
Ibrahim Mohamedkarim Abdi and Josephine Mbura
Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, P.O BOX 81310 Mombasa.

ABSTRACT
This study generally looked into the challenges of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in maintaining peace in the country. The study also looked into the challenges the mission faced from March 2007, when it was first deployed to Mogadishu, and August 2012, when Somalis elected a new federal government to replace the old existing transitional governments to date. It had further gone to scrutinize how the mission was perceived by the people of Somalia in relation to the political dimensions of the Federal Government of Somalia and as well what has been done and what has not been achieved by the AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) in fulfilling its mandate of peacekeeping. The key aspects was the initial international political context in which the mission deployed; problems of internal coordination between the mission’s components; the lack of a reliable local partner with which to wage a counter-insurgency campaign; problems of strategic coordination among external partners; the nature of the enemy forces facing AMISOM, principally Al-Shabaab. AMISOM’s lack of relevant capabilities and resources to perform its mandated tasks and the capacity of facilitating legitimate and effective governance structures, especially as AMISOM began to deploy outside Mogadishu of late to begin liberating new frontiers in the South central regions. The study highlighted the role of Somalia factions, groups and clans in country’s problem. The general objectives of the research was to assess factors influencing regional intervention in Somalia and with specific objectives of the influence of stakeholder interest in on the regional intervention in Somalia, power competition among partner countries on regional intervention and evaluation of diverse goodwill on regional intervention in Somalia. During the study, the researcher used descriptive statistics research design both in qualitative and quantitative. The target population of this study was the members AMISOM and UN mission in Somalia. In the study, 106 people were selected as a sample size using Slovne’s formula. The researcher collected data through questionnaire and finally processed and analyzed the study result using the statistical packages of social scientist (SPSS). The researcher found out that both stakeholder interest and power competition have strong positive relationship with the regional intervention and that if the interests are not consistent with the objectives, the resultant will be low performance. The study recommends that peacekeeping mission and relevant stakeholders develop clear priorities and work towards a central strategy. Towards the peace building and stabilization efforts in Somalia.

ARTICLE INFO
Received history: 3 September 2016; Received in revised form: 30 September 2016; Accepted: 4 October 2016;

Keywords
Peace Building, Integral Strategy Roadmap, Geopolitics.

1. Introduction
The conflict in Somalia is a long-standing one, which had a profound regional impact. The main conflicts in Somalia had been inter-clan clashes and rivalry for power, warlords trying to assert their control over various regions in the country, piracy off the Somali coast, acts of terrorism perpetuated mostly by Al-Shabaab and border conflicts with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya (Luckystar, 2012). However, the security situation in Somalia has changed positively in recent past and this change is attributed to such phenomena as the intervention of African Forces in maintaining peace in the country. However, there were gaps and challenges facing the operation. The intervention of African troops in Somalia was meant to help to secure fragile peace. They were required to safe guard the capital for a long time, fight the insurgents, and liberate the areas under the control of Al-Shabaab, but intervention was not successfully implemented to aspirations (Luckystar, 2012).
Regional intervention/security can be simplistically defined as the ability of regional nations to ward off all forms of threats to its survival ranging from external aggression to challenges of economic, political, social and cultural deprivations while coping with the challenges of political development and good governance (Luckystar, 2012). While there have been successes, Somalia remains unstable, with political disputes and conflicts ongoing. After their independence in the 1960s and in response to the various sources of insecurity in Africa and the international environment, around 32 newly emerging African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963.
following the beginning of the “demise” of European colonialism (Elaigwu, 2003). The OAU established the institutional bases to assure the complete decolonization of the continent, to promote peace, security and cooperation, represent African in international diplomacy as well as lay the ground for the latter political and economic integration of all member states (Walraven, 2001).

The international system has already been stratified economically, politically, militarily and socio-culturally under the dominance of the developed nations when Post-independence African states join it as subordinate and impoverished actors. For much of the following three decades, one important feature of the international system was that it became an arena of an intense super power rivalries between the ex-USSR and the USA, a period referred to as the Cold War (Elaigwu, 2002). The question of African security should be examined in the light of its close relationship with the dynamics in the international system. When newly emerging African states joined the international system, they tried to fit into its existing structure; trade, monetary zones, political alliances, military and socio-cultural arrangements without being able to either control or change it. At the same time these states had to face the challenge of colonial legacies usually demonstrated by the indirect subordination or the direct physical military presence of their colonizers in a form of constant interventions in the politics of their ex-colonies (Francisco, 2004).

The question of Somalia should therefore be analyzed in view of the nature of colonial state formation and the subsequent takeover of power by post-colonial, mostly “illegitimate” and dictatorial regimes. Historically, the Italians and the British who had the upper hand against their French competitors in the Horn of Africa since the last decades of the 19th century colonized Somalia. While Italy took over the southern portion naming it Italian Somaliland, the British controlled the north and north-eastern portion of the present day Somali territory. Both sides were territorially and politically separate before the year 1960 when they officially merged together and declared an independent state of Somalia (Brons, 2001 and Ayoob, 2002).

The post-independence regimes pursued a policy of restoring colonially lost territories scattered in the neighboring nations in the Horn of Africa particularly in Ethiopia, which has the lion’s share. This ambition had arisen from the so-called the “Somali Irredentism” which was the dominant ideology of the politics in Somalia in pursuant of which the consecutive governments had to adopt foreign policies to realize the objective in question (Brons, 2001).

As a result, the ‘young’ nation sooner dragged itself into a border war with Ethiopia first in 1964 and then later into another full scale war in 1977/78. Both wars ended with the defeat of the “irredentism” and further bifurcated nationalism advocated by dictatorial regimes in the country. The ramifications had weakened the central government. The debacle of the defeat had threatened the incumbent president Siyad’s rule over emerging and strong faction leaders from different clan lines (ibid: 181).

The US which once led a mission called Operation Restore Hope in connivance with the UN peace-keeping operation was forced to leave Somalia after blaming for the casualties it encountered on its troops. International community’s failure in this regard further escalated the humanitarian crisis. Though the UN tried to broker negotiations among faction leaders, the political situation, despite the much-publicized peace agreements, remained extremely fluid and unstable (Fennimore, 2003).

Although the Organization of African Union (OAU), the predecessor of African Union (AU) failed to intervene in Somalia to curtail the escalating conflict, it attempted to give diplomatic support for a number of peace initiatives in collaboration with regional arrangements like the IGAD. Yet most of OAU’s endeavors were rather rhetoric and doomed to failure. It was just after its replacement by the AU that OAU’s old-intact principle of non-interference had to be abandoned giving the former the ‘legitimate’ right to intervene in the internal affairs of its member states in dire of humanitarian crises as explicitly stated in its Constitutive Act. As a result, AU’s relatively new principle of humanitarian intervention has been operational under the auspices of the Peace and Security Council. The AMISOM was officially launched since 2007 as one of the few peace-keeping operations so far responsibly waged by the organization despite grave challenges ahead of it (Moller, 2009).

The performance of AMISOM focused to provide support for the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the country and foster the political dialogue and reconciliation geared towards achieving national and regional security. It was mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create necessary conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia. How well the organization implemented its policies and programs and accomplished its strategic intent in terms of its mission and vision is of paramount concern. However, its intent has was hampered by a number of issues such as the shadow of Ethiopia’s Intervention. Established during Ethiopia’s attempt to forcibly install the TFG in Mogadishu, AMISOM was born into a war zone (US Bureau of Counter terrorism, 2012).

Ethiopia’s 2006 campaign was the latest in a long series of military incursions aimed at degrading Islamist bases in Somalia like Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). There was also considerable skepticism within the African Union about the legitimacy and effectiveness of Ethiopia’s actions and the wisdom of deploying into a violent, chaotic vacuum with no apparent peace strategy. Superpowers’ presence in different regions of Africa especially Somalia, compounded with internal factors either caused or escalated the numerous conflicts. The ramifications had weakened the central government (Fennimore, 2003). After Siyad’s downfall, the country turned into a battle field of two of the strongest faction leaders, particularly: Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aideed and for much of the following two decades, Somalia became a playground for the dominant faction elements organized on the basis of clan cleavages competing to get the upper hand in seizing political power from the central government (Chesterman, 2001).

The African Union Peace and Security Council, in its 69th meeting of January 19, 2007, mandated the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to: Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia working with all stakeholders, to provide as appropriate protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions, to provide within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts and to monitor in areas of deployment of its forces in the security situation.

AMISOM has been struggling in Somalia since its deployment. It has been constantly attacked by the insurgents. Lack of political progress is also another cause of concern for AMISOM. Some argue that the deployment of any peacekeeping force should be preceded by an inclusive peace agreement and consensus among major parties to the conflict, which unfortunately is not the case for AMISOM. The
security situation in Somalia caused reluctance among states contributing troops particularly Nigeria and Ghana (Svensson 2008).

According to some observers, those states that contributed troops also lacked full commitment to the Somali peace process. This evidently posed challenges to the performance of the mission within their mandates so as to achieve their objectives. In addition to being understaffed, the mission also continued to face financial and logistical constraints (Svensson, 2008). The annual budget of AMISOM is estimated to be US$622 million. As of January 2008, AMISOM has received only US$32 million (Peace and Security Council of the AU 2008). Its troops have not been regularly paid. Some observers argue that, at the beginning, AMISOM was considered neutral, but after it engaged in a series of combat operations with insurgents, it has been accused of indiscriminate attacks and shelling, resulting in its credibility being eroded (Interview with AFP correspondent).

AMISOM structures of command and control are not yet clear and the command has been without cohesion (Svensson, 2008). This obviously hampers the effectiveness of the mission and its capacity to successfully discharge its mandate. In general, the underfinanced and understaffed AMISOM is not playing the role it is expected to play. The UNSC has, therefore, extended the mandate of AMISOM several times. On February 4, 2010, the UNSC extended AMISOM’s mandate to January 31, 2011 (Interviews with Ali Wahad Abdullahi AFP correspondent, 2011).

In the midst of Somalia’s decades of conflict, Al-Shabaab, terrorist group with al-Qaeda links, has become particularly noticeable not only nationally but also regionally. Foreign intervention, therefore, is no new phenomenon in Somalia. On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia in self-defense to launch a military offensive against Al-Shabaab, called Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country), the reality of the Al-Shabaab menace in the region was highlighted. But still there were obstacles surrounding the intervention goals, therefore the study will look into the factors influencing the regional intervention in in Somalia.

Objectives of the Study

This study was guided by the following specific objectives.

1. To analyze the influence of stakeholders’ interests on regional intervention in Somalia.
2. To examine the influence of power competition among partner countries on the regional intervention in Somalia.
3. To evaluate the influence of diverse goodwill on regional intervention in Somalia.

2. Literature Review

Theoretical Framework

Regional intervention in maintaining peace is the most desired outcome and objective operations. Conflict resolution of a country is an important aspect that has been graded as stability, community co-existence and social development of the people (Kinsella & Rousseau, 2008). Without perfect integration and co-existence everything will be at suspicious. People or a country in serious disagreement, incompatibilities, fight, argue, contest, debate, combat, clash and war etc. can succeed nothing about its goals and aspirations. Conflict resolution refers to a range of process aimed at relieving or eliminating sources of conflict (William K Roche, 2010). Conflict resolution is a term for a whole range of methods and approaches for dealing with conflict: from negotiation to diplomacy, from mediation to arbitration, from facilitation to adjudication, from conciliation to conflict prevention, from conflict management to conflict transformation and from restorative justice to peacekeeping. To understand the theme under study, the research made use of theories of change, and democratic peace theory and ends with field theory.

Theories of change

The most important thing to know about theories of conflict resolutions to have depth understanding towards peace building and state building. Theories of change were that they were intended to be helpful and practical solution. They are not an academic exercise to make your work more difficult, but instead a tool to improve the design, implementation, and assessment of your programs. (Vogel, 2012)

As a development practitioner, the programs you design were intended to improve the conditions (economic, political, social, environmental, etc.) in a given context. As such, they would hopefully change how institutions operate/are structured, and the way people think or act such that these improvements take place and are sustained. As a practitioner, you drew upon your experience, and that of others, to create ways to catalyze or facilitate such changes. In doing so, you are making explicit, or sometimes implicit, assumptions about how the change will come about, i.e., which activities will function in which ways to create the desired outcome. “A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context.” It was intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program would address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes (Shapiro, 2006).

It was important to extend the statement a bit further to clarify underlying assumptions by adding the rationale or logic how and why the change would come on. For instance, one theory of change for a post-war program aimed at promoting employment for ex-combatant youth might was as follows: “If we provide employment for ex-combatant youth, then we would reduce the likelihood of inter-communal violence, because unemployed youths were the most likely to be recruited into fighting; many still held weapons and remain connected to their command structures. If they found employment, they would disengage from their command structures and would be less recruit-able into fighting because they would have more to lose (Nan, 2012).

There were several ways in which theories of change were useful in conflict and development programming, some of which have already been mentioned are 1) To make assumptions explicit about what change we expected to take place, and how/why we expected this to happen, 2) To weed out unrealistic program ideas and clarify and refined ideas that was worthy of further consideration, 3) To uncover gaps in programs, when to find that there were steps in the logic of the theories that turn out to be either incorrect or missing entirely. 4) To make sure everyone involved in designing and implementing the program had the same understanding of why a program was structured as it was, and how to implement it according to that structure. 5) To provide a basis for assessing relevance, effectiveness, and impact in monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and therefore to help identify reasons for success or failure. 6) To identify where adjustments or modifications in the program may be needed to achieve the desired outcome/result. 7) Based on above six terms, to contribute to knowledge about violence, peace, and development (Vogel, 2012).

When analysis, theory of change, and implementation come together effectively, the result should be a noticeable change in the conflict dynamics. Focusing on these outcomes,
particularly in the context of evaluation was critical for purposes of accountability and learning. If a project does not appear to affect the overall conflict dynamics, however, there were four broadly reasonable explanations: 1) the underlying analysis was incorrect. Perhaps the project did affect identified conflict factors, but these factors were not related to the overall conflict dynamics in the manner previously understood; for example, the project addressed the symptoms of conflict, instead of its sources. 2) The theory of change was unfounded or invalid. The expected changes did not take place because the project made incorrect assumptions about how change would occur in this context. Or perhaps the project did affect the targets of its change as intended, but the expected changes from this particular set of actions did not address drivers of conflict or had unintended negative consequences; for example, the project brought together leaders from opposing sides to pursue common goals unrelated to the peace process, and although relationships improved, attitudes about the other and about the peace process did not. 3) The project was not implemented properly. Perhaps the project did have a valid theory of change for affecting the conflict dynamics and the proposed actions would have yielded the desired outcomes, but the project did not go off as planned; for example, the project faced logistical challenges or malfeasance. 4) The theory of change was valid but insufficient. The project’s theory of change was valid and did affect the identified conflict factors, but it was insufficient to affect overall dynamics of peace and conflict. This, for example, could be due to the influence of other conflict factors that were not considered or addressed, or to the absence of linkages with other programs (Anderson, M. & Olson, 2003).

Democratic Peace Theories

Conflict resolutions have more different theories and theorists. Democratic peace theory can be suitable one for conflicts resolutions, in terms of the general peacefulness of democratic states or the dangers stood by democratizing states continue to be debated, the core dyadic proposition remains beyond dispute (Carothers 2002 & Ikenberry 2003). Democratic peace theory still had its critics, primarily within the realist school of thought, but the theory continues to be developed and was becoming increasingly formalized within the rational choice framework. Empirical evidence linking democracy to civil peace and conflict resolution really encouraged. This theory effects for the democracy from the effects of economic development, and to establish types of democratic practices and institutions make for enduring peace and stability in the aftermath of civil war.

It was clear that democratic governance was generally conducive to the resolution of both civil and international conflict and the spread of democracy was good for international society as a whole, for the security of democratic states in particular, and for the peoples residing in war-torn regions of the globe, to promote democratic reform in domestic and international peace (Carothers 2002 & Ikenberry 2003). The major ideological challenge to representative democracy and market capitalism brought with it a greater willingness to discuss the use of military force as a means of collapsing authoritarian regimes, with the expectation that democratization, while good for those liberated from dictatorial rule, also generates positive externalities for regional and international security. Pushing democratic reform was universally democratic aspiration that has encouraged some to be more forthright in recommending the use of military means to accelerate the historical forces driving the spread of democracy (Fukuyama 2006).

Multilateral operations like those mounted by the United Nations, the more forceful ones included, seem to have a better track record than unilateral interventions. But peace-building and democratization were never easy, particularly after civil wars in societies divided along ethnic or religious lines on the determinants of success, (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), and even when military intervention were likely to succeed in bringing about a democratic transition and stable peace, it must be weighed against the direct costs in blood and treasure, as well as the opportunity costs of foregoing alternative peaceful methods of conflict resolution.

Field Theory

The study of conflict was important for a variety of reasons. Kurt Lewin, German-born American academics wrote extensively on the subject of conflict. The most important of his contributions to the study of conflict was field theory. Field theory may be characterized as a method of analyzing casual relations and building constructs. The basic elements of Lewin’s field theory included: (a) Psychological explanation of behavior. (b) Systematic causation instead of historical. (c) Consideration of total situation. (d) An approach characterized by dynamics. Lewin argue whether or not a particular event will lead to a conflict depends largely on the tension level or on the social atmosphere in the group (Kataria Pooja, 2007).

Key sources of tension in conflict settings included needs of satisfaction: “A need in the state of hunger means not only that a particular region within the person was under tension but also that a person as a whole is on a higher tension level. This holds particularly for basic needs, such as sex or security. Lewins work has grown tripartite typology of conflict. The first type was approach-approach situations. A second type of conflict was avoidance-avoidance, where two forces are both undesirable. The third type of conflict was termed approach-avoidance, where a person faces choices that comprise both positive and negative characteristics (Peter & Wallenstein, 2002). Lewins work was ultimately, of a very practical nature and meant so be applied to real situations. Thus, for lewins, there was a social responsibility that connected research with education. This clear bond between research, training and action has persisted in the study of conflict resolution.

The development of the conflict resolution as a specialist field of study was impossible without the contribution played by the field theory, which had provided different resolutions for the peace-building process and for the management of conflicts. The very prominent among the conflict resolution theorists were, Kenneth Boulding, John Galtung, John Burton, Adam Curle, Elise, George Simmel, Lewis Coser, Kurt Lewin, and Morton Deutsch etc. Conflict resolution is applicable over the whole spectrum of societal relationships, usually referred to as the three levels of: the personal, the local or the community, and the global. It could be located in a number of different disciplines including Psychology, Ethics, International relations, Sociology, Communications, Politics, Business and the law (Verlag Fur, 2004). Conflict Resolution is the basis for professional practice in numerous fields such as restorative justice, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building and alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

It could also provide useful practical skills in personal, professional or International settings. A number of reports from government and related agencies in recent years have made clear that Conflict resolution was increasingly seen by the executive branch of government as an efficient, effective, and economically attractive, “healing” and culturally responsive alternative to traditional court-based and legal models for setting disputes. A qualification in Conflict resolution could enhance your opportunities and provide you
with capabilities for careers in both the public and private sectors, for example in teaching and education, human resources, law, the health professions, local and central government (Miall Hugh, Rams Botham& Tom, 2002). The PAWSS activity codes suggest that the four main categories of graduate career activity are: research; activism and Lobbying; public education; and development work, intervention and relief services. Finally, it can be said that Conflict resolution has a vital role to play even in war zones, building peace in divided communities. It is an essential instrument of social justice and social transformation. It can be argued that Conflict resolution is an integral part of development, peace and cooperation it is such a mechanism, which paves a way towards prosperity, tolerance, world brotherhood and humanity (Verlag Fur, 2003). It is a weapon that protects succeeding generations and posterity from the onslaught and scourge of war.

**The Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework below shows the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. In this, conceptual framework was used in research to outline the possible courses of action or the preferred approach to an idea. The independent variables in the study were; regional stakeholder interests, power competition among partner countries and the diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somalis, while the dependent variable was maintaining peace and stability.

![conceptual framework diagram](image-url)

**Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework.**

From the conceptual framework above, conflicting and divergent interest among regional partners may be as a result of unbenefiting regional stakeholder interests, power competition among partner countries and the diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somalis and inappropriate conflict resolution and peace building. The mentioned three factors were examined in detail to determine their relevance in contributing or being the “Factors Influencing the Regional Intervention in Somalia”.

**Stakeholders Interests and Regional Intervention**

The African Peace Support Mission in Somalia has been operating since 19 January 2007, when through the Resolution of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of African Union (AU) urged the deployment of troops with the purpose of providing an African response to the multifaceted security issues and imminent state collapse of Somalia. Even with efforts bloodshed and fighting was still going on in many parties of the country (Somalia). The limited resources that led to a significant number of casualties among soldiers still there, a general assessment of AMISOM reflects the AU-led Peace Support Operation (PSO) in the quest for the stability of the country was not implemented and succeeds (AU, 2007). The policy of eradicating the Al-Shabaab forces from the control of strategic areas in south central Somalia and the protection of key Government institutions and political figures were at a stake.

There was little political progress that has also been made in recent past like the launching of a new interim Constitution (Constitution, 2012), the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament 20 August 2012 and the swearing in of Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. These political events could be considered milestones in the stabilization of the country and they had engendered hope that such events could be the inception of a broader political process embracing the domestic stakeholders. However AMISOM and their regional and international supporters, responsible for carrying out the post-transitional state-building strategy, faced a number of constraints that have yet to be confronted and overcome, such as the necessity to defeat the well-rooted institutional legacy of corruption; the need to strengthen the weak and almost non-existent political institutional apparatus as well as its capacity and effectiveness in those areas controlled by the government and AMISOM and the necessity to deal with the complexity of clan-based politics that are preponderant in informal, local and self-governed structures of power (Benjamin, 2002).

AMISOM’s success partially depended on whether governmental structures were able to deliver much-needed public goods and services and provide stability and peace throughout liberated areas. At this stage, the immediate and most challenging goal for AMISOM was to figure out how the stabilization of the so-called “liberated areas” could be effectively achieved and maintained according to AMISOM’s scope and capacities. The AU understands “stabilization” as the multidimensional process of extending the administrative authority of the government, delivering public goods and services to the local population and supporting the reform of the security system (Benjamin, 2002). Bearing in mind that AMISOM and other Regional Stakeholders of Somalia peace building process were playing a supportive role, leaving the ownership of the process to the Government, AMISOM’s multidimensional peace-making strategy was based on two major approaches: a security-oriented approach, which was dependent on the enhancement of the security system and the continuing defeat of insurgents; and a politically-oriented approach, which is based on the promotion of good governance.

With the purpose of targeting those goals, the AMISOM Mission initially structured its deployment in terms of the Military, the Police and the Civilian components. AMISOM was seen in Somalia that time as being a tool of western interests because of Washington’s support for Ethiopia’s campaign and because of a strong diplomatic push by the Bush administration to get African states to contribute troops to the mission. Many Somalis were outraged that the United States had openly provided intelligence support to Ethiopia during its operations, and engaged in airstrikes on Somali soil (Brons, 2001).
Secondly, The AU’s short record of peacekeeping provided little evidence to suggest that it would be able to find, deploy, manage or pay the 8000 troops authorized to form AMISOM. Sure enough, the AU struggled to secure promises of just over 60% of the authorized troops. In practice, approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops were the sum total of AMISOM until December 2007 when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived. AMISOM had around 4,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi (AMISOM, 2009). Nor could the AU pay for its own peacekeeping mission. Instead, it relied on funds from the U.S., UN, the European Union and several other states. Deploying them also proved impossible without Western assistance and when they were deployed they lacked crucial pieces of equipment and material (UN, 2008). Thirdly, the conflict environment that instead of bringing peace and stability to Somalia by installing the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu brought only a significant deterioration in the security situation and a renewed phase of warfare. In this context, arguably AMISOM’s most fundamental challenge was how to act as a peacekeeping operation when there was no peace to keep.

Within the AU, the weight of opinion was clearly to hand over the mission to the UN; the sooner the better. But in the UN Security Council there were good reasons to be cautious (UN, 2007). For instance, Ban Ki-moon had said that deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia was ‘neither realistic nor viable’. A year later, however, the Bush administration pushed for a UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia. It soon discovered that there was no appetite for such a force among European and African powers. The furthest it got was resolution 1863 (UN, 2009) which expressed the Security Council’s “intent” to establish a UN peacekeeping operation “as a follow-on force to AMISOM (UN, 2009). With Barrack Obama’s arrival in the White House, however, the U.S. government began to adopt a more cautious stance.

The report on the modalities of such a transition, Ban Ki-Moon set out four options intended to help achieve the UN’s strategic objective in Somalia. The “high-risk” Option A, envisaged replacing AMISOM with a 22,500 strong UN peacekeeping operation with a Chapter VII mandate. The “pragmatic” Option B was for the UN to devise a support package for AMISOM until the Somali National Security Force could secure Mogadishu on its own. The “prudent” Option C was Option B plus a UN Political Office for Somalia and a UN Support Office for AMISOM within Mogadishu. Option D, “Engagement with no international security presence,” was intended to serve as a contingency plan in case of an AMISOM withdrawal (UN, 2009). The Secretary-General has advocated an “incremental” approach, divided into three phases: Phase 1 would entail adopting Option B; during Phase 2, Option C would be practiced; and during Phase 3, it would be appropriate to enact Option A. Option D would remain the contingency plan in case of AMISOM withdrawal.

The immediate and most challenging goal for AMISOM, with its limited scope and capacities, is to achieve and maintain effective stabilization of the liberated areas. Somalia is still partially controlled by Al-Shabaab militias that operate under different logics of power. Thus, the Somali government, which is receiving support of the Somali National Security Force (SNSF) and AMISOM, is faced with a social reality in which its legitimacy needs to be fortified throughout the country. AMISOM is operating in a stabilization phase, in a social reality categorized by the UN as too dangerous for the deployment of UN troops (AU, 2012). The UN has provided strategic, technical and financial support to AMISOM; however, helping it to carry out its mission and partnership has entailed implications in AMISOM’s decision-making process.

There was also the geographical proximity as a factor to make an assessment on Somalia’s immediate neighbors in the Horn of Africa. The roles and intensions of four of its neighboring states, Ethiopia, Eritrea (though never shares border with Somalia), Djibouti and Kenya are topics for discussion.

Ethiopia was one of the most important neighboring states for Somalia in many respects. It thus assumes to have several reasons for engagement in Somalia’s politics. This raises an eyebrow with many political analysts in the horn region. One good reason from the perspective of Ethiopia is the long and historical conflict-prone relations the two countries had since the late 1970s. They were at war with each other in 1977/1978 caused by the aggression of Somalia against Ethiopia. The latter has always been unwelcoming to see in the foreseeable future a potentially aggressive neighbor in case a strong Somali state comes into existence. This was particularly true in as long as there were still claims by Somalia’s political forces over Ogaden (Ethiopia’s Somali region), which seems not to be abandoned.

The second justification was the fear that Somalia may ferment unrest among ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia due to the fact that Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federalism can be put in danger. As most analysts argue out of its regions, the so-called ‘Somali region’ or region zone five remains marginalized from Ethiopian politics and government’s repression has been quite criticized for being severe. As a result there was a fertile ground for any Somali attempts to instigate conflict inside that region and most likely in a form of call for struggle to ensure Muslim rights, perhaps even by proclaiming Jihad, as did the UIC.

Eritrea is another important country whenever Somalia’s conflict situation is mentioned. The incumbent regime in Eritrea has no real stake in the Somali conflict. But it seemed that Eritrea’s roles could be analyzed from the perspective of its hostile relationship with the incumbent regime in Ethiopia. This drives Eritrea’s behavior vis-à-vis Somalia. Eritrea secured its political independence after thirty years of armed struggle against regimes in Ethiopia till 1991. After overthrowing the communist dictator in Ethiopia together with the incumbent regime in Ethiopia which the latter officially recognized Eritrea’s independence and seemed to create a fertile ground for a new era in the relationships which was almost successful but gradually started to deteriorate till a full-scale border war broke out in the years1998-2000 between the two countries (Moller, 2009).

Since then rather than resuming direct warfare, both seemed to opt for waging proxy wars against each other and one of the main battlefields being Somalia. While Ethiopia supports the TFG, it becomes clear that Eritrea opted for helping initially the UIC and later the ARS-A wing. It was clear that Eritrea does not seem to have neither religious nor ideological affinity with the Islamist forces of Somalia. But it was argued that still Eritrea has been providing the remnants of the UIC with both the right to establish base-like facilities on its territory as well as with arms which both the UN and the US could not welcome it (ibid).

Djibouti in relative terms, compared to Ethiopia and Eritrea which in one way or the other seem to have been strongly engaged in Somali conflict, the roles and motives of this country was not as such very significant as the above two. For instance, Djibouti, likewise Ethiopia was a target of irredentist Somali national project. But there was no real animosity between Somalia and Djibouti. The small country
tries to play a role of a broker in hosting conferences devoted to Somali-state building and the most recent reconciliation between the TFG and the factions of the ARS-A which did not boycott the event in August 2008 (Mollor, 2009).

Kenya exceptionally, has been perceived as an anchor of stability in the region. Its roles have been less crucial albeit receiving a large number of Somali refugees and becoming still target for Somali irredentism. It had in general terms pursued a multilateral track in connivance with sub-regional arrangements particularly the IGAD. More so, Kenya was in has been in collaboration with the US by helping to close the border with Somalia apprehending people suspected of being aligned with ‘terrorists’ by the Washington (or Ethiopia). Of late Kenya has also been accused of wanting to illegally explore offshore natural resources that lie in the Somalia waters. This has caused an uproar in the Somali polity and resulted in a court case in the international maritime authorities in which Somalia is a complaint. A negotiation of out of court case is yet to yield fruits.

Power Competition among partners and Regional Intervention

The conflict resolution responses of IGAD and AU were effective in the first stage conflict resolution approaches, mediating for negotiations to sign peace agreements. In this regard, IGAD in collaboration with AU were able to bring representatives of various clan leaders into a forum of negotiation and to sign binding peace agreements. It has been more effective in bringing the conflicting parties into negotiations to sign more than fifteen peace agreements. However, their responses were significantly failed in the implementation and consolidation stages of conflict resolution approaches due to several factors. For instance, one of the potential problems to the implementation of the peace agreements was absence of government institutions that enforce law and order and handle complex security situation in Somalia. IGAD, rather than implementing the terms of the peace agreements, was striving to establish governmental institutions, which could maintain peaceful political situation for the implementation of the terms of the agreement (Adam, 2003).

Multiplication of political factions, absence of commitment and consensus among the major political players in the country also obstructed IGAD’S and AU’s efforts in implementing the agreements. Thirdly, absence of commitment and sustainable support from the international community has also been a great hindrance for the implementation of the peace processes. Fourthly, persistent divisions and disagreements among IGAD member states and also the intervention of regional and extra-regional actors before and during the agreement were the other setbacks of the implementation of the peace processes. These problems coupled with the intense financial constraints made the implementations and consolidation of the peace processes difficult. Generally, the conflict resolution responses of IGAD and AU have brought establishment of the central government with no effective institutions, through democratic process (Cornwell, 2009).

The end of the Cold War brought a rapid growth in quantity of UN activities in Africa. Soon after unsuccessful withdrawal from Somalia and failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda led to the retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa. Major Powers in the UNSC retreated from their initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for engagement in African conflicts. Simultaneously, a debate about possible increased cooperation with regional organizations emerged. Interventions by African countries in conflicts outside the UN or AU frameworks have been observed. More importantly, such interventions by individual states have occurred side by side with internationally mandated missions in two central theatres of armed conflict: Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both are the centerpieces of a regional conflict formation with non-state armed groups, but also state forces operating across borders on a regular basis (Civins, 2008).

In Somalia, the establishment of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) was meant to replace Ethiopian military involvement, but the neighbor’s forces have repeatedly intervened after an official withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenya directly intervened in Somalia after October 2011 and got approval from the AU later, followed by the plan to incorporate Kenyan forces into AMISOM (Memar Ayalew Demek, 2014).

Political analysts argue that perceived interferences by some frontline states in the Somali Peace Process, contributed to unnecessary tension and mistrust between the TFG and the ICU. Because both sides used to claim the involvement of external players and countries in providing military and other support to one side or the other. While the TFG claims that there are international terrorist within the ICU with support from some countries including Eritrea; the ICU on the other hand alleges the deployment of Ethiopian forces is in support of the TFG.

Diverse goodwill of partners versus the Somali and Regional Intervention

The handover from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the Federal Government in August 2012 was generally seen as a positive development and an opportunity for this leadership to create credible national institutions in partnership with the international community (African Development Bank, 2013). The leadership underwent a notable change at this time; signifying a break with the past. The government was internationally recognized and its installment indicated an influx or arrival of returnees, new business, and diplomatic relations. International recognition gave it legitimacy and access to resources, although its actual authority does not extend far outside Mogadishu. Hammond suggested to expand control to rural areas which are currently under Al-Shabaab, the SFG should negotiate individual alliances with local authorities and militias, which seemed to have worked for the TFG (Hammond, 2013).

The EC and DFID fund an organization called Safer World to run three non-state actor platforms, in south-central, Somaliland and Puntland, which has produced a series of consultations with civil society and CSO representation to the UN and other international bodies; this has increased the visibility of civil society in policy (Safer World, 2011a). Safer world’s program has highlighted that Somalis feel excluded from decision-making and policy processes, which are generally run by external actors, and that civil society was a growing forum for real participation (Safer world, 2011b). The Non-State Actors Platforms provide a structure with which the international community can engage (Safer world, 2011b). This program has been diffidently effective in increasing CSO capacity, developing coalitions and CSO networks and a common voice, increasing representation of marginalized groups and the emergence of new voices, and increasing legitimacy for local organizations (The EU Somalia Unit and DFID, 2012: 21-23).

The conflict resolution responses of IGAD and AU to the Somalia crises have been greatly affected by the complex nature of the Somalia politics. Many scholars who studied the politics of the country came to a conclusion that the Somali
politics is complex and hinders conflict resolution responses due to several factors. First, it is complex in that the Somali politics is fragmented across clan lines and competition among major clan groups for political supremacy and control of economic resources have complicated the hope for achieving sustainable peace and economic development as well as the establishment of central government. In the political landscape of Somalia, clan plays an important role being a factor of political organization and has been an instrument for getting the monopoly of legitimate use of violence. Second, the perception and hatred of the Somali people towards a centralized authority is also the other factor that complicated the political dynamics of Somalia. Hence, it hinders the conflict resolution efforts of regional and international organizations (Anon, 2005).

It has been argued that the Somali people are more loyal to their clan leaders than the central government even for claiming physical security. As a result, they usually do not trust one political force assuming state power. This makes the process of peace building activities of IGAD and AU trivial. Third, the intervention of external powers in the Somali politics with different motivations and contradictory strategies in handling the crises has also been the challenging IGAD and AU in their conflict resolution efforts in Somalia. It limits its capacities to implement the terms of the agreement in consultation with the Somali people. In addition, uncoordinated and badly managed intervention of regional and international actors made the situation worse. They also supported one group against the other in order to sustain their interests rather than the common/public interest. Fourth, there have been clash of interests and persistent division among IGAD and AU member states in dealing with the kind of support that the Somali people to be provided with. Their supports to the Somali people various depending on their national interests (Adam H. M 2002).

Regional Intervention

Peace-building is an intervention that was designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace. When the community integration and stability of state is not certain it is obvious that conflict arises. Peace making plays an important role in keeping society integrated and in maintaining legitimacy within the state. Intervention believes it is positive system and has direct effects on the processes of nation and state building. Intervention is to make peace and state restoration. It creates a lot of projects that people among conflicts may get job opportunities and also it reduces mass unemployment and poverty in the country.

3. Methodology

This study follows descriptive research design. It is cross-sectional both quantitative and qualitative in nature. In analytical research, the researcher used facts or information already available, and analyzed them to make a critical evaluation of the material (Mugenda, 2003). It was a cross-sectional survey because the researcher examined many people at same time.

The target population of this study was 145 people of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other members affiliated to the Somali politics in peace building. The AMISOM included AU political office in Somalia, members of AMISOM operation Departments, members of lead operation officials, members of civil experts working with AMISOM mission and members of the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) support to the AMISOM mission. These population was suitable for this study because they were most relevant and knowledgeable about Somalia’s peace maintenance and stability.

4. Research Findings

Descriptive Analysis

The total number of the respondents of this study were 106. All questionnaires were distributed and all completed questionnaires received to ensure an adequate analysis of all research questions. In this study, 106 questionnaires were filled and collected which represented 73% of target population (145).

Stakeholders’ Interests

The study was conducted in Mogadishu, in the AU, UNSOM and AMISOM- base in Somalia, and were asked some questions about how Stakeholders’ interests can effect on regional intervention in Somalia. This section evaluates the first variable of stakeholder’s interest in regional intervention in Somalia. The table below illustrates the response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable One: Stakeholders’ Interests</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Stand. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Are the neighbouring countries who are in the forefront of fighting Al-Shabaab really willing to eradicate this menace with the dedication, commitment and honesty?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do you think the coming back of a stable and strong Somalia as a country with its legitimate and fully fledged functioning institutions will be a threat to some stakeholders in the region?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do you agree the irredentism principle of agitating for a greater Somalia including parts of Ethiopia and Kenya is downplaying and influencing the coming back of the Somali state to its feet?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>0.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>If stakeholder’s interests are not complied with, the desired outcome of Somalia’s ‘state and peace building in regards to the AMISOM intervention will likely face major hurdles in achieving its goals?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>0.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Do you agree that current diverse stakeholders’ interest has positive impact on the performance of the AMISOM mission in Somalia?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table 4.2 above demonstrated interpretation of variable one of the study, as follows: Q1. “Do you believe that the neighbouring countries who are in the forefront of fighting Al-Shabaab really willing to eradicate this menace with the dedication, commitment and honesty?” With mean score 3.71, and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “poor”. In Q2 “Do you think the coming back of a stable and strong Somalia as a country with its legitimate and fully fledged functioning institutions will be a threat to some stakeholders in the region?” The result of this question; mean score 3.63, the range of scale denoted that the response “poor”. In Q3 “Do you agree the irredentism principle of agitating for a greater Somalia including parts of Ethiopia and Kenya is downplaying and influencing the coming back of the Somali state to its feet?” The result of this question; mean score 3.59, the range of scale denoted that the response...
“poor”. In Q4 “Do you agree that If stakeholder’s interests are not complied with, the desired outcome of Somalia’s ‘state and peace building in regards to the AMISOM intervention will likely face major hurdles in achieving its goals?’ The result of this question; mean score 3.55, the range of scale denoted that the response “poor”. In Q5 “Do you agree that current diverse stakeholders’ interest has positive impact on the performance of the AMISOM mission in Somalia?” The result of this question; mean score 3.73, the range of scale denoted that the response “poor”.

In conclusion the mean index of this variable “Stakeholders’ interest on regional intervention” the extent of stakeholders’ interest as mean average 3.64 that its interpretation meaning was “poor” so this poor indicated that the stakeholders’ interest of Somalia partners is not in line with the objectives, it meant that poor cooperation of stakeholders may not encourage peace building and state building in the country.

Based on the result of the table 4.2 it is investigated the relationship between stakeholders’ interest and regional intervention, indicated that the stakeholders’ interest has strongly positive relationship with the regional intervention. That means if stakeholders’ interest is good or bad the regional intervention also takes same directions.

**Power Competition among Partner Countries**

This section displayed the second variable to evaluate the respondents’ answers about how power competition among partner countries effects on regional intervention in Somalia, the below table illustrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable two: Power Competition among Partner Countries</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do agree that bilateral intervention by different stakeholders has contributed to stabilizing Somalia positively?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do you agree Somalia has become a battle field for waging proxy wars against each other by power competing regional partners?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do you believe when there are some power broker countries who benefit from the peace building agenda of Somalia including hosting reconciliation state building can be effective?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Power and political competition among troops contributing countries in Somalia can lead to good performance delivery of the mandate of the African mission</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Do you believe when there a risk in power competition among the different partner countries intervening in Somalia mission can bring positive forward?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do you agree that the different motives and strategies of external actors involved in the peace making process in Somalia can encourage the social stability?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mean Index** 106 3.68 0.671

The table 4.3 demonstrated interpretation of variable two of the study, as follows: Q1 “Do agree that bilateral intervention by different stakeholders has contributed to stabilizing Somalia positively?” the result of this question; mean score 3.68, the range of scale denoted that the response was “poor”. In Q2 “Do you agree Somalia has become a battle field for waging proxy wars against each other by power competing regional partners?” The result of this question; mean score 3.70 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “poor”. In Q3, “Do you believe when there are some power broker countries who benefit from the peace building agenda of Somalia including hosting reconciliation state building can be effective?” The result of this question; mean score 3.72 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “poor”. In Q4, “Do you believe that power and political competition among troops contributing countries in Somalia can lead to good performance delivery of the mandate of the African mission”. The result of this question; mean score 3.77 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “poor”. In Q5, “Do you believe in your opinion there is risk in power competition among the different partner countries intervening in Somalia?” The result of this question; mean score 3.58 and the range of scale represented that the respondent answered “good”.

In conclusion the mean index of this variable “power competition among partner countries” the degree of power competition as mean average 3.68 that its interpretation meaning was “poor” so this indicated that power competition can effect regional intervention in Somalia. Based on the result of the table 4.3 it investigated the relationship between power competition among partner countries and Somalia regional intervention, so the result obtained indicated that power competition has strongly positive relationship with the regional intervention. This means if partner collaboration is good or poor the regional intervention also takes same directions.

**Diverse Goodwill of Regional Partners versus the Somali populace**

In this section, the third variable was looked into and the respondents’ answers about how diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali people effects on regional intervention in Somalia, is illustrated in the below table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable Three: Diverse Goodwill of Regional Partners versus the Somali Populace</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do you agree some members of the Somali community are war-profiteers, driven by their own interest and desires and are obstructing the performance of the African Mission in Somalia in stabilizing the country?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Decreasing popularity of the war profiteers among the general Somali populace has to success in AMISOM’s mandate?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is a general feeling that the country is ran by external actors including donors from the west and European countries.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Do you think the AMISOM intervention caused unnecessary deaths and displacement, and that it also resulted cultural and human rights violations?</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Some scholars predict that the Somali politics is complex and the people are divided along clan lines and groups for political supremacy and resource control.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mean Index** 106 1.41 0.670
The table 4.4 demonstrated interpretation of variable three of the study, as follows: Q1 “Do you agree some members of the Somali community are war-profiteers, driven by their own interest and desires and are obstructing the performance of the African Mission in Somalia in stabilizing the country?”, the result of this question; mean score 1.48, the range of scale denoted that the response was “good”. In Q2 “Decreasing popularity of the war profiteers among the general Somali populace has to success in AMISOM’s mandate?” The result of this question; mean score 1.47 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “good”. In Q3, “Do you believe when there is a general feeling that the country is ran by external actors including donors from the west and European countries” The result of this question; mean score 1.45 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “good”. In Q4, “Do you think the AMISOM intervention caused unnecessary deaths and displacement, and that it also resulted cultural and human rights violations?” The result of this question; mean score 1.28 and the range of scale signified that the respondent answered “good”. In Q5, “Do you believe that some scholars predict that the Somali politics is complex and the people are divided along clan lines and groups for political supremacy and resource control” The result of this question; mean score 1.41 and the range of scale represented that the respondent answered “good”. The result of this question; mean score 1.24 and the range of scale represented that the respondent answered “agreed”. This means the respondents confirmed to the assertions in the questionnaires.

Regression Analysis

In the research study, used a regression analysis as to test factors influencing regional intervention in Somalia as dependent variable by measuring the stakeholders’ interest, power competition partner countries and diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali populace as independent variables. Researcher applied this method the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) to measure multiple regressions of the study. Coefficient of determination explains the extent to which changes in the dependent variable can be explained by the change in the independent variables that means all the independent variables can be influencing factors with dependent variable.

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.769*</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>.491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), Diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali populace, Stakeholders’ interest, Power competition among partner countries

In order to test research questions, a standard multiple regression analysis was conducted regional intervention as the dependent variable and the three factors influencing regional intervention: stakeholders’ interest, power competition among partner countries and diverse goodwill of regional partners versus Somali populace as the predicting variables. Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 present the regression results. From the model summary in table 4.5, it is clear that the $R^2$ was 0.592 indicating that the combination stakeholders’ interest, power competition among partner countries and diverse goodwill of regional partners and Somali populace explained a 59.2% of variation in regional intervention in Somalia.

ANOVA

Table 4.6. ANOVA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35.570</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.857</td>
<td>49.256</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>24.553</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60.123</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), Diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali populace, Stakeholders’ interest, Power competition among partner countries

b. Dependent Variable: Regional Intervention in Somalia

The table 4.6 From the ANOVA statistics shown in table, the processed data, is the population parameters that its significance level is 0.000% which indicates that the data is ideal for making a conclusion on the population’s parameter as the value of significance (p-value) is less than 1%. The F critical level of significance calculated 49.2. This shows that the overall model was significant.

Regression Coefficient

Table 4.7. Regression coefficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Constant)</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.842</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders’ interest</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power competition among partner countries</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali populace</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: Regional Intervention in Somalia

Table 4.6 presents the regression results on how stakeholders’ interest, power competition and diverse goodwill influence regional intervention in Somalia. The multiple regression equation was that: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \varepsilon$ and the multiple regression equation became: $Y = 1.206 + 0.129X_1 + 0.462X_2 + 0.245X_3 + \varepsilon$. As depicted in table 4.6, there was a positive and significant influence of stakeholders’ interest on regional intervention ($\beta = 0.028; t = 2.842; p < 0.05$). There was a positive significant influence of power competition on regional intervention ($\beta = 0.27; t = 1.783; p < 0.05$). There was also a positive and significant influence of diverse goodwill on regional intervention ($\beta = 0.025; t = 0.378; p < 0.05$). Also indicates that stakeholders’ interest, power competition and diverse goodwill are the most effective and enhanced factors of regional intervention of Somalia. Therefore the model would change to:

$Y = 1.206 + 0.129X_1 + 0.462X_2 + 0.245X_3 + \varepsilon$

4.6.4 Correlation Coefficient

Table 4.8 presents correlation coefficient result which was analyzed the relationship between independent variable of the study “stakeholders’ interest, power competition among partner countries and diverse goodwill of regional partners versus the Somali populace” the result of this analysis showed that these influencing factors were significant and have positive relationship.
There are number of issues that remain to be dealt with. These issues reflect two closely related dimensions: the contextual and the structural dimensions. The contextual dimension refers to issues that have emerged from the recent political and security situation in Somalia. The intervention of external powers in the Somalia politics with different motivations and contradictory strategies in handling the crises has also been stressed. It limits its capacities to implement the terms of the agreement in consultation with the Somali people.

6. Recommendations

1. The lack of centralized strategy among the actors of Somalia conflict resolution ad peace building will not lead to the attainment of the overall objective of the mission. It is therefore imperative to develop a central strategy that guides the operations of mission so as to achieve the mandate of the mission.

2. The study recommends that the mission of peacekeeping and relevant stakeholders should have strong vision and mission with clear priorities. This will of course be possible if conflict resolution and peacebuilding actors are willing to establish positive framework to realize an actual positive change.

3. Winning the hearts of the Somali people: The regional stakeholders drive in winning the hearts and minds of the communities is a key confidence building tool. The provision of service such as medical care water among other things to civilian population is critical in demonstrating the goal of the mission. Building, gaining and maintaining public confidence is critical in the fight against Al-shabab. This is because the militia group is adopting and waging an asymmetric warfare that can only be won with the support of the Somali population.

4. Liberation and Effective Control of Occupied Areas: Together with the Somali National Security Forces AMISOM should not relent in its drive to liberate areas still occupied by al-Shabaab. Once liberated these areas should be effectively controlled to prevent the potential incursion of the vanquished militants. Better and sustained training of the national security forces as well as their upkeep and welfare are paramount as the exit strategy of AMISOM will effectively depend on the capacity of these forces to take over and maintain the security in the country.

5. Building the Capacity of the Somali Police: AMISOM should enhance its support to the Somali Police Force and facilitate its transformation into a credible law enforcement component.

6. Legitimacy of the Federal Government: AMISOM, in collaboration with the central government, should continue to engage with the existing local structures and dynamics in promoting national reconciliation processes. In this sense, enhanced coordination and clear demarcation of responsibilities amongst all the regional stakeholders in the intervention process is important in order to minimize friction among them and for purposes of efficient and effective use of resources.

7. Regulation and Standard of Operations: There should be official regulation and standard of operation which guides the management of operations to avoid over-lap of activities in adjacent sectoral operations.

8. Effective Investigations on Amisom Personnel: Effective investigation of allegations of serious misconduct by AMISOM personnel, and adopting disciplinary measures in line with the missions code of conduct, the hosting countries laws and the international regulations.
7. Areas for Further Research

This study used quantitative and qualitative approaches as a research method of collecting primary data and objectivity of the questions that had effect on the overall results of the study. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches might produce significant results. Secondly, based on small sample size and limited respondents in Mogadishu mission’s base may affect the quality of research, therefore adding other relevant areas like sector two (Kismayu), sector three (Baidoa), sector four (Beledweyne) might generate a more significant results that finally would contribute to the huge reliability of the research findings.

References

AMISOM. (2009 ). AMISOM WEEKLY REPORT.
Gent, S. E. (2003). Instability, Intervention, and Inter-Power Politics.. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester.
UN. (2009). DEEPENING PEACE AND REDUCING POVERTY.