share them and considers it legitimate to ignore some of the rules of war. He has rules of his own, but either those rules do not interfere with his actions or he choose to break them if necessary.

Difference #13: the underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged. This became obvious to me when I was teaching a class in political strategy. Strong feelings, even passion, are involved. I am reminded of the year where I was teaching students how to use strategy in analyzing the domestic policies of foreign countries. I required them to identify a core idea in the course of a three-hour seminar, but each successive weak and each successive case, nobody came up with one. Romano Prodi’s near legislative defeat in Italy, Spain’s terrorism laws, New Zealand’s Maori, no student could come up with core ideas for any of those cases. Until we studied the Catholic Church’s response to child abuse by clergy in Ireland – then all the students came up with core ideas quickly and easily (Keep the kids in church, keep the church out of kids, and more of that ilk). Underdogs are pursuing a strategy because they are passionately committed and emotionally engaged in achieving their goal. This is a help in creativity, since it allows access to more than rational decision-making.

The Heuristic Device

The core idea is a metaphor at the heart of a strategy that will help a user to include *mètis*, i.e. to make, under pressure, decisions consistent with the broader goals and objectives, and forces the user into using a broader range of intellectual capacity than the rational. In other words, it is a learning tool to give strong-side strategy the benefit of the better characteristics of the underdog’s strategic thinking. The second exercise teaches in more detail what the core idea is and how it can be used.

Part II: Teaching and Training in Strategic Thinking
Three Types of Learners

In training people in strategy including *mètis*, you may expect three types of participants:

- the natural strategists: those who only need to have a new concept of strategy including the *mètis* explained to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately;

- the on-sight strategist: who will need to see the new concept of strategy including the *mètis* demonstrated to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately; and

- the coachable strategist: who will need to be coached through a total of five or six applications (using case studies, for example) of a new concept of strategy including the *mètis* to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately.

It is already clear that *habitus* is a major problem, but also that there are a proportion of natural strategists who can be readily identified in this way. It is also clear that there are natural strategists who are not identified in the training itself, but realize it after taking the training. Moreover, the proportion of natural strategists among visible minorities, women, the disabled, and others with some sort of permanent disadvantage is much greater. If this also holds true for armed forces, then those who have made efforts at diversity may be receiving an unexpected dividend.

The workshop proposed below takes about three hours, if given all at once, though the follow-up necessary to train the third type of person, to be completed individually, will take more time. The two exercises of the workshop can be given one at a time. They are: discovery and diagnosis, and development of the core idea.

Exercise 1: Discovery and Diagnosis

In this exercise, which takes about 1 or 1.5 hours, the objective is to introduce the participants to the basics of strategy including *mètis*. Individuals are asked to play a simple board game, such as checkers or chess, and are given a structured set of tasks of increasing complexity to force the failure of rational thought alone. They are then required to use the core idea, a metaphor that orchestrates all actions in the strategy of the weak. The trainer observes and confirms with them when they are using *mètis*. The materials required are simple: enough board games for every two or four people (the exercise works for people working in teams of two in playing the board game); enough seats and tables for everybody; and either a chalkboard, a flipchart, an overhead projector or a document camera. The board game can be selected to be culturally appropriate. The exercise allows for the use of translators if necessary. What the trainer is looking for is the ability to predict outcomes in increasing numbers of scenarios, and the ability to think ahead to a much greater extent. People who can do this are likely to be natural strategists, and are much more likely to be practicing the strategy of the weak.

At the close of this exercise, the trainer facilitates a discussion about the effectiveness of the first experience with a core idea. In the alternative, if time is short, the trainer can assign the worksheet shown below, an integration learning tool commonly used in management or business.

Integration Diary

Topic of Report:	In my view the important components are:	Because:
Links with previous learning about strategic thinking:	My thoughts about this topic are:	
I have a better understanding of:	I am more effective at:	I am more likely to:
I want to learn more about:	What I can use...	where?

The integration diary’s goal is to help the participant become aware of how s/he learns, so that s/he eventually will be able to become a better learner regarding counterinsurgency.

The report is structure to bring the participant to increasing levels of abstraction, i.e. it provides an additional chance to experience telescoping. The form is supposed to be completed in point form only, so that the participant works with individual ideas and concepts, rather than having the chance to be descriptive. The diary must be completed in the space provided to force the participant to choose among various possibilities, and therefore learn what priorities on which to focus. There are no right or wrong answers for this, or any other, worksheet. The point is to make explicit the processes of the participant's learning.

Topic of report this is the specific aspect that the participant wishes to analyze in greater detail. There should be only one topic, for example: counterinsurgency, not 'counterinsurgency and planning.' The topic should be specific rather than vague. The topic should also be at the same level of generality as the rest of the content of the worksheet.

In my view, the important components are: here, the participant should break down the topic of his/her choice into components. This process should continue until it is no longer possible to break the topic down any further. The participant then selects the components which will be discussed in the worksheet. Not all components will be analyzed.

Because: Here the participants gives the reasons why the components selected are important enough to continue to work with. Here the participant must select priorities once again, explicitly. This process occurs in everyday life, but it is not explicit.

Links with previous learning in strategic thinking: here, the participant must think over what s/he has learned about strategic thinking in the past, and identify where the topic under consideration connects with what s/he already knows.

My thoughts about this topic are: the reason for this box is that the participant will have a wide range of reactions to the learning that has just occurred. This box allows him/her to make those thoughts explicit, and also to provide him/her with the opportunity to set them aside for future consideration, if necessary. The participant is now less encumbered with other thoughts to continue the analysis.

I have a better understanding of: for the learning to be genuine, there has to be a greater comprehension of some, possibly several, phenomena. In this box, the participant is expected to provide at least one of these.

I am more effective at: for the learning to be genuine, there has to be a change in behavior. That change can be either an improvement in an existing behavior, or a change in the probability that a particular action or course of action will be chosen. In this box, the participant is expected to list at least one such improvement.

I am more likely to: for the learning to be genuine, there has to be a change in behavior. Sometimes that behavior is mental or psychological. That change can ebe either an improvement in an existing behavior, or a change in the probability that a particular action or course of action will be chosen. In this box, the participant is expected to list at least one such change in probability.

In the last three boxes, the participant must become very specific and concrete about what the learning has done for him/her.

I want to learn more about: learning is a chain, and in an earlier box the participant was required to identify what previous learning on this topic s/he had done. Here, the participant must identify what s/he would most want to study next.

What I can use: of the learning that has occurred and has been identified, the participant must now select what has practical or immediate applications in his/her responsibilities or life. In this box, the participant must identify the elements of learning that he can actually apply.

Where? Of the learning that has occurred and has been identified, the participant must now specify what applications exist for the elements of learning that s/he has identified. It is important for participants to be as specific as possible.

Sample Integration Diary

Integration Diary

Topic of Report: telescoping	In my view the important components are: Levels of abstraction Changing levels of abstraction Obstacles to changing levels	Because: This is the crux of the task to be done This is the skill I have to learn or develop This is what I have to overcome
Links with previous learning about strategic thinking: Old definition of strategy Old definition of tactics	My thoughts about this topic are: Limits to what I can learn in a single day Why hasn't metis been discussed before anywhere?	Unsure of how much I can actually telescope Confused about the way I'm being trained here
I have a better understanding of: How this can help me understand insurgents	I am more effective at: Picking out fellow soldiers who can do this metis	I am more likely to: take into account who is a strategic corporal and who isn't when I plan
I want to learn more about: How insurgents think	What I can use... The test	where? With soldiers in my unit when we deploy

Exercise 2: The Core Idea

The third exercise joins the way of thinking of the first exercise with the content of the second. In this exercise, participants must plan a response to the events described in the appendix, first without a core idea, and then using a core idea. Participants are therefore required to use the information and skill to which they have just been introduced.

Worksheet: Strategy without core idea

Issue
Goal
Tactics
1.
2.
3.
4.

In this worksheet, the participant is expected to identify the components of a strategy to answer a particular challenge. As with the integration diary, the participant should use point form and no more than a single sheet to complete the worksheet. This will force him/her to be conceptually specific, and to choose among competing priorities. This way, the trainer can assess the judgment of the participant as well as his or her capacity to think using strategy with metis. Those components are the problem, to be described succinctly in the top box, "Issue"; the solution to that problem that suits the participant best, again to be described succinctly in the middle box, "Goal"; and the steps that will have the participant reach the goal, or the method he plans to

use, of the collection of actions s/he plans to use, in the bottom box, “Tactics.” A strategy need not be developed only in adversarial circumstances – it can be used to rise to a challenge of any type. But because it is demanding to develop and implement, it is usually only used in dire circumstances where there are at least one and usually many enemy players. As usual, the participant must be detailed, specific, succinct, and must stay at one level of generality or detail throughout the worksheet. Below is a sample worksheet for a comparatively simple task, such as setting up a military camp for one night for a patrol.

Sample Worksheet: Strategy without Core Idea

Issue	tired troops in a hostile environment
Goal	provide secure, safe and restful environment for troops for one night
Tactics	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. identify most defensible location within accessible range 2. assign guard duty 3. assign tasks re: setting up camp 4. other

Because coming up with a core idea is often the most difficult part of the exercise, there is a short worksheet that can be completed quickly that will stimulate the thinking of the participants.

Worksheet: Developing A Core Idea

Category	Possible Images or Metaphors	List Images or Metaphors	Other Images or Metaphors	Develop a Slogan/core idea
Military	machine gun, rifle, tank			
Geographical	river, waterfall, creek			
Plant	tree, fern, Venus flytrap			
Transportation	bus, golf cart, car			
Sports	Caddy, gymnast, football			
Mechanical	wrench, Allen key, ratchet			
Insects	mosquito, ant, butterfly			
Animals	cougar, puma, rhinoceros			
Role models	Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi			
Your own category:	Your own metaphors:			

This worksheet is designed to force the participant to start thinking beyond the rational, linear model that has served him/her so far so well. The goal of the worksheet is to get the process of thinking metaphorically established, and then to give the participant some practice. It is deliberately simple to foster and focus thinking with strategy including *métis*. The sample worksheet is being completed with the same task as set out above, setting up camp for the night. Not all the metaphors are actually practical or helpful. The point is to produce a number of them so that the participant can then develop the capacity to judge which are better or more practical.

Here, the worksheet is completed as instructed above, save for the box on ‘Core Idea’, which should arise from the participant’s best efforts in the previous worksheet. Let us assume that the camp would need to either give greater rest or care to exhausted or wounded troops, or that there are particular supplies or equipment that requires protection.

Sample Worksheet: Developing a Core Idea

Category	Possible Images or Metaphors	Other Images or Metaphors	Develop a Slogan/Core Idea
Military	machine gun, rifle, tank	battalion, submarine, armoured personnel carrier	Work together like a c-3 gun and a shell
Geographical	river, waterfall, creek	Mountain, plateau, desert	A 24-hour oasis
Plant	tree, fern, Venus flytrap	Flower, tomato, potato	Let’s close up camp like one of those evening prayer plants
Transportation	bus, golf cart, car	Truck, walking, running, bicycle	Let’s make our break like a cruise ship for the night
Sports	Caddy, gymnast, football	Soccer, tennis, ping pong	
Mechanical	wrench, Allen key, ratchet	Silicone gun, screwdriver	
Insects	mosquito, ant, butterfly	Bee, wasp, slug	Let’s circle around the queen bee
Animals	cougar, puma, rhinoceros	Tiger, lion, gazelle, turtle	
Role models	Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi	Mother Theresa, Montgomery of Alamein	
Your own category:	Your own metaphors:		

Then the work can proceed to the development of a strategy with a core idea.

Worksheet: Strategy with Core Idea

Issue
Goal
Core idea
Tactics
1.
2.
3.
4.

Those would be placed in the camp where they would be the most protected. Hence, the core idea adopted below would be: “Let’s circle around the queen bee” with the rest of the troops being the worker bees around the hive.

Sample Worksheet: Strategy with Core Idea

Issue	tired troops in a hostile environment
Goal	provide secure, safe and restful environment for troops for one night
Core idea	let’s circle around the queen bee
Tactics	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. identify most defensible location within accessible range 2. assign guard duty 3. assign tasks re: setting up camp 4. other

Conclusion

Such a shift in thinking and mindset requires some very important skills be taught and some important characteristics be developed. Current training in most areas of endeavour does provide the chance to develop self discipline and the ability to do their job. Two other capacities are also required: the ability

to change gears quickly, and what I call the ability to telescope: the ability to act within a certain scope and forecast the consequences on a broader scale, or to act on a broader scale and be able to forecast the consequences on a smaller scale.

The possibility of more rigid habits of thinking is more common among large, successful, and affluent armed forces, as in all walks of life. *Habitus* is the system of durable, transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of existence.³ The conditions of existence produce generating, organizing principles of practice and of mental representation of situations, which can be objectively adapted in their aim, but without the awareness of those aims and the mastery explicit of the operations necessary to attain them. The more specialized the training, the more affluent and/or successful the people, the more resistance there can be to learning, the more rigid the way of thinking. For example, among the NATO armed forces, therefore, it would make it more like for the US armed forces to be held back by *habitus* than, say the Lithuanian forces. However, the *habitus* usually will become less rigid in times of crisis: the more severe the crisis, the more open people will become, and while it may be too late to help solve the crisis at hand, it is possible to introduce training at that time.⁴

There are a number of caveats to the training proposed above. First, the workshop and training are, at the time of this writing, untried and untested in this proposed application. Second, the proportions of types of practitioners of *mètis* in the military is not known, as is the proportion among the various types of learner may be found in much lower proportions than in other walks of life. Third, the training of troops proposed can be ordered, but the learning cannot. They may participate in the

workshop while resisting the learning. Fourth, the optimum effectiveness for this training is no doubt to have it integrated into the regular training, about which the author needs to know more.

In any event, there are exercises and training in existence to fit any schedule, which are polyvalent to suit any occupation or endeavour. They will not be of equal significance, however. There are also case studies available for training purposes, and for much broader applications. There is also a new general theory of strategy, and proposal of proposal of strategy as unit of analysis and guide for action and a methodology for theory-building. This new theory is already illustrated with a set of case studies involving states as actors: the analysis of a single state, the analysis of bilateral relations between states, the analysis of multilateral relations among states, and the analysis of bilateral and multilateral relations between an international organization of states and both member and non-member states. The second set of case studies using the individual citizen as actor has also been completed, along with two practical guides to action in the political system. At the time of this writing, a series of semi-fictional case studies involving individuals and groups in systems is being prepared. The future necessity for the inclusion of the application of strategy for the analysis of supra-national groups using strategy in a systemic context is already clear. These necessities figure among the next topics for research.

In parallel to these theoretical works are a series of practical guides, already mentioned, whose goal is to make available the methodologies produced by strategic theory, but without requiring the abstract theoretical work of the other strand. This strand includes books already published on organizational political strategy and tactics for individuals and small groups, as well as a book on using strategy in political activism, on how to use strategy to analyze national and international policies established by governments, on health services, on bioterrorism, and on electoral strategies. At the time of this writing, several books on research, and other applications are in preparation.

³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Le sens pratique* (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88.

⁴ There is a third factor, of which I am aware, but which I have only begun to analyze, and which I will not address more than in the note: in the generation of people who grew up with access to the Internet and video games, I notice a difference in the ability to think abstractly, to take the initiative, and to concentrate for longer periods.