Mitigating selfishness in mobile ad hoc networks
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ABSTRACT
Mobile ad-hoc networks have become very popular because of their widespread usage. Cooperation among the nodes in ad-hoc networks is an important issue for communication to be possible. But some nodes do not cooperate in communication and saves their energy. These nodes are called as selfish nodes. In the literature there are many methods which deal with the selfish behavior of nodes. This paper compares different methods available for reducing the effect of selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks.

Introduction
The emerging mobile ad hoc networking technology seeks to provide users “anytime” and “anywhere” services in a potentially large infrastructure less wireless network, based on the collaboration among individual network nodes. The routers are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network’s wireless topology may change rapidly and unpredictably. In such a dynamic environment routing the packets reliably to the destination becomes a critical issue. All the nodes in an ad-hoc network acts as a router and cooperate among themselves for proper functioning of the network. It is assumed that all the nodes that participate in the network will do forwarding and routing in favor of other nodes. But this assumption does not work in all cases. Sometimes the nodes agree to forward, but fail to do because they want to save their battery power and CPU cycles. They just keep receiving the data destined to them, and drop the data of other nodes without forwarding or routing them, which reduces the throughput of the network. These nodes are called as Selfish nodes. They are classified under misbehaving nodes.

There is another class of nodes which intentionally drop data, forward to different destination or misroute the data etc. They are called as malicious nodes. This paper deals with only selfish nodes. Selfishness can be handled in two ways. One way is to punish the nodes for being selfish.

Another way is to reward the nodes for not selfish. There are many approaches in the literature which follows either the first of the second method. This paper discusses the methods for mitigating the effect of selfishness and organized as follows. Next section gives overview of approaches for handling selfish nodes.

Credit based Methods
Credit based methods are also called as incentive based methods. In these methods selfish nodes are not punished instead unselfish nodes are rewarded for helping other nodes. This stimulates the cooperation of nodes in the network. This section discusses some of the credit based systems in the literature.

Secure Incentive Protocol
Yanchao Zhang et al [1] inherited much of the features from [2] and [3]. This approach assumes that each mobile node (MN) has a tamper-proof security module such as SIM cards in GSM networks, which deals with security related functions and each intermediate node (IN) puts non-forged stamps on the forwarded packets as a proof of forwarding. Secure Incentive Protocol, (SIP) uses “credits” as the incentives to stimulate packet forwarding. For this purpose, each smartcard has a credit counter (CC) which is pre-charged with a certain amount of credits before shipped out. The charging and rewarding on a node is done by decreasing or increasing the CC in that node. And the CC will retain its value even when the MN is power off. When the MN is power-on again, it could still reuse the credits in the CC even in another SIP-enabled ad hoc network. To guarantee the security of SIP, each smartcard contains a private number and a public number (keys). The nodes have no knowledge about the keys stored in the smartcard and could not change CC in an unauthorized way either. SIP is session-based and mainly consists of three phases. During the first Session initialization phase, a session initiator (SI) negotiates session keys and other information with a session responder (SR) and INs between them. And each IN puts a non-forged stamp on each data packet forwarded and SI/SR collect those stamps for later rewarding use in the next Data forwarding phase. The final phase is Rewarding phase, in which each IN is awarded a certain number of credits based on the number of forwarded packets. Advantages of this method are 1. SIP is routing-independent in the sense that it could coexist with any on-demand unicast routing protocol such as DSR and AODV. 2. SIP is session based rather than packet based. 3. Security module is tamper proof and hence unauthorized access is not allowed. But the problem with this approach is, it needs every node to possess the hardware module and SIP is implemented in the hardware.
module. Hardware module will not be available in the already existing mobile nodes.

Stimulating Cooperation in Self Organizing MANETs

L. Buttauan et al [3] focuses on packet forwarding and they address the problem of stimulating co-operation in self organizing Mobile Ad-hoc Networks for civilian applications. This approach uses a tamper resistant hardware module called “security module”. This security module maintains a nuglet counter. When the node forwards a packet for the benefit of other nodes, the nuglet counter is increased by one, when it sends its own data the counter is decremented by one. Every node has to maintain a +ve counter value in order to send its own data. The nuglet counter is protected from illegitimate manipulations by the tamper resistance of the security module. This approach ensures that the misbehavior is not beneficial and hence it should occur rarely only. But the availability of hardware module is not guaranteed in general.

Sprite

Sprite, was proposed by Zhong et al. in [4]. In Sprite, nodes keep receipts of the received/forwarded messages. When they have a fast connection to a Credit Clearance Service (CCS), they report all these receipts. The CCS then decides the charge and credit for the reporting nodes. In the network architecture of Sprite, the CCS is assumed to be reachable through the use of Internet, limiting the utility of Sprite.

Identifying and isolating Selfish nodes

This section explains methods that are used for punishing the selfish nodes. Selfish nodes are identified and isolated from the network. They are stopped from using the network services. Most of the approaches in the literature are following punishing system rather than rewarding system.

Watch Dog and Path Rater

S. Marti et al [5] addresses the problem of nodes agreeing to forward packets of other nodes but fail to forward. This describes two mechanisms to improve the throughput of the network. One mechanism is the watchdog, which identifies the misbehaving node by monitoring the nearby nodes whether they forward the packets of other nodes in the network. The other mechanism is the path rater that defines the best route by avoiding those misbehaving nodes. Since this approach tries to avoid the misbehaving nodes for routing, there’s less chance of dropping packets, thus providing a better throughput even in the presence of high number of misbehaving nodes. But this approach does not isolate the misbehaving nodes; they still utilize the network services, i.e. the nodes are not punished for misbehaving.

Core

Michiardi and Molva [6] proposed a Collaborative Reputation (CORE) mechanism that also has a watchdog component for monitoring. Here the reputation value is used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual isolation of a node. Reputation values are obtained by regarding nodes as requesters and providers, and comparing the expected result to the actually obtained result of a request. In CORE the reputation value ranges from positive (+) through null (0) to negative (-). The advantage of this method is that having a positive to negative range allows good behavior to be rewarded and bad behavior to be punished. This method gives more importance to the past behavior and hence tolerant to sporadically bad behavior, e.g. battery failure. But the assumption that past behavior to be indicative of the future behavior may make the nodes to build up credit and then start behaving selfishly.

Confidant

CONFIDANT [7] collects evidence from direct experiences and recommendations. Trust relationships are established between nodes based on collected evidence trust decisions are made based on this relationships. There are four interdependent modules: (a) monitor, (b) reputation system, (c) path manager, and (d) trust manager. Monitor collects evidence by monitoring the transmission of a neighbor after forwarding a packet to the neighbor. It then reports to the reputation system only if the collected evidence represents a malicious behavior. Reputation system changes the rating for a node if the evidence collected for a node’s malicious behavior exceeds the pre-defined threshold value. Then, path manager makes a decision to delete the malicious node from the path. Also path manager assists the node in making decision such as whether to forward a received packet by checking the upstream node’s identity (previous-hop) in the blacklist. Trust manager is responsible for forwarding and receiving recommendations to and from trustworthy nodes. Here recommendations are known as ALARM messages and trustworthy nodes are referred as friends. The ALARM messages received from friends are evaluated for trustworthiness before being sent to the reputation system. Trust manager assists in making trust decisions for the following, whether to: (a) provide and accept routing information, (b) accept a node as a part of route, and (c) take part in a route originated by some other node. CONFIDANT proves to show better network performance in presence of malicious nodes compared to DSR protocol.

Cache scheme to detect Selfish nodes

Hongxun Liu et al [8] proposed a hardware assisted detection scheme is proposed and evaluated. In this scheme, the hardware can detect the misbehavior conducted by the selfish nodes. Selfish node either drops all the packets not related to it or drops the data packets only. Upon detecting the misbehavior, the hardware will report the misbehaving node (itself) to other nodes. The other nodes will use the information received to protect the network. In this scheme, there is a separation between software and hardware inside a single mobile node. The software could be misbehaving, but the hardware is tamper resistant and is the cornerstone of building trust relationship among mobile nodes. Here the focus is on the detection of misbehaving node dropping packet. There are two kinds of packet dropping conducted by the misbehaving nodes, simple dropping and selective dropping. In simple dropping, the misbehaving nodes will drop all the packets not to or from them; while in selective dropping, the misbehaving nodes will only drop data packets not to or from them while forwarding the control packets, such as route request, route reply, etc. There are four counters used in the cache based detection scheme: TC (Total Counter), DC (Drop Counter), TDC (Total Data Counter) and DDC (Data Drop Counter). The first two counters are used to detect simple dropping while TDC and DDC are used to detect selective dropping. TC is used to record the total number of unique packets received, while DC is used to record how many unique packets are dropped by this node. TDC is used to record how many data packets are received by the node while DDC records the number of data packets dropped. Another timer is added to improve the detection performance. The timer is used to give additional penalty if a node doesn't forward a route request. The penalty timer (PeT) is started when an original route request is received. If the node doesn't forward the route request during the period of PeT, an extra penalty is added.
to DC. PeT is only started when an original route request is received. A duplicate route request will not initiate PeT. The cache unit inside the detection hardware can tell if a received route request is original or duplicate. The authors also argue that the cache scheme can detect the misbehaving nodes accurately in terms of detection effectiveness and false positive in both the simple dropping and the selective dropping scenarios. Also only minor changes are needed in the software layer. But still it is a hardware based approach. Thus it has its own practical difficulty in implementation.

Acknowledgement Based Schemes

ACK Scheme over DSR

Kejun Liu et al [9] considers only packet forwarding misbehavior. When a node forwards data packet success fully over the next hop, the destination node of next hop will send back a special two hop acknowledgement called 2ACK. This method works along with DSR[10] protocol. There are many disadvantages in this approach. This paper does not address what happens when a 2ACK got lost or dropped by a malicious node, or what happens if a malicious node sends the 2ACK packet without forwarding the data packets. i.e the node does not forward the data packet, but it simply sends 2ACK which act as an acknowledgement for the 2 hop neighbor.

ACK Scheme over AODV Protocol

T.V Sundararajan et al [11] proposes a method which also follows 2ACK scheme but works on AODV [10] protocol. It follows the same concepts of 2ACK scheme. But the acknowledgements will anyway increase the overhead in the network. Also there are chances for false positives. i.e a well behaving node may be considered as misbehaving. This paper does not deal with loss of acknowledgements.(2ACKs).

Improved Acknowledgement Based Scheme to detect packet dropping attack

Aishwarya Sagar et al [12] classify selfish nodes into 3 types as in [13]. (i.e. SN1, SN2 and SN3). SN1 nodes take participation in the route discovery and route maintenance phases but refuses to forward data packets to save its resources. SN2 nodes neither participate in the route discovery phase nor in data-forwarding phase. Instead they use their resource only for transmissions of their own packets. SN3 nodes behave properly if its energy level lies between full energy-level E and certain threshold T1.

They behave like node of type SN2 if energy level lies between threshold T1 and another threshold T2 and if energy level falls below T2, they behave like node of type SN1. Here each node maintains a LIST which consists of ID of every data packets sent or forwarded. After forwarding data packet to the next hop along the active route, LNode of every group will make an entry of forwarded data packet in the LIST and wait for ACK-1 and ACK-2 packet which are sent from RNode of first set and RNode of second set respectively. Also ACK-1 and ACK-2 packet must be received within time T1 and T2 respectively.

There are 3 steps. 1. Detection of malicious group - Before identifying malicious or misbehaving node, network should be aware that some malicious activity is present or not. Identification of particular misbehaving node- Based on whether the acknowledgement is received within the time limit or not. 3. Isolation and mitigation of misbehaving node –by avoiding the detected misbehaving node and updating LIST of misbehaving nodes. A comparison with other acknowledgement based scheme is available in [12]

A Robust Approach to Detect and Prevent Network Layer Attacks

The algorithm designed in [14] mainly identifies four attacks parallely namely, packet eavesdropping, message tampering, black hole attack and gray hole attack. These attacks are identified by setting different threshold values to the ratio Cmisd/Cpkt where Cmisd represents number of packets lost and Cpkt is the number of packets sent. If the ratio calculated exceeds the limit of tolerance threshold value 20%, then the link is said to be misbehaving otherwise properly behaving. Parallely using the ratio value, the corresponding attacks will be identified. The algorithm looks simple but setting up the threshold value to 20% or any other percentage needs further clarifications.

Methods based on routing protocols

There are some approaches which identify and isolate misbehaving nodes by modifying the existing routing protocols for ad hoc networks. This section discusses some of those approaches.

Extended DSR

V. Narasimha Raghavan et al [15] modified the existing Dynamic Source Routing protocol based on the extent of friendship between the nodes to make the nodes to co-operate in an ad hoc environment. Here a node classifies its neighbors as a stranger – if there was no communication between them, acquaintance – communicated for some time or a friend- if communicated several times. Based on this classification trust level is established as “no trust, low trust or high trust”. Each node maintains a friendship table showing the relationship of one node with its neighbors. When a node wants to communicate with other node, route request is sent as a broadcast to all its neighbors. Route reply obtained from its neighbor is sorted by trust ratings. The source selects the most trusted path. If it’s one hop neighbor node is a friend, then that path is chosen for message transfer. If a node is found to be selfish its packets are not forwarded thus isolating the selfish nodes from the network.

Trust based Secure Routing Protocol

Houssein Hallani and Seyed A. Shahrrestani [16] proposed a fuzzy based trust model for nodes. This approach works on AODV routing protocol. Fuzzy logic helps to quantify trust between nodes in ad hoc networks. This paper addresses the following problems. Packets dropped, wrong forwarding, fabrication and replay attacks. This evaluation model is a Mamdani type with four input and one output variables. The elements of a fuzzy set are mapped by membership functions to a value, which defines the degree to which a fuzzy variable is a member of a set. The membership functions $\mu(P)$, $\mu(WF)$, $\mu(F)$, $\mu(RA)$, $\mu(T)$, map the input variables, packet_dropped, wrong_forwarding, fabrication and replay_ attack, and the output variable, trust_level, into the interval (0,1) respectively. After applying the fuzzy trust evaluation model each node will have a trust level. Each node is assumed to be able to evaluate the trust level of each of its neighboring nodes based on the information regarding the behavior history of these nodes. These trust levels are then used to determine the most appropriate route between S and D. But this approach is specific for AODV [17]. Also, mapping the trust level using fuzzy trust evaluation model itself is energy consuming.

Local Detection of Selfish nodes

Bo Wang et al [18] in their paper used a finite state machine model of locally observed AODV actions to build up a statistical
description of the behavior of each neighbor. They applied a series of well known statistical tests to features derived from this description to partition the set neighboring nodes into a cooperative and selfish class. This approach detects both route request drops and route reply drops by the selfish nodes. Selfish behavior is distinguished from cooperative behavior by comparing the statistical behavior of neighbors across multiple local routing instances.

**Conclusion**

This paper discussed several approaches for dealing with selfish nodes. Selfish nodes are a real problem for ad hoc networks since they affect the network throughput. Many approaches are available in the literature. But no approach provides a solid solution to the selfish nodes problem. The Credit based approach provides incentives to the well behaving nodes and just by passes the selfish nodes in selecting a route to the destination. But selfish node still enjoys services without cooperating with others. The detection and isolation mechanism isolates the selfish nodes so that they don’t receive any services from the network. Thus penalizing selfish nodes. But what happens if many nodes become selfish? Network communication itself will become impossible. Thus we cannot eliminate all the selfish nodes from the network. A new method to reduce the effect of selfishness and stimulating the nodes to cooperate in the network services should be developed. The overhead in achieving this should also be less. Because we should remember that after all we are dealing with battery operated devices.

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