



Factors Influencing the performance of federal Government of Somalia

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ABSTRACT

Much has been written about the putative virtues and vices of federal and unitary systems of government, but little experimental testing of the impact of such systems on the quality of governance has been conducted. The study was focused on the factors influencing the performance of federal Government of Somalia, a case study of Somali Federal Government, this time scope provides adequate information to the problem under investigation. The target populations of this study was 120 include the elected leaders in various political fields. They included Members of Parliament of the Federal Government of Somalia, Community leaders, Youth leaders and Women leaders. The researcher used closed questionnaires. The researcher directly distributed questionnaires to the respondents. The sample size consisted of 92 participants selected from the accessible population the Slovene's formula used to determine the minimum sample size. Data collected was analyzed by using descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistical tools were used to help in describing the data and determining the respondents' degree of agreement with the various statements under each factor. The data was analyzed and processed electronically using statistical package for social scientists (SPSS version 22) to analyze the factors influencing the performance of federal government of Somali. At the end of this study, the researcher is hopeful of coming up with recommendations that ensured peaceful coexistence of people in Somalia, while recognizing their diversity. It was found in this study clan interest table 4.5.3 shown the results researcher revealed that 79.7% percentage with the mean of 1.9% of the respondents mentioned that were agree that the main problem of Somalia the performance of federal government of Somali is clan interest. The study also revealed that an increase in clan interest and clan based federalism of Somalia positively affect the factors influence the performance of federal government of Somalia. The study recommends federalism was accomplishing the task of preserving natural unity through the distribution of powers and sovereignty between the central government and autonomous territorial entities operating within it. It ensured the peaceful coexistence of peoples, while recognizing their diversity and also to established formation fair division of natural resources between federal government and regional states.

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1. Introduction

According to the international political and legal theories and practice, co-federal, federal, consociation and unitary systems of government, are the four main forms also called structures of government which are used by various countries around the world. As we saw in the coming paragraphs, each system is a product of particular historical, geographical, racial, cultural, linguistic and religious circumstances and peculiarities of nations. No nation has adopted a system of government out of the blue or for a love of it. But due to these determinant factors some nations have chosen a co-federal, federal, consociation and unitary system. Here are some brief introductions and historical perspectives how and where these systems developed, applied and transformed with the passage time and development of nations (Elmi, 2008).

A confederation is a governmental structure where by two or more independent states enter a treaty for reasons of mutual trade, defense, political rapprochement and/or geographical necessity. They set up common commissions or secretariat to work out their mutual interests while each state in the

confederation has its sovereignty and government - head of state, legislature, army, money, flag and passport (Elmi, 2008).

If we look back into history most confederations emerged in Europe and America. The united Provinces of the Netherlands a confederation existed from 1579 to 1795; the Swiss Confederation Switzerland from 1789 to 1848; the German Bund a confederation from 1815 to 1866; the American Confederation from 1781 to 1789(1) Eventually over time and with the progress of societies such confederations had developed into either a federal state e.g. USA, Germany, consociation federal state e.g. Switzerland – a loose system where the central government is weak and constituent provinces called cantons with ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity retain their sovereignty; or to a decentralized unitary state e.g. The Netherlands. In Africa a confederation called Senegambia emerged between Senegal and Gambia and it aborted in the 1980s (Elmi, 2008).

The confederations sprang within one country's borders but today there are no modern confederations at national level

but global, continental, regional and sub-regional levels like the United Nations organization (UNO), Islamic Conference (IC), Organization of American States (AOS), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), League of Arab States (LAS), and the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) in East Africa for the purpose of co-operating and coordinating economic, social, security, and technological matters between member states (Elmi, 2008).

A Federal state is a highly decentralized form of government in which two or more independent states or provinces agree to form and share a central federal government and institutions while retaining some of their powers. The federal state is mostly premised on 'geographical devolution with guarantees for the autonomy of the units.' The federal constitution defines and distributes these powers and functions between the central state and the constituent states or provinces with the necessary guarantees. Normally, the federal government powers and functions include national defense and security, monetary and economic regulation, nationality and immigration, national symbols e.g. flag and emblem and foreign relations while the constituent units have powers to run trade and economy, education, health and policing. The latter also have the say to question the federation and dissociate from it if they wish so (Watts, 2008).

Now there are fifteen federal states in the world. One in Australia, four in the Americas - Canada, Brazil, Mexico and the United States; five in Europe - Belgium, Germany, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Switzerland the last two have consociation system where the central powers are either rotated or divided between ethnic groups. In Africa three federations were formed in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda and only the Nigerian one has survived. In Ethiopia an ethnic based federal system of government was adopted in 1994. So the Ethiopian and Nigerian federations which are fragile and yet to be consolidated are the only ones existing Africa. In Asia two federations that emerged in India and Malaysia still survive with underlying tensions. In the Middle East a federation called the Arab Republic was formed between Egypt and Syria in 1958 and it fell apart in 1961, and again in 1971 Egypt, Libya and Syria announced Federation of Arab Republics that finally broke up in 1973. In the Middle East there is one monarchic federation, i.e., the Federation of Arab Emirates. But some countries with ethno-cultural and religious diversity use the unitary system rather than federal one e.g. Britain, Kenya (Somalitalk, 2008).

The consociation system is a loose federal government for ethno-culturally, linguistically and religiously fragmented societies. The purpose of the use of this form of federalism is to insulate and keep at bay sharp differences and competition between these communities from consociation federal government run by mature elite politicians elected and delegated by the respective communities. For example, Switzerland has such various ethno-cultural and religious population groups German, French, Italian, etc. where the Swiss Federation is run by a federal assembly and executive collegiate council elected and delegated by the ethnic provinces known as cantons with the members of the former two rotating the post of president on ethnic basis every year (Somalitalk, 2008).

The unitary system of government has been the first, basic and is the most dominant one currently used in the world. There are at least four types or variations of the unitary system: a) a highly centralized type in which the central government or head of state has all the powers and controls

the country, that can be an absolute kingdom, dictatorial military or civilian one party regime e.g. Somalia in 1969-1991; b) a centralized type which usually practices partial liberal democracy and avails most of the powers for itself but delegates some petty powers and functions to municipalities e.g. Somalia in the 1960-1969; c) a decentralized type that often practices liberal democracy and devolves adequate autonomous decision-making roles and powers to regions and districts to plan and carry out their social and economic affairs e.g. UK, Netherlands; and d) a fourth type that either espouses to partial democracy or democracy and is premised on consociational religious consociation in which the high posts of central government are apportioned between communities divided on the basis of different religious, for example, Lebanon where the president belongs to Marinate Christians, prime minister to Sunni Muslims, and speaker of the parliament to Shi'a Muslims, etc. (Elmi, 2008)

For over 20 years Somalia endured turmoil caused by militia warfare, corruption and terrorism. Somalis suffered because of the governing dysfunction. Hundreds of thousands died, millions emigrated or fled to refugee camps; and violence, especially against Somali women and girls, reached unparalleled levels. Indeed, Genocide Watch regularly places Somalia on its watch list for crimes committed by the Islamic fundamentalist group, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin, commonly known as Al-Shabaab or "Movement of Warrior Youth." These crimes against other Somalis include rape, abduction of children as soldiers and murder (Watts, 2008). Moreover, some have argued that the Somali transitional government committed crimes against humanity through its misappropriation of foreign aid. In summary, a lack of governance left Somalia as the standard failed state; an ongoing humanitarian disaster, a sanctuary for pirates and a terrorist threat to the world community. Creating a functioning federalism in Somalia means negotiation, reconciliation and sharing of power among Somalis. Yet in the last 20 years "genuine negotiations" did not occur. International attempts at solving Somalia's instability resulted in the establishment of central governments that barely exerted control over a few square miles. These transitional governments lacked legitimacy, and even worse, hurt the Somali people through corruption and theft. Ending the mass atrocities occurring in Somalia entails building national unity and sharing power across individuals, clans and rivals (Watts, 2008).

Somalia was a country that had been functioning under centralized/unitary state system for a relatively long period of its post-colonial history. Somalia has yet failed to reconstitute the basic characteristics of statehood: the obliteration that followed the protracted civil wars, particularly; left Somalia as a "failed state" that cannot recover over a short period of time. Somalia is politically weak, socially fragmented and listed most fragile and vulnerable nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Dahiye, 2013).

As a failed state located in a strategic area, Somalia attracted international interventions and protracted discussion. Its collapse engendered debate concerning the cause of its dysfunction and what should be done to establish stability. The most common reasons given for Somalia's failure include: its clan system, enduring influence of colonialism, lack of sufficient economic resources, and blundering by the international community at peace building.

International community has paid unwavering efforts to Somalia state-building formation but it seems that Somalia has suffered this top down state building approach because many attempts of restoring peace, security and rebuilding state

functions of Somalia failed. Notably the recurrent of political and security crisis in Somalia preventing any meaningful solution to be realized,

It was late 2012, when last Somalia conference was held in Mogadishu to end the transition government and created permanent Federal State of Somalia, constitutional referendum and holding multiparty elections were ambitious plans laid down by the international community in order to move forward rebuilding state institutions at minimum level. However despite of all the international community efforts to create a federal state in Somalia, the country is still experiencing political instability. This indicates evidence of failure of federalism in bringing relative peace to Somalia, it is because of this view that the study aims at studying the challenges facing the success of Federalism in bringing relative peace to Somalia (Dahiye, 2013)

Objective of the Study

The main purpose of this study was guided by the following specific objectives.

- 1) To determine the influence of security challenges on the performance of federal government of Somalia
- 2) To determine the influence of international community interference on the performance of federal government of Somalia.
- 3) To analyze the influence of clan interest on the performance of federal government of Somalia.

2. Literature Review

Theoretical framework

Federalism system is a political concept in which a group of members are bound together by covenant or agreement with a governing representative head. The term "federalism" is also used to describe a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constituent political units (such as states or provinces). Federalism is a system based upon democratic rules and institutions in which the power to govern is shared between national and provincial/state governments, creating what is often called a federation (Ronald, 2002). To understand the article under study, in the research was used the theory of federalism, the theory of regional integration and the theory of political federalism.

The Theory of Federalism

Federalism is a process rather than a design, in scholar's attempt to analytically bring into clear perspectives the basics of federalism as a structural mechanism for the governance of men within various polities that form part of the physiology of global political community. These theories have variously highlighted the components inherent in federalism as does the attention they deserve in that: the actual sorting out of functional tasks among different levels of government is a perpetual source of tension and uncertainty in most federalism (Elazar, 1998). It should be stated at this point, that, our consideration of federalism in theoretical and practical perspectives would be more of a contemporary review of the works (Wheare, 2002). But then, we would argue that there can hardly be any appropriate point of departure than the contributions of (Wheare, 2002). Our adoption of Wheare's work as the point of our analytical take-off is anchored on this scholar's universal acclamation as the reputed father of (modern) federalism (Roosevelt, 2000). In fact, Wheare's contribution to federalism which, as recently noted by (Ajayi, 1997) was based "in its entirety on the American 1887 federal model" now forms the bedrock of all federal policies. His doctrine of federalism, which, while recognizing the inevitability of conflicts among the components of the

federation or any federation, prescriptively advocates mechanism for constitutionally dealing with such conflicts include the following: - The division of governmental responsibilities between levels of government. Written constitution spelling out this division and from which federal and state authorities derive their powers. A judiciary independent of both levels of government that acts as an arbiter in cases where there are conflicts over the jurisdictions enumerated in 1) above (Ajayi, 1997).

The federal arrangement emphasizing coequal supremacy of the various levels each in its respective field of operation. The citizens of the federation are concurrently under two authorities and owing loyalty to them (Wheare, 1964). Put together, Wheare views federalism as a form of government which embodies "the federal principles". However, the workability of these principles is contingent on the recognition of the dual prerequisites of federalism which according to Wheare stated that: firstly, the communities of states concerned (i.e., federating) must desire to be under a single independent government for some purposes...secondly, they must desire at the same time to retain or establish independent regional government in some matters at least. This, among others, explains Smiley's (1976) argument that "the most characteristic aspect of a federal constitution i.e. federalism is its division of law-making powers between the central and regional governments". It equally explains the catalyzing factors for federating in most polities which (Burgess, 1991) called the "determinants of federalism" and, which (Ola, 1992) identifies as: a) A sense of insecurity and an acknowledgement of a need for common defense b) A hope for economic advantage c) Some profitable historical association, which is simply continued in this form. d) Some feelings of mutual compatibility of the component parts e) a history of peaceful co-existence and settlement of disagreement through a process of give and take.

A federal system of government often arises from the desire of a people to form a union without losing their identity. It is a compromise in a multinational state between two types of self-determination - the determination to maintain a supranational framework of government which guarantees security for all in the state, nation or the nation-state on the one hand and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities on the other hand. Thus, expatiating further on the concept of federalism and Whittington eloquently argued, that, "a federal system reconciles a desire for over-all unity with a desire for local or regional autonomy." And, this argument, has since been reinforced by (William, 1999) when he claimed that federalism basically or fundamentally satisfies the need for co-operation and fulfils the desire for unity without being parasitic to local identity and power (emphasis mine) Even though, these positions sound confirmatory is-à-vis one of the core arguments of Wheare, the latter's position, apart from its being unrealistic in terms of contemporary federalism, has been variously criticized (William, 1999).

The Theory of Regional Integration

In the above, two major traditions of federalism theory have been presented. In this section it was attempted to modify the approach, to lay the basis for a comprehensive model for regional integration. As a rule, federations rest on a voluntary decision to integrate, as in the case of USA and Australia or the European federations like Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and thus to form a new state, a new international actor. As federations are the final result of regional integration processes, it is a mistake not to treat federalism theory as

regional integration theory proper. It is hard not to agree with him in his positive evaluation of Riker's theory of federal bargaining in a modified version, extending the perceived threat from that on external and internal diplomatic or military threats to include economic and thus social threat too. But Riker's theory lacks an explanation as to the intervening variables or factors which facilitate the integration process and help keeping the federation together, such as a) a common culture and b) an institution upholding the federal idea the integration project (Nancy, 2004).

With an eye to the basis for creating the new federation, it is suggested to add one intervening or facilitating variable namely a common cultural basis. Sharing the same basic culture ensures, as argued previously, that there is a common understanding of the central concepts like 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'rule of law'. But what is culture? (Gullestrup, 2003) Culture is the worldview and the values, rules, moral norms and actual conduct as well (Olaopa, 2003). As the material and immaterial products and symbols related thereto as human beings in a given context and over a given time span take over from the previous 'generation'; which they eventually in a changed form try to pass over to the next 'generation' and which in one or the other form differentiates them from human beings belonging to another culture." Culture is not static; it develops over time, among other reasons, due to socialization.

Common beliefs are built over the years as to how 'things are done'. This variable has been present in all federations entered into on a voluntary basis. The dissolution of India into India and Pakistan, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union into a very fragile Commonwealth of Independent States including a fragile Russia may be attributed to the lack of a common cultural basis. Thus it seems reasonable to use a model with three elements, when looking at why federations arise. The two first elements are the most important, concerning the concrete large decisions, the third is important for the preparation of the grand decisions. The last is important for facilitating the decision or the federal bargaining itself. 1) The wish to counter a perceived threat be that military, economic, societal etc by expanding one's territory by peaceful means; 2) the wish to join a federation or territorial entity, to counter a perceived threat, and thus secure the survival of one's own state, and 3) a common cultural basis (Olaopa, 2003).

What Riker's and Wheare's theories, and indeed most federal theories, are trying to explain is the 'all out' situation, where sovereign states within a shorter period strike a federal bargain and create or join a federation. It is harder for Riker and Wheare to explain an 'organic' or stepwise creation of a federation. But the point is that federal theory ignores, or is not interested in the organic development, where a slow or piecemeal transfer of autonomy, 'sovereignty', from the constituent entities to a political center is taking place. Thus the federal theories are able to explain one kind of regional integration process, but not another. We are talking of two processes possibly leading to the same goal, a new state. An obvious choice of complementary theory for explaining the organic integration process would be newest version of neo-functionalism, as proposed by (Burgess, 1991) and by (Schmitter, 2005). And federalism and neo-functionalism share several assumptions, such as 1) Integration is an attempt to create a stronger unit than the individual member states before the integration. 2) Interests drive the process, not ideology. 3) An external 'kick' threat, crisis may be necessary to ignite a higher stage of integration. 4) The attitude of the

elites is important and 5) the participating states are democratic.

The Theory of Political Federalism

Multi-ethnic nations have sometimes found decentralized political arrangements attractive. Such arrangements permit peoples who may differ greatly in their conceptions of a good public life to develop and maintain their own separate communities, within the context of a larger and more powerful political economy. Ethnically more homogeneous nations such as the United States, at the time of its founding, or Australia today, often find decentralized modes of policy formation and administration convenient as well. In such nations, geographic distances, diverse economies, regional disparities in preferences, and variations in local historical experience can make decentralized policy-making institutions more efficient and more responsive than national ones. Federalism, the division of sovereign authority among levels of government, can be seen as a way of stabilizing, or making credible, decentralized governmental structures. This paper examines whether practical federal arrangements can sufficiently insulate governmental decisions at all levels to maintain a stable and credible decentralized political structure (William 1999).

This theory it counsels the adoption of policy formation processes that take advantage of scale economies and that permit citizens to sort themselves among jurisdictions according to their tastes for public services. Decentralization permits the allocation of decision making authority to take account of the economic characteristics of the goods and services being produced. It permits the choice of governmental units capable of internalizing externalities in service provision and recognizes that this usually was entail having different units provide each good or service and that taxation be organized at the national level to ensure that allocation decisions are not tax induced (Ferejohn, 2000).

Conceptual frame work

In the conceptual framework below shows the relationship between independent and dependent variables. (Saunders, 2012) Holds that, conceptual framework is used in research outline the possible courses of action or the preferred approach to an idea. The independent variables in the study are; security, international community and clan interests, while the dependent variable is performance of federal government of Somalia.

From the conceptual framework above, performance of federal government of Somalia may be as a result of unbefitting security problem, international community interference and clan interests within Somalia context. The perceived three factors are examined in detail to determine their relevance in contributing or being the factors influencing the performance of federal government of Somalia.

Security

The fact that the Federal Government is still unable to make its writ run all across the country has reinforced a view that it should not have a role in federal state-making. The fact that large areas of land remain in the hands of Al-Shabaab certainly poses a challenge. Despite the liberation of the major port of Kismayo in 2012 and of a number of towns in central and southern areas recently, Al-Shabaab's continued rural control has made formation of local governance structures difficult. Targeted killings of local administrators coupled with Al-Shabaab's approach of taking advantage of clan alliances and counter-alliances have all worked against federalism taking root in Somalia. Some government critics, despite all evidence to the contrary, have argued that

federalism is a model imposed by neighbors of Somalia with the deliberate intent to weaken the state (Beer, 2014).




Figure 2.1. conceptual framework.

The region has significant security interests in Somalia, and immediate neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda all have sizable forces in the country. Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somali is very much linked into the Middle East, and Egypt, Qatar and Turkey are very active in the country. (Hogendoorn, 2013) Despite its size, Djibouti plays a significant role, in large part because much of its population is Somali and many Somali businessmen either do business in, or have strong ties with businessmen from the country. Djibouti has also hosted several multi-year Somali peace processes and its elite have strong ties to Somali leaders. Its forces are now based in relatively quiet central Somalia (Hogendoorn, 2013).

Ethiopia has been Somalia's historic regional rival: disputes over control of the Ogaden region, which Somali nationalists consider to be part of "Greater Somalia" continue, and led to a brief war (1977-78) and much longer proxy conflict. Calls for the annexation of the Ogaden, as well as other parts of greater Somalia, remain popular with Somali nationalists, and pandering to this sentiment by the Islamic Court Union (ICU) was part of the reason Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006. Addis Ababa quickly expelled the ICU from major cities, and then remained to prop up the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This led to the rise of Al-Shabaab, which presented itself as the most effective force fighting Ethiopian "occupation". It was during this period that the group received its most significant Diaspora support not because they shared its ideology, but because they saw Al-Shabaab as part of a liberation struggle. The intervention cost Ethiopia dearly, and three years later, Addis quietly relented to the selection of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former chairman of the ICU as the new TFG president. Ethiopia quickly withdrew, with AMISOM only slowly replacing it as the force protecting the embattled government. Since then Ethiopia has focused largely on supporting groups that can effectively act as a buffer along its borders, many of whom are resistant to the new central government. This includes Somaliland and Puntland State. (Hogendoorn, 2013)

Kenya is a relatively new entrant in Somalia. Nairobi forcefully intervened in 2011 to create its own buffer state and facilitate the return of more than 0.5 million Somali refugees

currently living in the country. Kenya subsequently joined AMISOM, but often follows its own interests. In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its support behind Ahmed Madobe, its most effective proxy force leader. Publicly Kenya is looking for an exit, but Somalis view this claim with great skepticism. According to the UN Monitoring Group, Kenyan-Somali politicians and Kenyan military officers are allegedly earning large amounts of money from trade, including illegal charcoal, passing through Kismayo, and more importantly most believe Kenya wants to control southern Somalia because it has large oil and natural gas deposits. Al-Shabaab is aggressively trying to turn the local population against the Kenyan "Christian" forces occupiers, and the Westgate Mall attack was an attempt to trigger a crackdown to that end (Hogendoorn, 2013).

Uganda is most removed, but remains the dominant actor in Mogadishu (despite the presence of a large Burundian contingent) because of the size of its contingent and the forceful personality of President Museveni. Its contingent is also accused by Somalis of profiteering from the war. Previously very active, Museveni lately has been distracted by political turmoil in Kampala and has taken a less force role, ceding some influence to Ethiopia and Kenya. (Hogendoorn, 2013).

International Community Interference

According to the literature review of previous scholars, international involvement complicated by numerous bilateral countries with individual agendas, there are also a number of international organizations, including the UN, AU, and IGAD (not to forget, occasionally, the League of Arab States, the World Bank, and NATO) active in Somalia with no clear division of responsibilities or lead actor. (This sometimes was a problem within the UN and AMISOM as well, where agencies did not cooperate or contingents did not follow the chain of command). They are also joined by a number of special envoys with unclear roles versus the international organizations, the missions in Somalia or ambassadors accredited to Mogadishu (Dosenrode, 2010).

The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the overlapping mandates of the AU and the UN. The AU has the military peace enforcement responsibility, but by virtue of having been in Mogadishu for the last four years and fielding a force of over 17,000 troops is a major political actor in Somalia, while the UN has a political mandate, but by virtue of security being a huge part of re-establishing stability in the country (as well as supply a great deal of support to AMISOM, through UNSOA, and the government) was very much involved in security policy and security sector reform. Both missions are also headed by special representatives with no clear instructions on how to share responsibilities. This was a particular problem for AMISOM and UNPOS, particularly because UNPOS was based in Kenya and its senior staff rarely spent much time in Mogadishu (Dosenrode, 2010)).

It is too early to tell if new United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM), established on 3 June 2012 can succeed where so many others have failed. Its mandate includes the provision of policy advice to the SFG and AMISOM on peace building and state building in the areas of: governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination of international donor support. It is also tasked to help build the SFG's capacity to promote respect for human rights and women's empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions. To strengthen intra-UN coordination, a major problem since UNPOS was created in

1995, a post of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator was established on 1 January 2014 and “structurally integrated into UNSOM (Hogendoorn, 2013)

Importantly, UNSOM is based in Mogadishu and was deployed across Somalia, as requested by the Federal Government and as conditions permitted so far it is only present in the capital, Garowe, Baidoa and Kismayo (it has not received permission to establish an office in Hargeisa). The Security Council emphasized the need for coordination, and UNSOM and AMISOM worked “on parameters for practical partnership on the ground”. To date UNSOM is just starting to deploy with approximately 50 staff in Mogadishu, whose mobility is severely subscribed because of insecurity (the UN compound was attacked on 19 June and 1 permanent staff, 3 contractors and 4 guards were killed, along with at least 6 Somali bystanders). It was not up to full strength until early 2014, depending on the security situation. (Hogendoorn, 2013).

The major role for UNSOM was coordinating security sector reform and international support. As was noted by the UN technical assessment team, “A common and closely coordinated strategy for international security support, which sets out clearly the respective responsibilities for the Africa Union, the United Nations, other allies, and Somali forces, with clear timelines and appropriate resources is a priority”. Security training is now being conducted by Somali forces, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), Turkey, Ethiopia and Bancroft Global Development, a private company; this is ostensibly coordinated through a UNSOM facilitated and Somali-led steering group. Much work remains to be done. According to the last UN report, Somali forces continue to face significant logistical challenges and “indiscipline continued to present a challenge, and there were reports of clashes within Somali security forces in Baidoa and Buurhakaba, and an increasing number of desertions in Bay and Bakool. Furthermore, police continue to face serious capacity gaps and “international support, including stipends and training continues, but lack of coherence undermines its effectiveness” (Beer, 2014)

Donor coordination was equally challenging. Encouragingly the SFG has developed the Somali Compact that strives to provide an overarching strategic framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts over the next three years. It was remaining to be seen if the donor community, in its New Deal pledges, was adhere to that framework, especially as counter-terrorism priorities again raise to the fore with the recent Westgate Mall attack. (Beer, 2014).

Clan Interests

The remains the major force challenging the spread of federalism. The draft constitution states that two and more regions can form a federal state, but this makes no allowance for clan interests. These have manifested themselves in the form of disputes and conflicts between clans that see themselves as indigenous to certain regions and others who are considered newcomers, either due to massive displacement from the conflicts of the last two decades or as a result of deliberate policies practiced under the dictatorship of Siad Barre in the 1980s. These have strongly influenced clan efforts to influence attempts to merge regions into a proposed federal state. The availability of actual or potential resources has also played a role in hampering the creation of federal states. This also relates to the desire of regions to ward off federal hands

from the granting of profitable oil or other mineral concessions. (Bermann, 1998).

In other words, although there may be considerable agreement over the concept of federalism, there are still wide divergences on the practicalities of the relationship between Federal and State governments and limited creation and application of the necessary structures for the process. Equally, there are still uncertainties over which regions could or should come together to form states. In addition, controversies between high-level officials of the FGS also had a role in delaying the regional formation. Mostly driven by a desire to advance clan interests, such controversies stalled progress on numerous occasions, undermining the institutional integrity of the government. (Dahiye, 2013).

At the same time, despite these challenges, a closer look provides some encouraging signs. The rapprochement between the Federal Government and the Punt land administration is notable in this regard. Punt land, the oldest self-governing entity in Somalia (excluding Somaliland, which declared its own unrecognized independence in 1991), is not yet recognized as a federal state in the absence of an agreed constitution, but it is seen as a model to emulate in other parts of Somalia. The creation of the Juba Interim Administration (JIA) formation also demonstrates a significant development. Last year’s August 27 Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the Juba delegates led by Ahmed Madobe and the Federal Government was a milestone. It was followed by an agreement that endorsed the Addis Ababa Agreement by five other power contenders including Aden Shire in February 2014. The specifics of the Juba Interim Administration were finally agreed upon subsequently after two reconciliation conferences in Mogadishu and Kismayo as well as visits of officials of the FGS and JIA to Kismayo and Mogadishu. (Beer, 2014).

The JIA’s formation has three major positives as far as regional state formation is concerned. The first is that the regional initiative that was spearheaded by IGAD and Ethiopia’s mediation role was effective in helping the two parties reach a deal. It is a useful reminder that regional mechanisms can play a great role in pacifying Somalia. Secondly, as Kismayo is a city home to more than 19 clans and sub-clans, the success in forming JIA is proof of the possibility of producing compromises for the interests of the more powerful clans. The agreement was able to solve the dispute between the federal government and Juba political actors, providing an interim mechanism wherein administration of the Kismayo port would be under the federal government whereas the revenue would be used by and large to the development of the region. By promising inclusive representation of all clans, it has also substantially defused political tension in the region. For instance some of the attempts to create state formation are being held hostage due to rivalry over the levels of representation among two or three clans. The formation of the JIA provides a real example of the way to settle the different and competing interests of a number of clans. It is also important that the FGS showed flexibility in accommodating the interests of local parties and politicians in regional state formation in line with its bottom-up approach to federal state-making. Third, it might be added that the fact that the agreements reduced the tensions arising in Kismayo from rival presidential claimants and brought semblance of order was particularly commendable. (Beer, 2014)

The recent agreement to form a Southwest Interim Administration comprising Bay, Bakol, and Lower Shebelle is also a significant step. Two groups advocated this. One,

referred to as the Southwest 6 group, supported the formation of a single state encompassing Bay, Bakol, Lower Shebelle, Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba. A second group, the Southwest 3 group, supported a state composed of only three regions, Lower Shebelle, Bay and Bakol. The basis of the dispute lay in disagreements between the two main elements of the Merifle/Rahenweyne clans, and the agreements reached were have much wider repercussions on regional state formations. The attempt to include Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba in a Southwest state threatened the existence of the JIA and disruption of the whole Juba process. The Federal Government played an important mediating role, emphasizing that it was listening to the grass roots and also underlining that it was encouraging that a Somali-led process had gained the trust of all parties, and hopefully settled the dispute.(Dahiye, 2013).

Measurement of Performance Federal Government

The federalization process of Somalia is in full motion, but not complete. So far the new name of the republic is: The Federal Republic of Somalia and we have a provisional constitution that provides general guidelines and basic rules whose aim is to structure and shape the future federal state of Somalia. Together with political stability and security, the Somali government is determined to finalize all the necessary constitutional amendments, complete the formation of the federal entities of the country and gradually build the federal institutions of the central administration. However, while the implementation of Somalia's federalization task is gradually gaining momentum, it seems that the majority of the Somali people are at a complete loss about the type of federalism, suitable to their country. The sixty and more federal states and devolutions of the world behave between a centralized unitary government style and a very loose federalization brand. In some states the federal government is very powerful while in others the regional entities are more dominant than the central administration. The existing federal states of the world are divided into executive, parliamentary and monarchy (Qassim, 2014).

The most vital equilibrium for the Somali federalism is to divide fairly the powers of the government between the center and the regions on one side and to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country on the other. In other terms, the level of the power sharing should not jeopardize the freedom of the regional entities to manage autonomously their own regional affairs and at the same time keep together Somalia as one nation and one people. While the federal government of Somalia is trying its best to be fully engaged in its federalization duty, the hazy concept of federalism, not very clear to many Somalis, has both supporters and opponents within our population. (Ronald, 2002).

Puntland, Jubaland and South West State and the one that has just concluded in Garowe on May 2015 was an extremely useful and step forward towards the implementation of Federal System, where there was a large consensus on how 'to establish a forum and hold routine meetings' between the top leaders of the Federal Government of Somalia and Presidents of Federal Member States, achieving the vision 2016, accelerating the formation of the remaining Federal States, the Somali National Defense Force integration and the independent constitutional commissions in order to finalize implementation of the federal system in the country and the need to empower states. While this discussion was in the interests of a strong Federal Somalia, it is not given in a partisan spirit, but because of a deep and profound belief that a

strong Federal System is absolutely vital to our Somali way of life. We all want national unity where ever and whenever national unity aids in the preservation of Somalia and the security of our people. No one wants, or should want, national unity in any policy or action injurious to the best interests of the nation; in any policy which would destroy the State formation, the 'post-transitional' institutions and the System of Government in Somalia (Hashi, 2015).

It is impossible for the nation to develop unless states develop. Can we develop a new mechanism that plans according Somalia's strengths, empowers states, and brings on board all state formation activities, including those, which happen outside the Federal Government? Time and experience have demonstrated the Federal System of Government to be the only system, which was preserved the Somali way of life. It has built a strong Somalia. It was preserved a united Somalia. The Federal Somali Government and State government's structural set-ups should be fundamentally changed to achieve a truly democratic society where the rule of law reigns supreme above everyone including the presidency. The law enforcement agents like the Police, NISA, SNA, should be completely and truly independent in terms of funding and execution as it obtains in the modern world(Hashi, 2015).

The long overdue establishment of National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and Constitutional Court should be truly inclusive and completely independent in terms of funding and administration, receiving orders from no one. The judiciary both at state and federal levels, should be truly and completely independent and no state or federal executive should have any form of power/influence on the judiciary by making the appointment, promotion and dismissal of local, state and federal judges the sole responsibility of the National Judicial Commission without seeking the permission or approval from anyone.

Despite the good will of the leaders of Somalia to preserve the unity of the country within a federal system of government, opponents of federalism label it as harmful and extremely scary political strategy. Many people argue that the federal system is not suitable to Somalia because of its people's homogeneity: same religion, same language and same culture. The advocates of this theory believe that federalism is introduced not to keep Somalis together but to divide them.

They also believe that the ongoing clan based regional states are very much damaging and divisive. They campaign that clannism is the opposite of nationalism and the antithesis of the Somali-ness itself. The more clan based entities are established, the more the Somali people shall physically divided emotionally distanced and their eventual voluntary reach-out demonized. Somalis are usually bonded by very beautiful and very much respected relationship. The more they are separated by clan based federal entities, the less mixed marriage was occurred and consequently the general Somali-ness was faded gradually (Stein, 2003).

3. Methodology

The research design was adopted in this research used descriptive research design is a valid method for researching specific subjects and as a sign to more quantitative studies.(Shuttle, 2008). At this point, the researchers want to study factors influencing the performance of federal government of Somalia. The researcher was investigation designs have enabled him to get the necessary data for this study.

The target population of this study was 120 individuals who included the elected leaders, in various political fields. They were including 40 Members of Parliament of the Federal Government of Somalia, 30 Community leaders, 30 Youth leaders and 20 Women leaders. The MPs were consisting of Chairpersons of parliament Committees. These selected people are suitable and relevant for this study.

the regression model used is $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$, where

Y = dependent variable Performance federal government of Somalia.

X = the independent variable factors influence

X₁: influence of Security

X₂: International Community

X₃: Clan interest

ε : Error term.

4. Research Finding

Descriptive Analysis

The total numbers of the respondents of this study were 92 and aimed to distribute and receive 92 completed questionnaires to ensure an adequate analysis of all research questions. In this study, were collected and filled 92 usable questionnaires that represent 76.7% of target population (120). The criteria used to measure performance and challenges of the research study were to examine independent variables of the research questions. The study found that examined factors security challenges, international community interference and clan interest have significant influence on performance of federal government of Somalia.

Security influence

This study was conducted in Mogadishu, which was asked some questions about how security challenges can influence on the performance of federal government of Somalia. In this section displayed that the first variable in evaluation of the respondents' answers about security, the below table were illustrated.

Table 4.3. Security Influence.

No	IV One: Security Influence	N	Mean	SD
1	the tribal militia is the challenge to the performance of Federal government of Somalia	92	1.50	.896
2	Al-Shabab or insurgency groups are obstacle the performance of federal government of Somalia.	92	1.63	.641
3	lack of unity of national military army can undermine the performance of federal government of Somalia	92	1.49	.602
4	Lack of transparency and accountabilities of Somalia political leaders can cause instability and security problems	92	1.52	.620
5	General political instabilities and security escalation decline the performance of federal government of Somalia	92	2.05	.930
6	Piracy is one of the most security problems in Somalia	92	3.10	.865
	Mean index		1.88	0.762

Table 4.3 express that the respondents answered that the tribal militia is the challenge to the performance of Federal government of Somalia and mean score found was 1.50. The respondents answered that Al-Shabab or insurgency groups are obstacle the performance of federal government of Somalia and mean score found was 1.63. The respondents answered that lack of unity of national military army can undermine the performance of federal government of Somalia and mean score found was 1.49. The respondents answered

that Lack of transparency and accountabilities of Somalia political leaders can cause instability and security problems and mean score found was 1.52. The respondents answered that the General political instabilities and security escalation can decline the performance of federal government of Somalia and mean score found was 2.05. The respondents answered that they cannot decide that the piracy is one of the most security problems in Somalia and mean score found was 3.10 that means neutral response.

Table 4.4. International community interference.

No	IV Two: International Community	N	mean	SD
1	The intervention of Foreign troops in Somalia supporting Somalis in terms of peace maintenance are sometimes problem to the real implementation of federal system in Somalia	92	2.26	.993
2	Hiding agenda of neighbors countries in Somalia are great obstacle to success of federal government institution to create effective federal states and relevant national commissions	92	2.34	.829
3	The unclear strategies of international community in Somalia may delay to reach and success the common goals of Somalia federal system	92	1.75	.750
4	The involvement of international community to Somalia has positive impact to the performance of federal government of Somalia	92	2.12	.888
5	The international community actually contribute to resolve the conflict or problems in Somalia	92	2.25	.968
6	Non common strategies of international community in Somalia can be delay to the system formation of federalism of Somalia	92	1.72	.881
	Mean index		2.1	0.88

International Community Interfere

In this section displayed the second variable in evaluation of the respondents' answers about how international community interfere can influence on performance of federal government of Somalia, the below table were illustrated Table 4.4 Shows that the respondents answered that the intervention of foreign troops in Somalia supporting Somalis in terms of peace maintenance are sometimes problem to the real implementation of federal system in Somalia and mean score found was 2.26. The respondents answered that the hiding agenda of neighbors countries in Somalia are great obstacle to success of federal government institution to create effective federal states and relevant national commissions and mean score found was 2.34. The respondents answered that the unclear strategies of international community in Somalia may delay to reach and success the common goals of Somalia federal system and mean score found was 1.75. The respondents answered that the involvement of international community to Somalia has positive impact to the performance of federal government of Somalia and mean score found was 2.12. The respondents answered that the international community actually contribute to resolve the conflict or problems in Somalia and mean score found was 2.25. The respondents answered that non-common strategies of international community in Somalia can be delayed to the system formation of federalism of Somalia and mean score found was 1.72.

Clan Interest

In this section displayed the third variable in evaluation of the respondents' answers about how clan interests can

influence on the performance of federal government of Somalia, the below table were illustrated

Table 4.5. Clan interest.

No	IV Three: Clan Interest	N	Mean	SD
1	Power sharing conflict may negatively reflecting to successful implementation of Somalia federalism	92	1.50	.896
2	Clan based federal states is barrier to the federal system in Somalia	92	1.88	.796
3	The current federal states in Somalia established based on clannism	92	1.72	.816
4	The federal system is responsible the conflicts between Somalis reside in the regions	92	2.21	.989
5	The federalism divided the country and the people of Somalia	92	2.09	1.013
6	Federalism in Somalia improved Public Service delivery to the Citizens	92	2.15	1.257
	Mean index		1.92	0.83

Table 4.5 express that the respondents answered that the power sharing conflict may negatively reflecting to successful implementation of Somalia federalism and mean score found was 1.50. The respondents answered that the clan based federal states is barrier to the federal system in Somalia and mean score found was 1.88. The respondents answered that the current federal states in Somalia established based on clannism and mean score found was 1.72. The respondents answered that the federal system is responsible conflicts between Somalis reside in the same regions and mean score found was 2.21. The respondents answered that the federalism divided the country and the people of Somalia and mean score found was 2.09. The respondents answered that the Federalism in Somalia improved Public Service delivery to the Citizens and mean score found was 2.15.

Performance of Federal Government

In this section displayed the fourth variable (dependent variable) in evaluation of the respondents' answered about how it looks the performance of federal government of Somalia, the below table were illustrated the result.

Table 4.6. Performance of Federal Government.

No	DV: Performance of Federal Government	N	Mean	SD
1	Political stability has been achieved through the formation of federal government in Somalia	92	2.21	1.022
2	Federal government has enhanced security in Somalia	92	2.21	1.043
3	Constitutional amendment has been achieved through federal government	92	2.16	.935
4	Federal government has brought about fair distribution of resources in Somalia	92	2.21	.989
	Mean index		1.46	0.99

Table 4.6 shows that the respondents answered that political stability has been achieved through the formation of federal government in Somalia and mean score found was 2.21. The respondents answered that federal government has enhanced security in Somalia and mean score found was 2.21. The respondents answered that constitutional amendment has been achieved through federal government and mean score found was 2.16. The respondents answered that the federal government has brought about fair distribution of resources in Somalia and mean score found was 2.21.

The federalization process of Somalia is in full motion, but not complete. So far the new name of the republic is: The Federal Republic of Somalia and we have a provisional constitution that provides general guidelines and basic rules

whose aim is to structure and shape the future federal state of Somalia. Together with political stability and security, the Somali government is determined to finalize all the necessary constitutional amendments, complete the formation of the federal entities of the country and gradually build the federal institutions of the central administration. However, while the implementation of Somalia's federalization task is gradually gaining momentum, it seems that the majority of the Somali people are at a complete loss about the type of federalism, suitable to their country. The sixty and more federal states and devolutions of the world behave between a centralized unitary government style and a very loose federalization brand. In some states the federal government is very powerful while in others the regional entities are more dominant than the central administration. The existing federal states of the world are divided into executive, parliamentary and monarchy (Qassim, 2014).

Regression Analysis

In addition, the researcher conducted a multiple regression analysis so as to test factors of influence variables (independent) the performance of federal government of Somalia (dependent variable). The researcher applied the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS V 22.0) to code, enter and compute the measurements of the multiple regressions for the study. Coefficient of determination explains the extent to which changes in the dependent variable can be explained by the change in the independent variables or the percentage of variation in the dependent variable (performance of federal government of Somalia) that is explained by all the independent variables (factors of influence).

4.6.1 Model Summary

Table 4.7. Model Summary.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.495 ^a	.245	.219	.60851

a. Predictors: (Constant), influence Security, Intentional Community, Clan interest and performance of federal government of Somali.

The results in Table 4.6.1 indicate that regression coefficient (R) is 0.495 or 49.5% which implies that there is a great factor influence the performance federal government of Somalia while R-square is 0.245 showing that the predictor variable, represented by factor influence, contributes less than 0.219%) to the performance federal government of Somalia.

ANOVA

Table 4.8. ANOVA.

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10.553	3	3.518	9.500	.000a
	Residual	32.585	88	.370		
	Total	43.139	91			

a Predictors: (Constant), Clan interest, influence Security, International and community interference

b. Dependent Variable: Performance federal government of Somalia

The table 4.6.2 shows that the combination of the three independents variables significantly predicted the performance federal government of Somalia. This model is greatly significance in predicating how the security influences on the performance of federal government of Somalia. Since f calculated (F = 9.500, p<0.01) is greater than the F critical (

value =2.3, $p < 0.05$), this shows that the overall model was significant and less than the bench mark sig. 0.05

Regression Coefficient

Table 4.9. Regression Coefficient.

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.399	.370		1.076	.285
	Security problem	.343	.144	.231	2.385	.019
	Int. community	.324	.120	.264	2.691	.009
	Clan interest	.296	.147	.200	2.018	.047

a. Dependent Variable: Performance federal government of Somalia

From the data in the above table the established regression equation was;

$$Y = 0.399 + 0.343 X_1 + 0.324 X_2 + 0.296 X_3$$

Table 4.6.3 the multiple regression model for the performance federal government of Somalia as per indicators, influence Security ($B = .343$, $p < 0.05\%$) which imply that this to prediction constant zero, International Community ($B = .324$, $p < 0.05\%$) indicates that significantly contribute much to the prediction and Clan interest contribute much to prediction ($B = .295$, $p < 0.05\%$) which implies that the security greatly affect performance federal government of Somalia. The results indicated that there was great significant relationship between the factor influence and the performance federal government of Somalia. This was interpreted to mean that the combination of the above security was very important on the overall the performance federal of Somalia. The study by Shechtman, Z., Mahmoud, Z. & Katz, M. (1994, p.53), partially supports the findings of this study. The study also implies that international Community and Clan interest are the most effective improved and delay the performance federal government of Somalia.

5. Conclusion

Federalism is a system of government which devolves power from the federal government to state levels and lower. It has been used by world states for centuries. Somalia has chosen Federalism.

This study has discussed the current and existing challenges of federalism system of governance and opportunities of the federal political structure for Somalia. A great deal of work has been done in drafting the constitution, electing a new president and appointing a new government, but there is more work ahead for Somalia's political leaders. It has to continue discussing the Federal Constitution, its deficiencies and opportunities to correct it, The success or failure of this current government was judged by how the Federal Government approaches and discharges the Federal Constitution, its support for establishing the remaining new Federal Member States, adequately and fairly dealing with constitution such as Punt land and Somaliland, sharing revenue and ensuring international security support together and developing better relations for all sides for the progress of Somalia. Work together on security, economic development, re-establishing federal forces and social structure without mistrust between states and federal government.

6. Recommendation

1. The study recommends international Community should come up with clear strategic plan towards Somalia stabilization program
2. It should be established Somalia National Unity Army for all states and eradicate clan militia.

3. They should be a clear policy and procedures to account for Somali citizen to their politician leaders.

4. Advance inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the federal government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities.

5. The study recommends federalism was accomplishing the task of preserving national unity through the distribution of powers and sovereignty between the central state and the autonomous territorial entities operating within it. It ensured the peaceful coexistence of peoples, while recognizing their diversity.

6. Revenues should be clearly defined and the share of each level of government should be stated clearly. The collection of taxes need to be addressed, if the Federal customs are assigned to collect all taxes, then the process that regional and local administrations can draw from the bank should be simplified.

7. To established formation fair division of natural resources between Federal government and regional states

8. To accomplish Constitution amendments, population census and political participation to local parliaments to the concerned federal state's discernment, reducing considerably accuses of acting to benefit one group over the other.

7. Area for Further Research

Basing on the findings, the study recommended that a similar study should be done on other regions similar line in order to access whether the same results was attained

1. Assess the best approach can work with the state governments and federal government of Somalia, after establishment of many federal states based on clan we see the relationship between federal member and federal government of Somalia and their relations is not good and based on trust between them. Also, there are still wide divergences on the practicalities of the relationship between Federal and State governments and limited creation and application of the necessary structures for the process. Equally, there are still uncertainties over which regions could or should come together to form states. In addition, controversies between high-level officials of the FGS also had a role in delaying the regional formation. Mostly driven by a desire to advance clan interests, such controversies stalled progress on numerous occasions, undermining the institutional integrity of the government.

2. So, the gap is the poor relationship between the states and federal government because there is lack of nation-wide negotiations and community participation about the federal states while declined the small clans and minorities according to the rule and political participations. Also, the draft constitutions were not acknowledged the definition of federalism accomplished in Somalia, what kind of federalism and how it looks like.

3. Some of the community palming to the government and complaining the way of implementation about the federalism while there so no community participation and not reconcile the educators, scholars, civil society and minorities.

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