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The emergence of mental trope in Arabic and Persian literature and its evolution

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ABSTRACT

This article was written with the aim of examining the differing views of the scholars of the art of the trope in the subject of mental trope or tropical predication and tries to compare the different aspects of scholars' views with an analytical and descriptive method and finally with the help of those scholars' views and studying the historical evolutionary course of that rhetorical device give a fruitful result to the lovers of the this art. Mental trope is one of the devices of the rhetoric in general and art of the trope in specific that the domain of dialectic and arguments about it goes back to the history of rhetoric and it came to known as propositional trope, trope in proof, and tropical predication. Mental trope is generally about the construction and the structure of the sentence and is beyond the boundary of the word; that is, each single word of the sentence is used in its conventional meaning, however, the construction of the sentence is not in agreement with its real concept. In other words, the verb and verbal group (infinitive, gerund, and past participle) is attributed to an agent other than its real agent.

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Introduction

The mental trope is one of the rhetorical issues which the domain of its dialectic and controversies goes back to the beginning of the rhetoric and it also came to known as the propositional trope, trope in proof, and tropical predication. Shirazi expresses the reasons of these nomenclatures as follows: "the relations of these terms are in this way respectively: it is called the propositional trope because the proposition has the meaning of relation and this trope is about the relation. As for the trope in proof, the most of examples in this trope is about the proving, and in addition, the disproof is subordinated to the proven, therefore, the root is the proof; and it is called tropical predication (Majazi, مجازي) with the relational *yā* (يا) because the trope is about the predication and relation and the relation includes the predicational relation, additional, and harmonic" (Shirazi, 1370, vol 1, p. 253).

The precursors' views

This term was used by Abd-Al-Ghafer Jorjani for the first time, thus he is known as the originator and discoverer of this kind of trope. Taha Hossein regards him as the one who made the dimensions of this kind of trope clear (Saghir, Bita, p.117). It should be said that this issue had also been dealt with before Jorjani; however, the term was coined by him. Sibawayh dealt with this issue in his book "Al-Kitab" with the example "نهارك" and Mobarrad in the book "Al-Kamel" discussed the issue by mentioning some famous examples (1988, vol 1, p 160).

Ibn Fares named that kind of trope as "the addition of the verb to what is not being the real agent", and pointed out to famous examples about it. Therefore, by this definition it can be said that he was the first one who attempted to give a definition and usage of the mental trope and allocated a chapter of his book in this regard (1993, p. 215).

Abd-Al-Ghafer has a detailed discussion about the propositional trope or tropical predication and its different types, but for avoiding the prolongation of the subject and because most of his views will be touched upon in Sakkaki and the other

later scientists' views, here just a division and definition of his views is mentioned that later established a basis for Sakkaki and other men of letters in the art of tropes. He divides the trope in two types, that is, the lexical trope and mental or propositional trope and will be expressed as follows:

"the trope through the word, that is, lexical trope and the trope through the meaning, that is, propositional trope" (Jorjani, Bita, p. 408).

From the viewpoint of Abd-Al-Ghafer Jorjani the reference of understanding the propositional trope is the mentality, therefore, he defines it in this way:

«أَنَّ كُلَّ جُمْلَةٍ أُخْرِجَتِ الْحُكْمَ الْمَفَادِ بِهَا عَنْ مَوْضِعِهِ مِنَ الْعَقْلِ لَضَرْبٍ مِنَ التَّأْوِيلِ فِيهِ مَجَازٌ» (ضيف، 1995: 214).

Meaning: "each sentence that you mentally change its understood proposition from its position through a kind of interpretation is a trope"; and the examples mentioned for this kind of trope are like the Quranic verse [وَ أخرجت الأرض أنقالتها] (Al-Zelzeleh, 2) that the verb is attributed to an agent rather than its real agent.

Sakkaki view

Sakkaki after narrating the views of the former scholars regarding the mental trope considers it as the implicit metaphor and repudiates the existence of mental trope as the way precursors perceived it in these kinds of examples. He gives his own definition regarding this kind of trope in the fifth part of the different types of tropes in this way:

«هو الكلام المفاد به خلاف ما عند المتكلم من الحكم فيه لضرب من التأويل إفادة للخلاف لا بوساطة وضع كقولك أنبت الربيع البقل» (سكاكي، 1987: 393).

Meaning: "Mental trope is when the conceived sentence is different from the view and opinion of the speaker, a contrary concept which is not through the original creation but through the interpretation. For example: "The spring grew the plant". In explaining his example he believes that that sentence is not a mental trope for if it is claimed that the verb "أنبت" (grew) expressed for using as omnipotent God, it is the conventional lexical trope not the mental trope (ibid). Therefore, from his

view, in this example the “ربيع” is likened to the “real grower”, then the Mushabbah bih (vehicle) is omitted and one of its components which is the “أنبت” is expressed like an implicit metaphor; thus in contrary to the Sakkaki’s precursors and some of the scholars of the art of tropes after him the mental trope firstly refers to the word not the predication and secondly its truly mentioning the Mushabbah (tenor) and the act of Mushabbah bih (vehicle) in the same way as in the implicit metaphor.

Sakkaki for resolving the doubts in his definition says: I told contrary to what it is about the speaker not what it is about the mentality to exclude the views of those unwise *دهرى* (atheist)s who say “أنبت الربيع البقل” (The spring grew the plant) with the belief that the growing is caused by the spring (ibid). After that definition and putting delimitation on it he recognizes the forms of trope as four types; conformity with reality and belief, nonconformity with the both, conformity with reality and nonconformity with belief, and conformity with belief and nonconformity with reality which are adopted from Abd-Al-Ghaher views. He also believes that this kind of trope is common among the Arabs and for each context he presented an example (ibid, pp. 396-397).

Qazvini views

Qazvini is not agree with Sakkaki in mental trope, but in contrary to Sakkaki he considers that kind of trope to be exist in predication not in sentence and that is a topic of semantics; that is, the mental trope is related to the attribution of the words, and because the subject is about the words it lies in the realm of semantics he accounts it as the mental trope because the attribution in everything is mental. He defines the trope in this way:

«و أما المجاز، فهو إسنادُ الفعل، أو معناه إلي ملايين له، غير ما هو له» (Qazvini, 2011, vol. 1, p. 36.)

Meaning: “tropical predication is the attribution of the verb or its meaning to the associations or the dependents that the verb or its meaning is not originally created for - with putting the indicative link for that attribution is to something other than what it is”.

He continued that the verb has many associations and dependents from among them are agent, object, infinitive, tense, place, and cause (ibid). The other point that Qazvini refers to is that the attribution of the verb to the agent and object that it is not originally created for is because of the similarity of those unreal agent and direct object to the dependents of the tropical verb and he presents examples like {فَهُوَ فِي عَيْشَةٍ رَاضِيَةٍ} (الحاقة/21) and {و {خَلَقَ مِنْ مَاءٍ دَافِقٍ} (الطارق/6) (ibid), that this is the implicit confirmation of Sakkaki’s view. Qazvini holds that the reason for naming the mental trope in this way is the attribution of that trope to the mentality not the original creation, because in his opinion the predication of the word is something achieved by the intention of the speaker not the original creation made by the creator (ibid, p.37).

Qazvini raises five objections to Sakkaki’s definition. The first objection is that Sakkaki said I brought the provision of “what is thought by the speaker” and I said nothing in “the contrary of what is conceived by mentality” for making the definition exclusive and the saying of the unwise which states “the doctor cured the patient” could be excluded; whereas, this remark is false because that provision do not exclude those kinds of statements. They will be excluded by the provision of “excluding the interpretation” (ibid, p. 38)

The second objection that is an obligatory is that the prerequisite of the Sakkaki’s statement in the verse “في عيشة راضية” -he will be in blissful life- is that the propose of “عيشة”

(life) would be the owner of the life, because the “life” is a mental agent that is likened to the real agent, therefore it is a false statement because it cannot be said that “فهو في صاحب عيشة راضية” -then he will be in the owner of the blissful life - and with the falsity of the prerequisite the correlative is also falsified. The reason for the falsity of the prerequisite is the unity of the form and content (Shirazi, 1367, vol. 1, p. 287).

Taftazani disproves Qazvini’s second objection against Sakkaki and says this objection against Sakkaki is justified on the condition that the purpose of “راضية” and the pronoun “عيشة” be the same thing, that is, the purpose of the “عيشة” be the real agent of the “راضية” and the purpose of the pronoun “راضية” which refers to the “عيشة” also be the real agent, but if in this sentence we intend the usage, the mentioned objection against Sakkaki is not accepted. Here the statement of the usage means that the “life” has two meaning; the tropical meaning, “the owner of the life” and the real meaning of “life”. The purpose of “life” is the real meaning and the purpose of the pronoun “satisfied” which refers to the “life” is its tropical meaning, so its translation is in this way: that person is in a life which the owner of the life is satisfied (ibid, p. 288).

The third objection of Qazvini against Sakkaki is that in the examples of “ليله قائم” - his day fasting- and “نهاره صائم” - his night praying - it is a kind of attribution of an adjunct to itself and it is not accepted. The explanation of its falsity is in a way that the “day” is Mushabbah (tenor) and what is meant by that is the person who is Mushabbah bih (vehicle) and what is meant by the pronoun “نهاره” - his day” is also the person who is Mushabbah (tenor) and with addition of “day” to the pronoun it became the addition of the adjunct to itself, therefore, when the prerequisite is false the correlative which is the Sakkaki’s statement is also false (Hashemi, 1390; vol, 2; p.281). Taftazani accepts this objection but he is dubious about its example and says that it would be better to bring “فما ربحت تجارتهم” instead of “نهاره صائم” because there is the possibility of usage in “نهاره صائم” (ibid, p.282)

The fourth objection of Qazvini to Sakkaki is in the verse “و قَالَ فِرْعَوْنُ يَا هَامَانَ ابْنِ لِي صَرِّحًا لَعَلِّي أَبْلُغُ الْأَسْبَابَ” (Ghafer, 36). The prerequisite of Sakkaki’s statement is that the Mushabbah (tenor) - “هَامَانَ” - would become the purpose of the Mushabbah bih - عمله و بناءه -, therefore, the purpose is “عمله” not the “هَامَانَ” and this condition is rejected because we know that the purpose is Haman who is the vizier of the Pharaoh.

The fifth objection of Qazvini to Sakkaki is about the examples of “أنبت الربيع البقل” and “شفي المريض الطيب” that if the purpose of Mushabbah (tenor) is the God almighty, the condition of Sakkaki’s statement is that one of the names of the God be “الربيع” or “الطيب”. However, attributing these names to God needs the permission of the “Share” (Islamic lawgiver) and assigning the name to God without the permission of the lawgiver is invalid; so the correlative of Sakkaki’s denomination and idea is rejected (Shirazi, 1367: vol, 1, p.289 & Hashemi, 1390: vol, 2; p.283).

Qazvini thinks that there is also a contradictory objection¹ to Sakkaki in this way that in the implicit metaphor he said that mentioning the Mushabbah (tenor) and meaning the Mushabbah bih (vehicle) with the aid of the context that this principle is rejected via the example of “نهاره صائم” which the Moshabbah (tenor and the Moshabbah bih (vehicle) are mentioned. Thus, he says:

¹ Contradictory objection is that finding a contradiction to a general criterion or principle (Shirazi, 1367: vol, 1: p.290)

«و لأنّه ينتقض بنحو "نهاره صائم" لاشتماله علي ذكر طرفي التشبيه» (قزويني، 1904: 53).

This objection is also rejected by Taftazani who says that in Sakkaki's view mentioning the two sides of the simile in a way that it is not the sign of simile would not damage the metaphor, like the example of "قد زرّ إزراره علي القمر" which Moshabbah (tenor) is "إزراره" and the Mushabbah bih is the "قمر". Because in here there is no sign of simile, conceiving it as a metaphor is correct (Hashemi, 1390: vol, 1, p. 288).

Taftazani's view

Taftazani supports the Sakkaki's view on the issue of mental trope and considers that kind of trope as metaphor. In response to Qazvini he says that your objection is true when we say that the Sakkaki's denomination regarding the implicit metaphor is that the purpose of the Mushabbah (tenor) would be really the Mushabbah bih (vehicle), while it is not this way, but the purpose of the Mushabbah bih is the proclaimed Moshabbah bih (vehicle) not the real one. Thus, he says:

«و الجواب أنّ مبني هذه الاعتراضات علي أنّ مذهب السكاكي في الاستعارة به حقيقة، و ليس كذلك بل مذهبه أنّ يراد بالكناية أن يذكر المشبه و يراد المشبه المشبه به ادعاءً و مبالغة، لظهور أن ليس المراد بالمنية في قولنا "مخالب المنية نشبت بفلان"، هو السبع حقيقةً و السكاكي مصرح بذلك في كتابه و المصنف لم يطلع تا: ج 1- 61) عليه» (تفتازاني، بي

Meaning: "... and the response [to those objections against Sakkaki]: the basis of all those objections is on the assumption that in Sakkaki's denomination on implicit metaphor the thought is on the Mushabbah (tenor) and the intention of the real Mushabbah bih. It is not this way, but Sakkaki's view is that the proclaiming and hyperbolic Mushabbah bih (vehicle) is intended, because it is evident when we are saying that "the death has grasped on somebody" our intention of the death is not a real rapacious beast and Sakkaki clearly emphasized this in his book "Meftah Al-Oloum", but he didn't understand what Sakkaki said."

(Sharehin) Exegetes' views

Ibn Abel-Esba proposes a general principle for the mental trope or trope in proof and says:

"The general principle of the trope in proof is that the attribution of something to a thing that is not genuinely related to it" (1368: p.251)

Alavi believes that the examples mentioned for mental trope are lexical tropes that are used with an extraneous meaning to the original meaning. He considers the Razi and Qazvini's view and whoever regards them as the mental tropes corrupted and he does not approve a place for trope in the mental provisions and believes that calling this kind of trope as the mental is a misnomer. Thus, he says:

"و المختار أنّ المجاز لا مدخل في الاحكام العقلية، و لوجه لتسمية المجاز بكونه عقلياً، لأنّ ما هذا حاله إنّما يتعلّق بالأوضاع اللغوية دون الأحكام العقلية» (علوي، 1332ش: 250).

Meaning: "the preferable choice is that the trope does not enter the mental propositions and if a proposition is a mental proposition, then the nomination of it as a trope is not admissible, because the trope just belongs to the lexical conditions and status of the word not the mental propositions".

He regards this denomination as the Jorjani's brainchild that the other men of letters and scholars of the art of trope followed him. He said in this regard:

«و اعلم أنّ ما ذكرناه في المجاز الاسنادي العقلي هو ما قرره عبدالقاهر الجرجاني و استخرجه بفكرته الصافية و تابعه علي ذلك الجهابذة من أهل هذه الصناعة كالزمخشري و ابن الخطيب الرازي و غيرهما» (همان: ج 3- 257).

Subkī after stating the Sakkaki and Qazvini's views respecting the mental trope, delineates the differences between them. He emphasized on this point that from the viewpoint of

Subkī the trope is lexical and from the viewpoint of Sakkaki trope is in predication. However, he holds that the intention of the speaker in mental trope is a requirement and in his view not every predication is a trope unless it is thought that the speaker has not intended the literal meaning of the predication and if there is a doubt in this case the real (literal) meaning should be construed (Subkī, 2009: vol, 1: pp. 145-148)

The author of the book "al-Šūrah al-balāghīyah inda Bahā al-Dīn al-Subkī" believes that Subkī is agreed with Qazvini and opposes the inclusion of the mental trope in the art of tropes. The reality and the mentality in Subkī's view is the same as what Qazvini stated (Barakāt, 1983: p. 127). Nevertheless, with an objection to Qazvini in this regard he somehow confirms the Sakkaki's view. Especially where he says:

«اعلم أنّ المصنّف في باب الاستعارة بالكناية جعلها مجازاً عقلياً، و ذلك مناقض لما ذكره هنا من إثبات المجاز العقلي في هذه الأمثلة، و إنكار أن يكون استعارة بالكناية» (همان، 155).

Tayebi presented a combination of Qazvini and Sakkaki's views in defining the mental trope which is simple and has no complication of the both definitions. He says:

«و هو الكلام المحكوم فيه بخلاف ما عند المتكلم بالتأول» (الطبيبي، 2011: 205).

Meaning: "that is a sentence in which provisioned in the contrary to what the speaker stated by inclusion of a non-literal context that prevents the original (literal) meaning".

He continues that the provision of "بخلاف ما عند المتكلم" – on the contrary to what the speaker says – is for excluding the statement of that "Dahri" (Atheist) who says "انبت الربيع البقل" – the spring grew the plant – and this statement is on the basis of his belief, because he didn't intend its opposite and we included the provision "بالتأول" – by interpretation – to exclude the false statement (ibid, p. 206)

Ibn Nazem also agrees with Sakkaki's view, because after stating some example of this kind of trope he talks about the similarity between the given subject and the elliptic subject in its dependence on the agent and says:

«و من شرط هذا المجاز أن يكون للمسداليه شبه بالمتروك في تعلقه بالعمل» تا: 146) (بي

Dasouqi introduced a new definition of mental trope that he considers it as the resultant of Sakkaki and Qazvini's views and says:

"If we attributed the transitive verb or what intended from it to something which is syntactically and mentally agent that would be a real predication; however, if it is syntactically agent and mentally not an agent, but a form, infinitive, etc. that would be a mental predication. Likewise, if we attribute the intransitive verb or what is understood from it to something that is syntactically and mentally subject of the passive, that would be a real predication; nevertheless, if it is syntactically subject of the passive but mentally not, that would be a mental predication" (Shorouh Al-Talkhis, 1992: vol, 1: p.232).

The mental trope from the perspective of contemporary scholars

In contemporary era the mental trope is known with the same nomenclature or predicative trope, and like other issues of rhetoric most of the contemporary scholars of the art of tropes have tried to state, explain, and clarify the precursors' views. Unfortunately, even the examples were adopted from the same old books and they just limited themselves to reporting those old views. However, a few of them stepped in the intrinsic nature of the issue and represented remarkable points of view which in this section we just mention those viewpoints.

Matloub views the predicative trope as a synthetic trope which every one of its words have the synthetic conventional

meaning of its own trope has just happened in the predication of these words. So, he says:

«هو المجاز الذي يكون في الإسناد أو التركيب و قد سُمِّي كذلك لأنه متلقى من جهة الإسناد و هو المجاز العقلي. و هذا النوع من المجاز تستعمل فيه الألفاظ المفردة في موضوعها الأصلي و يكون المجاز عن طريق الإسناد» (مطلوب، 1986: ج3-199).

Meaning: “that is a kind of trope that happens in predication or synthetic and is nominated with those names (that is, with the name of predicative or synthetic trope), because that is conceived through predication while it is a mental trope. In this type of trope the single words are used with their conventional meaning and the trope is through their predication”.

Salah Fazl unequivocally views the mental trope as lexical trope and a part of the art of trope. He implicitly confirms and accepts Sakkaki's view. He expressed his idea in this way:

«لا يفوتنا أن نشير بشكل عابر الآن إلي ضرورة مراجعة التقسيمات البلاغية و نقدها علي ضوء الاسلوب الحديث و علي اساس معطيات علم اللغة و من ذلك مثلاً تقسيم المجاز إلي لغوي و عقلي، و كلاهما في حقيقة الأمر لغوي بحت» (صلاح، 1998: 87).

Meaning: “it is necessary to briefly mention the importance of referring to the categories of rhetoric and critiquing it on the basis of new framework and approaches of the linguistics, one example is the division of the trope into lexical and mental, while both are in fact, mere lexical”.

Al-Maraghi used simple and clear words in clarifying and defining mental trope which is understandable and also not possible to have different interpretation of it. Thus, he says:

«المجاز العقلي: إسناد المتكلم الفعل أو ما في معناه إلي غير ما هو له في اعتقاده، لملايسة بينهما، مع قرينة صارفة عن أن يكون الإسناد إلي ما هو له في اعتقاده» (1993: 295).

Meaning: “the mental trope is that the speaker attributes the verb and what is related to it to something that he thinks is not originally created to it, because of the similarity between them by association of a refraining context that prevents the predication of the verb to its intended meaning”. He continues that the presumption of this trope is mostly rational and sometimes lexical or circumstantial and on the basis of this presumption he also called that a rational trope (ibid, pp. 295-297).

Tabaneh contested the view that the mental trope be discussed in semantics and consider it inadmissible and argued that it is a kind of trope just because the rhetoricians had a consensus on it and all of them discussed it in semantics. Therefore the Sakkaki's work is right and Khatib brought that kind of trope into semantics without any reason for it, is not even compatible with the definitions of semantics (Tabaneh, 1958: p.287). Following this remark he expresses Sakkaki and Qazvini's definitions of mental trope, but he didn't approve or reject any of them (ibid).

Saeedi prefers Qazvini's definition over Sakkaki's because it refers to the context and he holds that the mental trope like lexical trope requires the context (2000: p.127).

Haddareh considers Abd-Al-Ghaher as the initiator and discriminator of this kind of trope and explains the Abd-Al-Ghaher, Sakkaki, and Qazvini's views in a detailed discussion, and then he has clear remarks on two positions. In one case he opposes Sakkaki but agrees with Qazvini, in another case he opposes Qazvini but agrees with Sakkaki. He rejects the view of Sakkaki who says that the mental trope has a metaphorical basis and is counted as implicit metaphor. He thinks that in metaphor should be a ground of analogy between the established meaning and the tropical meaning, while in mental trope there is not such a ground. Therefore, in this kind of trope there is not any metaphor or analogy, but the trope is just in attribution of the

verb or what is in its meaning to an unreal agent (Haddareh, 1989: pp. 54-55).

On the other hand, he also disproves the idea of Qazvini that considers the mental trope a part in the art of invention not in the art of tropes and says:

«و لا نري صحة ما ذهب إليه القزويني، فالمجاز العقلي جزء من المجاز في أصله و معناه و لا ينفصل عن علم البيان» (همان، 55).

Meaning: “We don't approve what Qazvini believes, because the mental trope is a part of trope whether in the real speech or in the meaning and cannot be separated from the art of tropes”.

Conclusion

Abd-Al-Ghaher is the originator and initiator of the mental trope into the field of Arabic rhetoric. The mental trope is also termed as “propositional trope”, “trope in predication”, “tropical predication”, “predicative trope”, “trope in proof”, and “trope in synthesis”. The mental trope is generally related to the construction and structure of the sentence and is beyond the domain of vocabularies; that is, every single word is used in its conventional meaning but the structure of the speech is not the same as the real (literal) meaning. In other words, the attribution of the verbal group (infinitive, gerund, and past participle) to something other than its real agent is a mental trope like the speech of the God almighty: «وَأُخْرِجَتِ الْأَرْضُ أَنْفَالَهَا» that the earth is the unreal agent and the attribution of the “أنفَال” to the earth is a mental trope, or the example like “the spring grew the plant” is a trope in proof, for that we attributed the growing of the plant to the spring and this attribution is a trope because the spring doesn't really grow the plant. Therefore, in mental trope two things are required: 1. the refraining context 2. something that the verb or the verbal attributed and related to.

There are two main ideas regarding this issue from the time of Abd-Al-Ghaher Jorjani up to now, one is Sakkaki's view which is derived from Abd-Al-Ghaher view. This view maintains that in this kind the trope is in the speech and its connotation which is used as something other than its subject because of the existence of context and interpretation, and for this reason those kinds of trope counted as part of the art of tropes. The other view is of the Qazvini and his followers which is rooted in Ibn Fares idea. They hold that in this type, the trope is in the attribution of the verb or verbal to something other than its subject, and they include its place in the art of invention and exclude it from being a topic in the art of tropes.

On account of its nature which is a kind of trope and its function which is the usage of the word in its connotational meaning, the position of the mental trope should be in the domain of the art of trope, because that is accounted as an important and common type of the art of trope; on the other hand, the personification which defined as the attribution of one of the human features to a non-human and non-speaking creature is also regarded as mental trope which has gained a sublime position in today literature and also the children's literature.

It should be said that whether it is called an implicit metaphor or a predicative trope, these differences of the views doesn't have an impact on the function and position of that kind of trope and argument about it is a waste of time and dwindling the mental energy away from the fonds of this art. It can be said that the Qazvini's view is more preferable, at least due to its simplicity, and quick and valid understanding of the subject.

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